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INTRODUCTION 
The poll tax occupies a unique place in Virginia's 
suffrage history. Basically a twentieth century device 
ostensibly originated to provide revenue for the state 
by requiring payment of a fee before the exercise of the 
franchise, there was probably no other practice quite as 
foreign to the expanding suffrage traditions of Virginia's 
history as the poll tax. The only precursor to this tax 
was a capitation tax levied intermittently, the first 
such tax appearing in 1623 in the form of a levy of ten 
pounds of tobacco to meet the debt arising from defenses 
against local Indians. Free Negroes and whites were 
required by law to pay a capitation tax until 1787. In 
1813, a capitation tax on all free Negroes and mulattoes 
not bound out as apprentices was imposed in an effort 
to pressure the state's black population to either become 
~pprentices or leave Virginia. By 1816, the tax was 
·abo-lished, not to appear again until 1850 when another 
tax was imposed on free Negroes between the ages of 
twenty-one and fifty-five to finance the colonization 
then underway in Liberia. During 1860, an eighty cent 
capitation tax on all free male Negroes and whites 
twenty-one years of age and over was imposed. The 
following year, the discriminatory 1850 act was repealed, 
thus making capitation taxes uniform for whites and 
i 
Negroes. Starting in 1876, a poll tax as a prerequisite 
I 
to voting was levied in the state, but with the introduc-
tion of the Readjuster regime, the tax was removed, not 
having produced the anticipated revenues and not having 
become an effective controlling device. 1 Thus when the 
new state constitution of 1902 containing a poll tax 
2 
provision, among other franchise restricting features, was 
~reclaimed, the state was making a departure from its 
historical traditions of taxation and of a legally 
unrestricted franchise. There was little solid evidence 
b_ey_ond_ conjecture as to whether the results would be 
those that were desired. 
In chronicling the political history of the poll 
tax from its adoption until 1950, it becomes evident that 
~-t _is a story of two different views of government and of 
the degree of participatory democracy allowed by each. 
It must be admitted that most arguments did not reach 
such an abstract plane of discussion, often being nothing 
more than a demagogic appeal to the fears and prejudices 
_ _ ~Tipton R. Snavely, The Taxation of Negroes in 
Virginia ("University of Virginia Phelps-Stokes Fellowship 
Papers," No. 3: Charlottesville, Va., 1916), pp. 9-14. 
Hereafter cited as Snavely, Taxation of Negroes. 
3 
of the electorate. But even in these instances, a 
careful examination of the argument reveals the views 
of popular participation held by the speaker. This can 
be illustrated by reference to two statements of position 
delivered at a time when the poll tax was gaining increased 
attention. 
In May, 1939, Wilbur C~ Hall, chairman of the State 
Conservative Commission and an intimate member of the 
state.political organization directed by Senator Harry F. 
Byrd; delivered a speech over radio station WRVA in 
Richmond outlining the reasons for retention of the poll 
tax ·as a prerequisite to voting.. The state constitutional 
convention of 1902, Hall said, had as its main objective 
-
the purification of Virginia elections. The great evils 
then existing had come to the state as a result of 
Reconstruction and a period of unlimited suffrage, which 
allowed "hundreds of thousands" of Negroes without 
education or political training to vote. The sole purpose 
of the convention became the elimination of the Negro from 
the electorate, putting politics again on a decent footing. 
All-this resulted, he thought, in an immediate benefit 
for-Virginia. Scandalous practices ceased, political 
s~~ility replaced instability, the tone of public affairs 
~x,:nproved, and tendencies of a "dangerously radical nature" 
disappeared. Most important to Hall was the fact that 
Virginia politicians and officeholders had shown "a 
fine sense of honor and loyalty" as a result of the 
changes instituted in 1902. 2 
Aligned against the forces of order in this 
picture of political bliss was a liberal element of the 
population that desired to allow the looting of the 
state by "irresponsible, non-tax-paying voters" who 
would return Virginia to the system that had existed 
before the constitution of 1902. To Hall this meant 
4 
that government would be turned over to the "most ignorant 
and irresponsible elements in the community," that taxes 
would be levied by people who paid no taxes, opening the 
doors of extravagance and waste and making those that 
proposed such programs "more dangerous than the carpet-
baggers of the reconstruction period. 113 
Implicit in these statements by Hall is the belief 
that in order to be a responsible, intelligent voter, a 
person had to have a financial stake in the government 
that governed him. A sign of this stake and a way of 
showing one's interest in the community and a sense of 
___ 
2
n 'Retention of the Capitation Tax as a Pre-
requisite to Voting,' An Address Delivered by Wilbur C. 
l!all Over Radio Station WRVA, Richmond, Virginia, May 3, 
Ig39;" pp. 1-2, Westmoreland Davis Papers, University of 
Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va. Hereafter cited 
as Davis Papers. Hall ignored the fact that a limited 
electorate was also more manageable. 
3
rbid., pp. 3-6. 
civic responsibility was the payment of a small poll tax 
in advance of an election. Therefore, the suffrage 
\ 
system of Virginia was perfectly democratic in Hali,l' s 
I 
view, and the tax requirement seemed "a reasonable enough 
precaution against ignorance and irresponsibility. 114 
In contrast to the views expressed by Hall are 
those of tax repeal leader, Francis P. Miller, a member 
5 
of the House of Delegates during the 1938 and 1940 sessions 
and an active anti-Byrd man for the rest of his life. In 
December, 1938, he addressed the Richmond Public Forum 
on the question of retention of the poll tax. Miller 
reminded his audience of the history of the suffrage in 
~i_rginia, and while acknowledging the widespread corruption 
characteristic of Reconstruction Virginia that led to the 
~doption of the new constitution in 1902, Miller declared 
that Virginians now lived in a different age with circum-
stances changed, which made it essential to reconsider 
the constitutional requirements regarding the suffrage in 
relation to the principles in which the democrat believes. 
For his-own part, Miller said that he was a believer in 
the d_e_m_?_C::E_C:t~~ _ ~~ory of suffrage and sovereigni ty, 
requiring him to reject all theories that imply that some 
<Jl='OUps should rule while other groups be ruled. The people 
- - 4 . 
- - Ibid., p. 5. 
as a whole, therefore, constituted the sovereign and every 
literate adult should exercise the right of suffrage as 
evidence of his membership in the body politic. While 
the circumstances of history prohibited the realization of 
the-pure democratic theory, the permanent goal of a 
5 democratic society should be universal adult suffrage. 
6 
The distinct division of views exemplified by Hall 
and Miller were not always maintained during the controversy 
over the poll tax. Miller represented the minority opinion 
but-was influential in forcing the exposure of the 
illogical defense of the system. Hall, on the other hand, 
voiced the opinions of the majority of the Byrd organiza-
tion in Virginia which was using its efforts to maintain 
the existing suffrage system. 6 
- - --It is obvious from the two preceeding statements 
by the opposing sides in the poll tax debate that it was 
not a statistician's argument. In the first place, it 
was difficult to obtain accurate figures of qualified 
5111 The Poll Tax and the Suffrage,' Speech of Francis 
P. Miller at the Richmond Public Forum, Monday evening, 
Dec. 19, 1938," box 95, Francis P. Miller Papers, University 
of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter 
cited as Hiller Papers. Although both Miller's and Hall's 
statements are from the late 1930's, a similar division of 
views was present in 1902. 
~----~P~~ especially the letter of John s. Barbour to 
Francis P. h11-ler to which Barbour attached a copy of Hall's 
radio remark.= and stated, "This address so nearly covers 
my views on the subject that I am taking the liberty of 
submitting it to you •••• " Barbour to Miller, Jun. 8, 1939, 
ibid. 
7 
voters from which to draw indisputable conclusions. 
Separate lists were maintained for poll tax payments 
and for registered voters. The situation was complicated 
further by the fact that many people paid the poll tax 
-_but failed to register, or registered to vote but failed 
_to pay the tax. Therefore, this study has avoided 
dependence upon poll tax statistics, and when such 
:statistics appear during the debates on the subject, 
_they are at best rough estimates. 
- This study concerns the political and legal aspects 
of the poll tax in Virginia's suffrage history. Since the 
Virginia Negro was the object of the constitutional 
_provisions adopted in 1902, attention is also given to 
the effects of the poll tax on the Negro and his efforts 
to regain a voice in politics. Other historians have 
examined the poll tax and its effect on the South as a 
whole and its relation to such things as changing economic 
conditions and its influence on the Negro population of 
_the re_~:!-:<?_I1 ~ ?_ _ _ _ _ 
The opposition to Virginia's poll tax, cormnencing 
_eyen before the adoption of the new state constitution in 
--- - - -
7see Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, 
Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York, 1966); 
Fredric D. Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South (University, 
:Al_a., 1958); v.o. Key, Southern Politics in State and 
Nation (New York, 1949), pp. 578-618, hereafter cited as 
Key, Southern Politics. 
1902, continued until the adoption of Federal legislation 
in the form of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964. By 
1950, however, the most important debates over the: poll 
1, 
I 
tax had come to an end. Especially after 1954, when the 
Old Dominion entered a period dominated by the doctrines 
of interposition and massive resistance, it became 
8 
virtually impossible to raise the issue of poll tax reform 
to any level of calm and logical debate. The half century 
upon which this study focuses reveals an aspect of one of 
the most persistent debates in American history, the true 
relationship between the public and its government. 
CHAPTER I 
FORMING A LIMITED ELECTORATE, 1890-1902 
"Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we 
propose; that, exactly, is what this Convention was 
elected for," Carter Glass told the delegates to the 
Virginia constitutional convention in Richmond during 
1902. He was speaking in favor of a proposed suffrage 
article for the constitution that would become the basis 
for voting in the Old Dominion for more than fifty years. 
Glass, and the majority of other members of the conven-
tion, believed that the plan before them would "eliminate 
the darkey as a political factor" in the state in less 
than five years, bringing "purified" politics and a 
strengthened public service.I The efforts by Glass and 
his fellow politicians to remove Virginia blacks from the 
political process were the culmination of years of 
lReport of the Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, State of Virginia, Held in the 
City of Richmond June 12, 1901 to June 26, 1902 (2 vols; 
Richmond, 1906), II, pp. 3076-3077. Hereafter cited as 
Debates of the Convention. 
10 
discrimination and disfranchisement. The convention did 
not bring into being a new policy but merely gave the sane-
tion of law to an already existing set of standards. 
DEMOCHACY IN THE OLD DOMINION 
The process of disfranchising the Negro had been 
under way since the Conservatives, or Democrats, gained 
control of the state government from the Radicals. In 
1874, the Underwood Constitution was amended to give the 
legislature the power to determine the form of city 
government, a maneuver designed to assure white control 
of cities in the black belt of the state. The constitu-
tion was again amended in 1876. To the list of offenses 
for which a person was excluded from voting was added 
petit larceny, an offense considered to be common among 
Negroes. A poll tax was also instituted, but its effect 
was limited since the tax could be paid any time prior to 
voting.2 In 1882, after the Readjuster party under the 
direction of William Mahone gained control of state poli-
tics, the poll tax was removed, but the supervision of 
2william D. Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion, 
Virginia Farm Politics, 1885-1900 (Richmond, 1935}, p. 
53. 
elections was centralized and control maintained 
i 
through the electoral boards that appointed judges of 
elections.3 \ 
In Virginia, and throughout the South, further 
legal attempts at disfranchisement were delayed during 
11 
the 1880's. There existed the fear that agrarian inter-
ests and emerging Populists would seize control of state 
constitutional conventions and write new organic laws 
that would be compatible with their own views. As long 
as there were two strong political elements within a 
state, the Negro became an important element in plans for 
victory and was wooed for an ally. The defeated Lodge 
Force Bill, which would have provided for Federal super-
vision of Congressional elections, also demonstrated that 
Congress was capable of action against Southern trans-
gressions of Negro rights.4 Perhaps most important in 
Virginia was the fear among Democrats that a Republican 
3constitution of Virginia, 1876, Art. III, sec. I, 
par. 3,--and Art. V, sec. 23. 
4~_.Y._an Woodward, Origins of the New South, vol IX 
of A History of the South, ed. Wendell H. Stephenson and 
E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton Rouge, 1951), p. 322~ 
Hereafter cited as Woodward, Origins of the New South. 
12 
controlled Congress would not seat state representatives 
because of fraud and the throwing out of the Negro vote 
in elections.5 The Negro, therefore, remained a poten-
tial threat in state politics unless some legal means 
could be devised to eliminate his vote. The memories of 
Mahoneism reminded Virginians that ambitious politicians 
could easily use the Negro vote. 
- : •· c ---In order to legally remove the Negro from the polit-
ical process, the Underwood Constitution would have to be 
amended. Article three, section one, of this constitu-
tion enfranchised every twenty-one year old male citizen 
of :the United States who had been a resident of the state 
for one year. Section three of the same article offered 
those who desired to be rid of the Negro vote a method 
for effecting such a change. This section provided that 
in 1888, and each twentieth year thereafter and at any 
time.the General Assembly might provide by law, the ques-
tio_!l ___ of --~al~i_ng -~ constitutional convention should be 
presentedto_the qualified voters. Such a proposal was 
presented to the electorate in 1888 but was defeated by a 
-- --5charles E. Wynes, Race Relations in Virginia, 1870-
1902 (Charlottesville, 1961), p. 55. Hereafter cited as 
Wynes, Race Relations in Virginia. 
13 
vote of 63,125 to 3,698.6 Neither Republicans nor 
Democrats made an issue of the call for a convention. 
The Republicans opposed a convention because they saw 
nothing to gain. The Democrats feared the return of 
Mahoneism if any attempt was made to alter the constitu-
tion.7. 
After 1888 the Negro vote ceased to be a determin-
ing factor in state elections due to the emergence of a 
powerful Democratic party, but remained an excuse for 
·~a _constant source of election frauds, trickery and irri-
tation that threatened to corrupt the whole body politic 
of the Commonwealth."8 The spectre of Negro domination 
was paraded before those who criticized these corrupt 
practices. As one observer remarked, "That many other-
wise honest, upright and respectable men believed the end 
of Negro disfranchisement justified the means used to 
6nebates of the Convention, I, p. 211. 
- .. - · · ?Ralph c. McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention of 1901-1902 ("Johns Hopkins University Studies 
in Historical and Political Science," Ser. ILVI, No. 3; 
Baltimore, 1928}, p. 33. Hereafter cited as McDanel, 
~he.Yirginia Constitutional Convention. 
8Richard L. Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics, 
1865-1902 (Charlottesville, Va., 1919}, pp. 161-62. 
Hereafter cited as Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics. 
14 
obtain it cannot be doubted."9 By 1894 these election 
i 
frauds caused enough concern to result in the passage of 
. . d' . I the Walton Act in an attempt to improve con itions. 
Up to this time the state had operated under what 
was known as the Anderson-McCormick election law.10 This 
act provided for General Assembly selection of an elec-
toral board composed of three members for each county and 
city~in the state. The electoral boards were authorized 
to select all other election officials in their jurisdic-
tion. With a Democratic controlled legislature and the 
retention of the open ballot, partisan operation of the 
electoral boards was assured. In practice, each party 
supplied its own ballots to voters outside or inside 
polling places. Party workers could accompany voters to 
the ballot box to ensure that they voted correctly.11 
9McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention, 
p.- 33 ;---- - - - -- ----- . 
lOActs and Joint Resolutions Passed by the General 
Assembly of the State of Virginia, 1883-84, pp. 146-47. 
Hereafter cited as Acts of the General Assembly. 
:: _ . -~ _llwilliam C. Pendleton, Poli ti cal History of 
Appalachian Virginia (Dayton, Va., 1927), p. 374. Here-
after cited as Pendleton, Political History of 
Appalachian Virginia. 
15 
The Walton Act was designed to eliminate the 
fraudulent r:ractices under the Anderson-McCormick law and 
introduced a modified Australian ballot. The elector was 
to vote on a white paper ticket with the names of candi-
dates printed in black ink below the office they were 
running for. The voter was to deliver to the election 
judge a single ballot with lines drawn three-quarters of 
the way through the names not voted for and was allowed 
two and one-half minutes to mark his ballot. A special 
constable was appointed by the electoral board to assist 
those voters who were physically or educationally unable 
to mark their ballot. 
Special care was taken in regard to the ballots. 
In addition to the format specifications, the electoral 
board was to have the ballots printed. An oath of non-
disclosure was required of the printer. The board then 
counted and marked with its seal and sealed the ballots. 
Unused ballots were to be "carefully destroyed" before 
the ballot boxes were opened. 
An attempt was also made to make the electoral 
board more representative of the voting population. Pro-
vision was made for a minority election judge, but this 
feature was weakened by another provision of the act that 
16 
declared that no election could be voided if there was 
not a minority representative serving as an election 
judge. Willful failure to follow the provisions of the 
act was made a misdemeanor with a fine of $200.00 and 
imprisonment for one month.12 
The Walton Act has been variously interpreted. An 
analysis of Virginia government made in 1912 concluded that 
the act had been "a great improvement upon the old 
system. 11 13 However commendable the objective of the act 
may have been, its actual effect seems to have been sub-
verted by human nature and by fraud. The Walton Act re-
tained the electoral boards instituted under the Anderson-
McCormick law, thus insuring their control by partisan 
Democrats. During elections, the electoral judges invari-
ably supplied a Democratic constable to assist those 
voters physically or educationally unable to mark their 
ballots.14 Since the Republican party had proportionately 
12Acts of the General Assembly, 1894, pp. 862-67. 
13p. A. Magruder, Recent Administrations in Virginia 
("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Po-
litical Science," Ser. XXX, No. l; Baltimore, 1912), p. 
85. 
14Pendleton, Political History of Appa·lachian 
Virginia, p. 375. 
17 
a much larger following among poor illiterate whites than 
the Democratic party, the new ballot provisions caused a 
greater number of Republicans to lose their votes. 
Negroes were afraid to ask Democratic election judges 
for assistance; whites were timid or hesitant to admit 
their ignorance before their friends. The result was 
that many voters, both black and white, stayed away from 
the polls and those who did vote of ten found a confusing 
ballot which they were not able to mark correctly.15 
An attempt was made by the General Assembly in 1896 
to improve the Walton Act. The use of a constable had 
proved so unacceptable that he was removed from the poll-
ing place. The amended act provided that the judges of 
election, or a majority of them, appoint one of their 
number to assist electors physically or educationally 
unable to mark their ballots. The judge was to enter 
the booth with the voter, read the ballot to him, and 
point out those names the voter wished to strike out.16 
The amended law resulted in little change in elec-
tion practice. A review of contested election cases in 
15Morton, The Negro· ·in Virginia Politics, pp. 133-34. 
16Acts of the General Assembly, 1896, pp. 763-70. 
18 
the House of Representatives reveals that almost every 
conceivable election fraud was used in Virginia at this 
time. In an election of 1896 contested by Jacob Yost, 
the Republican candidate for the seat won by H. St. 
George Tucker, evidence was presented that ballots were 
prepared in such a manner that the names of candidates 
were alternated in position to avoid a "smart Republican" 
who would vote early and then instruct less intelligent 
voters on the manner of voting. Further evidence was 
present that Negro voters were given instruction in 
recognizing just one name, and the election was reversed 
and Tucker lost his seat.17 
There were numerous incidents of judges preparing 
ballots in James City, Princess Anne, Surry, and Warwick 
Counties. Democratic registrars refused to register 
Republican voters. An election judge in Isle of Wight 
County swore he allowed voters to vote improperly marked 
ballots. Another judge, when asked if he had read the 
Virginia election laws, replied, "Part of it - a very 
17u. s. Congress, House, House Reports, 54th Cong., 
1st Sess., No. 1636. 
19 
small part; I don't believe in law nohow. 11 18 Democratic 
registrars admitted that many names appearing on poll 
books were not upon registration lists. Residents testi-
fied that although their names appeared on poll lists, 
they had not voted. Poll lists were so clumsily composed 
that "they show numbers of persons whose names begin with 
A voting together, followed by numbers whose names begin 
with B and C, and so on throughout the alphabet. Dead 
men were voted, and men known to be absent in the service 
of the United States. 11 19 
Ab.use in the preparation of ballots is best illus-
trated by the highly contested election in the Ninth 
Congressional District between General James A. Walker 
and Congressman William F. Rhea in 1898. A Congressional 
investigation revealed that the ballots used were compli-
cated and unfair and that any intelligent person would 
have had difficulty marking them in the required two and ' 
one-half minutes. The ballot used in Scott County was 
singled out for its unfairness. This ballot has to be 
18Richard A. Wise v. William A. Young, ibid., 55th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 772. 
19Richard A. Wise v. William A. Young, ibid., 56th 
Cong., 1st Sess., No. 186. 
20 
seen to be believed, and description is difficult. On 
three newspaper type columns were listed the names of six 
candidates for President and Vice President, the names of 
the electors for each, their residences, the names of 
Walker and Rhea, followed by the titles of the offices 
for which they were candidates. No form, order, or 
arrangement is apparent, and the names of the Congressio-
nal candidates appear in unexpected positions. The in-
vestigating committee concluded that the ballots "were 
necessarily very misleading and confusing. 11 20 
When Governor Charles T. O'Ferrall addressed the 
General Assembly at the end of 1897, he recommended 
"material changes" in the election laws. While contend-
ing that elections had become quieter and more orderly 
and that opportunities to purchase votes had been mini-
mized, the Governor declared that existing legislation 
disfranchised many voters and opened wide the door for 
corruption and dishonesty. O'Ferrall offered as the best 
evidence for imperfections the "thousands" of improperly 
marked ballots that had been rejected and acknowledged 
that election judges had been appointed who were "so 
20nouse· Reports, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1504 ft 
21 
ignorant as not to be able to read or write." The Gover-
nor proposed the adoption of an ~mblem ballot which would 
\ be displayed in exact replica in the press and at the 
I 
polls prior to any election, a change that would have re-
duced the number of improperly marked ballots but would 
have done little to remedy the corruption and dishonesty 
O'Ferrall had discovered. Perhaps fortunately, the 
General Assembly took no action on his recommendations.21 
It is apparent that by the mid-nineties the Negro 
and many whites had been practically disfranchised by 
corrupt election practices.22 When the question of call-
ing a constitutional convention was put to the people in 
1897, it was once again rejected. 23 The defeat of the 
proposal can be attributed to Democratic confusion on the 
subject. There was no agreement within their ranks as to 
what changes in the constitution should be made, and 
opposition came from conservative Democrats who feared 
21Journal and Documents of the House 
the State of Virginia, 1897-98, pp. 39-40. 
as Journal of the House. 
of Delegates of 
Hereafter cited 
22Morton, The Negro in Virginia· Politics, p. 134. 
23nebates of the Convention, I, p. 211. The vote 
was 83,435 for, 38,326 against calling a convention. 
22 
that state Populists might try to gain control of a con-
vention and insert some of their more radical ideas. 24 
In addition, there was still the perplexing problem of 
devising a method of disfranchisement that would with-
stand the test of constitutionality necessitated by the 
14th and 15th Amendments. In 1890, Mississippi had pro-
duced a unique device to accomplish this end. The new 
constitution of the state required that a voter be twenty-
one years old, sane, and a resident of Mississippi for 
two years and of his district for one year; he must not 
have been convicted of certain crimes, including theft 
and bigamy; he was required to pay a two-dollar poll tax 
eight months before elections; and he must be able to 
read a passage from the state constitution or understand 
it when read to him or give a reasonable interpretation 
of it.25 Lack of any provisions for bipartisan or bi-
racial representation on registration boards opened oppor-
tunities for discrimination. Mississippi's plan opened 
the door for disfranchisement of the Negro. South 
Carolina and Louisiana quickly adopted constitutions with 
24The· Times (Richmond, Va.), Feb. 6, 1900. 
25woodward,· Ori·gin·s of the New south, p. 322. 
23 
similar provisions, but it was not until 1898 that there 
was assurance the Mississippi plan would pass the test of 
constitutionality. 
The Supreme Court in 1898 upheld the voting pro-
visions of Mississippi's constitution. 26 To restrict 
voting to those who are literate is within the power of 
the state, the Court said, and voting was thus subject to 
the state's definition of literacy. It was not shown to 
the Court's satisfaction that color played any part in 
the administration of the Mississippi tests. The Court's 
decision in Williams v •. Mississippi marked the end of an 
era of disfranchisement of the Negro without sanction of 
law and opened the door to legal disfranchisement.27 
By the mid-nineties the Negro had been eliminated 
from the political process of Virginia by fraud, cheating 
and bribery, but by the close of the 1890's, the corrupt 
practices used against the Negro had caused serious prob-
lems for the Democrats. It was becoming increasingly 
evident that the Democrats in power would go to any length, 
26williams v. Missi·ssippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
27woodward,· Ori·gi·n·s· o·f the New south 1 p. 322. 
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even against fellow white Democrats, to maintain their 
position.28 The real threat to the state was seen by 
I 
those who viewed the evidence and results of contested 
I 
elections in the House of Representatives. From 1874 to 
1900 there were twenty contested elections from Virginia 
that reached the House. Sixteen of these cases dealt 
with alleged fraud. Eleven of the sixteen were decided 
by a Republican House and resulted in the seating of ·six 
Republicans.29 Early in 1900 the Richmond Times des-
cribed Virginia voters as countenancing election fraud to 
maintain white supremacy. But now the electorate, chaf-
ing under the system, had risen up to remove the pretext 
for fraud. "If the ignorant and vicious negro vote is 
the cause of corruption at the ballot box, then the cause 
must and shall be removed," a course more honorable and 
courageous and better for good government and public 
28wythe w. Holt, "The Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention of 1901-1902. A Reform Movement Which Lacked 
Substance," Virg·inia Magazine of History ·and Biography, 
LXXVI (Jan., 1968), 70-71. 
29chester H. Rowell,· A Historical and LegaT Digest 
. ·of Al"l the co·ntested Electi·on Cases in the House of 
Representatives of the United States· from the First to 
the Fifty-Sixth Congress, "1"789-1901 (Washington, 1901), 
passim. 
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morals than making a pretense of letting the Negro vote 
and then cheating him at the polls.30 
Undaunted by their defeats in 1888 and 1897, pro-
ponents of a constitutional convention continued to 
pressure for the meeting. With little opposition, the 
General Assembly passed a resolution in March, 1900, call-
ing for a vote on the convention in May of that year.31 
Although the Democratic State Convention endorsed the 
calling of the convention, there was opposition from 
Republicans who realized, like the Democrats, that d±s-
francisement of the Negro also meant disfranchisement of 
illiterate whites. 
In addition, opposition came from_ officeholders who 
feared elimination of their jobs as a result of changes 
in the constitution. Others feared the removal of the 
Negro would result in Republican political ascendancy in 
the state government. Some believed the Negro had been 
effectively removed and that there was no need for con-
stitutional revision, and there were many illiterate 
whites who feared being disfranchised despite Democratic 
30Editorial in The Times, Jan. 27, 1900. 
3·1Acts of the General Assembly, 1899-1900, p. 835. 
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assurances that such would not be the case.32 
To insure that the vote on the convention received 
the most favorable consideration, the General Assembly 
had provided that ballots be printed with only the words 
"For Constitutional Convention." All unmarked ballots 
were to be counted as a vote for the convention.33 The 
voter who favored the convention was therefore supplied 
with a ready-made ballot which he had only to deposit in 
the ballot box while those who opposed the convention 
were required to receive a ballot, enter a voting booth. 
and mark through it and then emerge to deposit the ballot 
in the presence of Democratic election officials, their 
friends and associates. This method of voting prompted 
one contemporary from the western section of the state to 
conclude that "the will of the white people of Virginia 
was against the convention, but their will was defeated 
by the [Democratic] Machine," and, once the convention 
32McDanel, The· Virginia Constitutional· Convention, 
pp. 13-15. The Democratic pledge is printed in Debates 
· of· the Convention, I, p. 99. 
33Acts· ·of· the· Gene·ral As·s·emhly, 1899-1900, p. 835. 
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assembled, this trick was condemned by Republican 
members. 34 
Despite the opposition aroused by the convention 
question, Democrats had the support of the Democratic 
press.35 The papers encouraged readers to vote for the 
convention and devoted large sections of their editions 
to the issues involved. Typical of the editorial comments 
is that of the Richmond Times shortly before the vote was 
to be taken. "Negro suffrage has become a curse to the 
South," the Times declared, and the time had come to 
remove the curse. The removal of the black was in the 
interest of both races, for it insured "peace and pure 
elections and good government." The paper revealed its 
conception of the duty of the white man to the Negro by 
declaring that "as he shows himself qualified he will be 
permitted to exercise the right of franchise. 11 36 While 
34pendleton, Poli ti·cal History of Appal'achian 
Virginia, p. 443; Debates of the Convention, I, p. 211; 
II I p. 3119. 
35Herrnan Horn, "The Growth and Development of the 
Democratic Party in Virginia Since 1890" {unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, Duke University, 
1949), pp. 59-60. Hereafter cited as Horn, "Growth of 
the Democratic Party." 
36Editorial in The· Times, May 8, 1900. 
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holding out the possibility for future Negro participat~on 
in the electoral process, the Times made it increasingly 
I 
difficult for a white Virginia politician to advocate the 
I 
black franchise. After a review of the report of the 
Committee on Reconstruction which recommended the 14th 
Amendment, the paper concluded "they recommended the en-
forcement of negro suffrage as a means of humiliating the 
Southern Whites" in order to bring them into "a condition 
of repentant submission. 1137 The persistence of such 
views opened the way for attacks on those who favored 
Negro voting or remained silent as carpetbaggers or 
scalawags, a label that no practical politician could 
endure. 
Although powerless to stop the movement toward the 
constitutional convention and disfranchisement, the black 
press in Richmond waged a vigorous campaign against the 
convention. The Richmond Planet, edited by John 
Mitchell, Jr., waged its crusade in an indirect manner by 
,_ 
indulging and catering to conservative Virginians for 
support, a tactic made necessary by Northern liberal 
37Edi torial in -ibid., Nov. 24, 1900 ·-
29 
indifference and Federal government neglect.38 The 
"scarecrow" of Negro domination, Mitchell charged, was 
being used to divert attention from the true purposes of 
the convention.39 The purposes, as Mitchell saw them, 
were the reduction of taxes for the rich, initiation of 
governmental reform to curtail corruption, revenge against 
a small but wealthy and independent segment of the Negro 
population, and degradation of the Negro. Mitchell 
rightly believed that if the Negro lost the vote, he 
would be denied the right to hold office. The next step 
was the denial of the right to labor and to earn money 
for his support.40 "That any man could believe that po-
litical rascality can be ended by the excuse of constitu-
tional rascality is a surprising thing to us," the Planet 
stated. "It is only polluting the source of all law and 
in this makes the situation worse instead of better. 11 41 
Mitchell's efforts and those of others opposed to 
38James H. Brewer, "Editorials from the Damned," 
Journal o·f southern Hi·story, XXVIII (May, 1962) , 225-226. 
39Editorial in· The· Pl"anet (Richmond, Va.), Apr. 28, 
1900. 
40Brewer, "Editorials from the Damned," 227-229. 
41Editorial in The· P-lan·et, Apr. 28, 1900. 
the calling of a convention were fruitless. When the 
votes were counted on May 23, the call for the c6nven-
I 
30 
tion was approved by a vote of 77 ,362 to 60,375.4:\2 The 
surprising aspect of the geographic distribution of votes 
was that the cities and black counties returned the 
majorities in favor of the convention that offset the 
anti-convention sentiment of the rural districts and 
white counties of the western section of the state. The 
pro-convention vote by the black counties is partially 
explained by the fact that Negro votes were simply not 
counted or that blacks were encouraged not to vote. 
Strong Republican feeling and the remains of sectional 
sentiment pushed the vote against the convention in the 
western part of the state. 43 It appears that the only 
real desire to disfranchise the Negro existed in the 
counties where he allegedly thre?.tened white control by 
his numbers, or offered an excuse for election fraud. 
The irregularities in voting procedures, the size of the 
42wynes,· Race· Re·lati·ons· in Virginia, p. 58; McDanel, 
The vi·rgin:ia Constitutional Convention, p. 16. 
43McDanel,· The· vi·rgin·ia· Constitutio·nal· Convention, 
p. 18. 
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vote, and the illogical nature of the returns led one 
historian to conclude that the constitutional convention 
I 
of 1902 "was not the result of public demand."44( 
I 
RECONSTRUCTING SUFFRAGE 
Delegates to the convention were not elected until 
May 29, 1901. Of the one hundred delegates chosen, 
eighty-eight were Democrats.45 Since the Democrats had 
made the calling of the convention for the express pur-
pose of removing the blacks from state politics a party 
issue, the course of the proceedings seemed set. The 
convention convened on June 12, 1901 and proceeded to the 
consideration of the problems before it, but it was not 
until late September that the Elective Franchise Commit-
tee submitted its proposals.46 
The Elective Franchise Committee was the most im-
portant of all the convention committees and had the 
most difficult task to perform. Among its twenty-two 
members were some of the leading politicians in the 
44wynes, Race Relati·o·n·s· i·n· vi·rginia, pp. 57-58, 62 .• 
. 45McDanel ,· The Virqi·ni·a· Con·stitllti·ona1· Conve·ntion, 
p. 19. 
46oebates of ·the· Convention, I, pp. 599-603, 620-
628. 
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Corcunonwealth. John W. Daniel was the chairman. Walter 
A. Watson, J. W. Wysor, Henry D. "Hal" Flood, Henry c. 
i 
I Stuart, and two Republicans, A. P. Gillespie of Tazewell 
I 
and Thomas L. Moore of Montgomery, were other leading 
figures whose task it was "to strike from the suffrage 
the alien and the enemy in Eastern Virginia and at the 
same time leave untouched the worthy but illiterate 
Anglo-Saxon of the mountain side and the west beyond. 11 47 
There was a wide divergence of opinion within the 
convention as to the purpose of the suffrage article. 
A. P. Thom, of Norfolk, expressed the view of many of 
the delegates from the counties with large Negro popula-
tions. The purpose of the article, in Thom's view, was 
not to secure white supremacy because Anglo-Saxons had 
the supremacy and would keep it regardless of the methods 
to which they might have to resort, but rather to remove 
the Negro completely from the electorate regardless of 
means and regardless of the number of poor whites that 
might be disfranchised.48 
Another group, led by Chairman Daniel and Carter 
47Ib·i· d., I 59 8 I p • • 
48Ibi' d., II · 2986 I p • • 
Glass, favored disfranchisement of sufficient Negroes to 
insure white supremacy, but did not want to disfranchise 
any whites. 49 The Rev. Richard Mcilwaine, of Prince 
Edward, and Judge Robertson, of Roanoke County, favored 
the disfranchisement of incapable whites as well as 
blacks. Mcilwaine introduced statistics to show that 
there were two and one-half times as many felonies per 
voter in the white Ninth District as in the black Fourth 
District, and advocated the elimination of the "ignorant 
33 
and vicious white element" of the western section as well 
50 
as the ignorant Negro in the eastern part of the state. 
Another group of Democrats from west of the Blue 
Ridge was satisfied with the conditions as they were, 
according to statements by J. B. Richmond of Lee and Scott 
counties and George B. Keezell from Rockingham. But this 
group was not opposed to disfranchising the Negro. They 
were willing to assist Eastern Virginia in ridding the 
state of the black vote as long as no whites were removed. 51 
Summers, of Washington County, and A. L. Pedigo, of Henry, 
expressing the Republican view, said that Negroes should 
52 have the right to vote. 
49
rbid., p. 3076. 
50
rbid., P. 2998. 
51
rbid., p. 3008. 
52
rbid., I, pp. 210, 213-214. 
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The Franchise Committee therefore divided into two 
general groups, according to Walter A. Watson. There were 
the "disfranchisers", like Watson, who were willing to 
"give up any and everything to disfranchise all the 
Negroes." The other group, "the whitewashers," were those 
members who would settle for less than total removal of 
the Negro from the electorate. 53 
With the committee divided along these lines, it 
is not surprising that both majority and minority suffrage 
reports were submitted to the convention. The primary 
conflict emerged as a question of the desirability of an 
"understanding clause." The majority report, submitted 
by Watson, maintained that such a provision was necessary 
to insure electorate purity, meaning the elimination of 
illiterates and the Negro, while the minority plan sub-
mitted by J. w. Wysor submitted that an understanding 
clause fairly administered would disfranchise thousands 
of whites and result in a property qualification for the 
54 
right of suffrage. One feature was present in both 
plans, however. Watson's prefatory explanation of the 
majority report stated the-assumption upon which this 
provision was based; experience had demonstrated that 
53walter A. Watson Diary, Feb. 7 and Mar. 21, 1902, 
Walter A. Watson Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Rich-
mond, Va. 
54 . . . . .. ··-··· -····· -· .. ·:. . 
Debates of the Convention, I, pp. 600-604. 
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those who participate in the government should contribute 
to its support. For that purpose, the report recommended 
the institution of a poll tax in the amount of one dollar 
and fifty cents, to be paid by those entitled to vote six 
months in advance of the election in which the voter 
intended to participate. The prepayment requirement 
was imposed in order to "prevent the corruption of the 
franchise by candidates for office on the eve of or during 
an election, and in order to confine the voting to those 
who value the privilege sufficiently to qualify themselves 
for it by their own individual and unaided act'! 5 ~. 
The minority report reflected similar reasoning. 
The only prerequisite imposed upon the voter under the 
Wysor plan was payment, six months in advance, of a poll 
tax. Wysor believed the amount of the tax should properly 
be determined by the Finance Conunittee, but he suggested 
an amount not in excess of one dollar and fifty cents. 
The tax was to serve a two-fold purpose~ it would provide 
revenue for the public schools and "purify and purge" the 
most "unworthy and trifling of that race" from the polls. 56 
That both plans required prepayment of the poll tax on 
the grounds it would prevent corruption in elections is 
55Ibid., p. 600. 
56 rbid., pp. 603-604. The Wysor plan also provided 
that no Negro was eligible for office in Virginia. 
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a not altogether startling admission of the part played 
by fraud in the elections that preceeded the conv~ntion. 
There seems to have been no disagreement as \to the 
I 
future distribution of funds collected from the poll tax. 
Use of these revenues to finance public education was a 
part of Virginia history, as it was in the history ·of 
other poll tax states. 57 Specifically, the report of the 
Finance Committee provided for the collection of a tax of 
one dollar and fifty cents per annum on every male resident 
over 21 years of age except pensioners of the state for 
military service. One dollar of the tax was to be used 
exclusively for the free public schools. The remainder 
was to be paid by the state into the treasury of the city 
or county from which it was collected. 58 It is not 
altogether apparent whether there was an "educational 
lobby" at work during the convention pursuing the enactment 
f th . . 1 . . 59 o is particu ar provision. Prior to 1876, sentiment 
57The Underwood Constitution of 1867-68 (Art. X, 
sec. 1 and 5) provided for equal and uniform taxes and a 
capitation tax of one dollar per year to be applied to aid 
public schools. Cities and counties were permitted a 
capitation tax of fifty cents to be used for all purposes. 
58
oehates of the Convention, I, p. 2646. 
59Frank B. Williams found pressure by educators was 
important in having revenues diverted to schools in his 
study of the poll tax in Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee 
and Kentucky. See, "The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement 
in the South, 1870-1901," Journal of Southern History, 
XVIII (Nov., 1952), 469-496. 
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was growing to make payment of the tax a precondition for 
voting because of a high delinquency rate in capitation 
payment and the need for more school revenue. 60 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction in his 
\ 
The 
i 
1873 
report recommended doubling the tax and making it a 
voting requirement. The possibility that candidates might 
buy votes by paying the poll tax was accepted by the 
Superintendent as an argument in favor of the measure 
since "a vote buying candidate would take other and 
worse means for securing votes if he did not do this. 1161 
The proposal was repeated in the school report of 1875, 
and given force by the discovery that revenue paid in the 
form of coupons from state bonds was diverted to payment 
of the state debt and not available for school financing. 62 
This was enough reason to assure passage in 1876 of the 
constitutional provision for payment of the tax as a 
precondition of voting. 
Joseph w. Southall, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction at the time of the 1901 convention, does not 
appear to have been as presumptuous as his predecessor. 
While not calling for any specific revenue producing 
60snavely, The Taxation of Negroes, p. 17. 
61Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
1873, (Richmond, 1874), p. 120. 
62I .. d 01. • , 1875, p. 124; Snavely, Taxation of Negroes, 
p. 18. 
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measures, Southall did reflect upon the situation of the 
Negro in the Virginia educational system. In 1899, the 
\ Superintendent estimated that the Negro cost the state 
I 
about one-half million dollars in excess of the amount 
of taxes paid into the treasury by him. "This is not 
an encouraging state of affairs," Southall concluded, 
offering no suggestion for the alleviation of the situation. 
As far as participation in government, Southall concluded 
"the granting of the elective franchise to these people 
without previous preparation was a colossal blunder, if 
not a crime." Evidently he was assured by a reading of 
the political picture of the time that the problems for 
state education would be corrected by the new constitution. 63 
Southall's concern over the proportion of funds 
collected from Virginia blacks and the money contributed 
by the state to their education surfaced during the 
debates of the constitutional convention and produced an 
almost unsolvable dilerrana. · Upon recorranendation of the 
Franchise Corranittee, the Finance Committee inserted a 
provision in its report that the capitation tax was not 
to be considered a lien or collectable by legal process 
from the personal property exempted from levy or distress 
63Re ort of the Su erintendent of Public Instruction, 
1898/1899, pp. XXXJ.V-XXXVJ.J.i ~· ,. 1900 1901, p. XJ.V. 
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under the poor debtors law. 64 The provision was obviously 
designed to further discourage payment of the tax by 
\ Negroes. Collection of delinquent capitation taxe~ had 
always been a problem. 65 One method used to force 
I 
collection was the placing of a lien upon personal 
property, but to continue such a practice would have 
worked against other provisions designed to remove the 
black as completely as possible from the political process, 
resulting in more'rather than fewer Negroes qualified to 
vote. By removing the threat of forced collection, the 
~egro would find no compulsion to pay the poll tax. The 
premise was, of course, that the exemption would work in 
favor of the white population. 
Support came from those msmbers who desired to 
strengthen the franchise provisions. Other members of 
the convention supported the measure because they felt 
forced collection by levy was not a democratic principle. 
John c. Summers of Washington County related that he had 
seen nwomen barefooted, children barefooted, old men 
tottering with age, and these little despicable collectors 
64oebates of the Convention, II, p. 2862. The poor 
law exempted such items as a pair of horses, a mule, a 
wagon, or a small house and its furniture, meal and flour, 
amounting in value to not less than $150.00. 
65 see chart in Appendix A. 
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come round and levy upon the last thing in God' s earth 
they have. 1166 ! 
I 
Opponents to the exemption provision were vocal, 
1 
and on March 5, 1902, T. W. Harrison of Fredrick County 
introduced an amendment to remove the exemption from the 
taxation article. Echoing the complaint of Superintendent 
Southall, Harrison noted that in 1899 the Negro paid 
$65,000 in capitation taxes while drawing from the 
Treasury over $250,000 in funds for education. To allow 
for non-payment would remove the largest source of revenue 
going to Negro public education and shift the burden of 
educating the Negro in large measure to the white popula-
tion. 67 After stating his opposition to the payment of a 
capitation tax as a precondition of voting, Henry D. Flood 
voiced the resentment that the people of his section of 
Virginia felt. "They are tired of seeing their taxes 
appropriated to run negro schools," the Campbell County 
delegate said, "and of having non6 of those taxes gotten 
out of the negroes, except a paltry sum, beyond what comes 
from the capitation tax. 1168 Other delegates questioned 
the intended result of the exemption provision, foreseeing 
that once the Negro realized that the provisions for 
66oebates of the Convention, II, p. 2650. 
67rbid., 2860-61. 
68 rbid., pp. 2863-64. 
prepayment were aimed at him, he would simply shift the 
burden of the tax to the candidate who was willing to 
pay it, thus opening the way for a greater chance of 
fraud. 69 
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The convention was clearly on the verge of a dead-
:lock over the purpose of the exemption provision. The 
delegates were being asked to view the section of the 
taxation article as a supplement to the franchise pro-
visions of the constitution. To the majority of the 
Franchise Committee, exemption from payment by levy or 
distress reenforced other measures to disfranchise the 
Negro. But the revenue qollected from the tax was to be 
used to support the public schools, and by not enforcing 
collection, the burden of support was shifted to the 
white population, a burden that Flood's comments indicate 
was not altogether welcome. The problem was that the 
section could not be considered as both a revenue measure 
and a franchise measure. 
When the question was put to the convention, the 
Harrison amendment was defeated by a vote of 46 to 21. 70 
The majority of the delegates realized the inconsistency 
69rbid., p. 2862, remarks by O'Flaherty, and p. 
2878, remarks by Kendall. 
7oibid., p. 2866. 
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of enforcing the prepayment provisions and then collect-
ing the delinquent taxes, thus in effect extending the 
period of time during which the poll tax could be paid 
and offsetting the disfranchising result desired. 71 The 
vote on this amendment also demonstrated the delegates 
rejected the contention made by some members that the 
Negro would always pay his poll tax whether payment was 
compulsory or voluntary. The rates of delinquency cited 
during the consideration of the amendment bolstered the 
hope that voluntary payment would increase the rate of 
delinquency among the Negro population. 
The convention still faced the problem of the 
black-belt counties that believed a disproportionate 
share of the school taxes they paid went to the support 
of Negro schools. In order to relieve the situation, 
the delegate from Dinwiddie, B. J. Epes, introduced an 
amendment to section six of the taxation article requir-
ing the Negro to pay "a more equitable proportion of the 
burdens of the public school system, and of local ex-
penses·. ·11 The provision provided that the General 
Assembly could authorize county boards of supervisors or 
city councils to levy an additional capitation tax of 
not more than one dollar per year which would be applied 
71. See Meredith's comments, ibid., pp. 2864-65. 
The black-belt counties were the south central Virginia 
counties. 
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to the aid of public schools, or whatever other purposes 
should be determined. 72 
I 
The Epes provision was enthusiastically su~ported 
I 
I 
by delegates from the black-belt counties. Rev. Richard 
Mcilwaine, Hampden-Sydney professor and delegate from 
Prince Edward, declared, "There is a great need of an 
amount ••• for school purposes, and if it can be gotten 
with the consent of the people, it seems to me that no 
movement could be carried through that would be more 
fraught with good. 1173 Some support also came from the 
western part of the state. Roanoke delegate William J. 
Robertson believed there were two reasons why the amend-
ment was a good one; the people of the black-belt had a 
legitimate cause of complaint that would be relieved by 
the amendment, and the amendment would inject the tax 
question into every local election campaign. Robertson 
submitted that the tax issue was just the issue needed by 
th 1 f V. . . 74 e· peop e o irginia. 
There was resistance to this concession to the 
black-belt counties from delegates who believed that the 
additional tax would disqualify as many, if not more, 
whites as colored voters. Even though in favor of a 
72
rbid., p. 2867. 
73
rbid., p. 2872. 
7flrbia:-•. :,. P. 2 86 9. 
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capitation tax to disqualify white elements who "ought 
to be disqualified," R. L. Gordon of Louisa was certain 
that the tax would not disqualify any considerable number 
of blacks in his section of Virginia. In the opinion of 
Gordon and other delegates who opposed the additional 
tax, "if $1.50 does not keep a man from voting, $2.50 will 
not keep him from voting." The man who was willing to pay 
the amount imposed by the state to vote "is going to pay 
whatever tax is necessary in order to permit him to ex-
ercise that right. 1175 
The vote on this amendment reveals that the conven-
tion recognized a concession was necessary to satisfy the 
black-belt counties on the school funding issue. By a 
vote of 44 to 27, the additional tax provision was 
adopted. 76 Besides Gordon, A. L. Pedigo from Henry 
County and J. M. Hooker from Patrick County, opposition 
came from the western and valley sections of Virginia, 
the area of Republican strength and a comparatively 
sparse Negro population. 
No other amendments were added to the section of 
the taxation article dealing with the poll tax, although 
there were efforts to provide for further exemptions and 
75
rbid., pp. 2870-72. 
!'J(?Ibi.d~·;·· p. 2873, 
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distribution of funds collected for the public schools to 
the counties in which they were collected. 77 The defeat 
of the second proposal fortunately saved the public edu-
cation system from being reduced to a state of chaos. 
It was not until March 31st that the convention 
again considered in detail the suffrage provisions of the 
constitution. Since the first presentation of the ma-
jority and minority reports in September, 1901, it had 
become increasingly evident to the Franchise Committee 
that the two plans contained differences that could 
stall the convention indefinitely if no attempt was made 
at a compromise. To resolve this problem, the Democratic 
members met in conference to disentangle the conflicts 
between the majority report and the Wysor report. The 
result was the Glass amendment, a compromise plan named 
for Carter Glass, delegate from Lynchburg. 78 
Convention members found that the most difficult 
compromises concerned what was known as the temporary 
understanding clause. When the original majority report 
was submitted, no educational test, reading, or writing 
prerequisites were placed upon citizens registering to 
vote prior to 1904. After that date, the majority 
report required the potential voter to make application 
77rbid., pp. 2876-80. 
78
rbid., p. 2943. 
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in his own handwriting and give a reasonable explanation 
of the general nature of the duties of officers for which 
he would vote. The Wysor report contained no te~porary 
provisions for those persons registering prior td 1904 
and required only that applicants be able to read the 
constitution in English and write their own name. 79 The 
Glass amendment retained the temporary provisions of the 
majority report, but after January 1, 1904, the prospec-
tive voter was to 
••• make application for registration in his 
own handwriting, without aid or suggestion 
or the use of memorandum, setting forth the 
names and residence of his parents, his own 
name, age, place and date of birth, his occu-
pation and place of residence at the time for 
two years prior to the date of his applica-
tion: and if he has previously voted, then to 
state in what State, County or City, and vot-
ing precinct he last voted; and he shall answer 
on oath, any and all questions propounded to 
him by the registration officer effecting his 
qualification as an elector, which said ques-
tions shall be reduced to writing; having done 
which and made oath to his statement, he sha$b 
be duly listed by the Registrar of Election. 
Debate on the understanding clause divideq the 
convention along the lines of "disfranchisers" and "white-
washers~" The concern, of course, was to make certain 
that the largest number of Negroes were disfranchised 
but to insure the enfranchisement of all whites. In 
79rbid., I, pp. 600-605. 
BOibid., II, p. 2938. 
answer to those who feared disfranchisement of as many 
whites as blacks by the provision, Carter Glass gave 
47 
assurance that the article would "not necessarily deprive 
a single white man of the ballot, but will inevitably cut 
from the existing electorate four-fifths of the Negro 
voters." "Our politics will be purified," Glass told the 
81 delegates, "and our public service strengthened. 11 
Despite efforts by Republicans and worried black-belt 
delegates to amend the understanding section, it emerged 
virtually unaltered. 
Similar unanimity was shown when the convention 
considered sections of the suffrage article dealing with 
the poll tax. The original minority report contained no 
provisions for the accumulation of the poll tax, but the 
minority acquiesced in the cumulative feature. The Glass 
amendment required prepayment of all poll taxes assessed 
or assessable for the preceding three years six months 
in advance of the election in which the potential voter 
81Ibid., pp. 3016-77. Thom expressed the concern 
of those who believed the understanding clause would not 
keep Negroes from registering because of a growing liter-
acy rate. " ••• It is this fleeting and disappearing 
qualification that we people are asked to accept as the 
solution of our trouble." Ibid., p. 2965. w. A. Watson 
believed the plan effectively removed the "old-time 
negro" but put in his place a new issue, "your reader, 
your writer, your loafer, your voter, your ginger-cake 
school graduate, with a diploma of side whiskers and 
beaver hat, pocket pistols, brass knucks, and bicycles ••• " 
Ibid., p. 3070. 
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intended to participate. Collection was not to be en-
forced by levy on personal property or otherwise until 
it had become three years past due. 82 ':\ 
John W. Daniel, who had worked on the cornprJrnise 
measure with Glass, noted in his introductory remarks on 
the amendment that there had been disagreement among the 
Democratic conference o~er the accumulative provisions. 
When debate began, the nature of the disagreement became 
apparent. Henry Flood moved to reduce the period for pre-
payment from three years to one. This would have allowed 
the potential voter to vote if he had paid the tax prior 
to the election in which he desired to participate, re-
.. 
gardless of whether he had paid the previous two year's 
tax. Evidently Flood's alternative had been thoroughly 
discussed in the Democratic caucus; his amendment was 
defeated with no discussion after Glass requested the 
section be allowed to remain unchanged. Quietly, 
quickly and without substantial opposition, the poll tax 
83 provision was adopted. Final adoption of the suffrage 
article came in the closing days of the convention, and 
the article emerged largely as presented by Carter 
Glass. 84 
82Ibid~, p. 2943. 
83Ibid., p. 2958. 
84~. , p. 3080. The fin al vote was 59 to 20. 
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The convention had not labored in vain. Virginia 
had followed the path blazed by Mississippi and South 
carolina with the avowed purpose of removing the Negro 
from the electorate. The franchise in Virginia was offered 
to every male citizen, twenty-one years of age, who had 
been a resident of the state for two years, of a county, 
city or town for one year, and of his precinct for thirty 
days, and who had properly registered and paid state poll 
taxes. 85 
To insure that the largest number of whites in the 
state were given the opportunity to register, the delegates 
provided a unique feature. During the years 1902 and 1903, 
there was to be a general registration in which male resi-
dents having the age and residence requirements were en-
titled to register if they, (1) had served in time of war 
in the army or navy of the United States, or Confederate 
States; (2) were a son of a soldier; (3) had paid one 
dollar in state taxes on property; or (4) were able to 
read any section of the constitution, or have it read to 
them, and give a reasonable explanation of that section. 
After January 1, 1904, permanent provisions required that 
the applicant have paid poll taxes for the preceding three 
85eonstitution of Virginia, 1902, Arta II, sec. 18. 
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years, made application to the registrar in his own hand-
writing, without aid, suggestion or memorandum, stating 
his name, age, date and place of birth, residence and 
occupation at that time and for the previous two years. 
If the applicant had previously voted, he was also to list 
the state, county and precinct in which the vote was cast. 
Lastly, he was to answer any and all questions "affecting 
his qualifications as an elector. 1186 
other provisions provided for an annual registra-
tion of voters, voting by ballot, and a three-member 
electoral board in each city or county, in which repre-
sentation was to be given "as far as possible" to each 
of the two political parties. The General Assembly was 
also given authority to prescribe a property qualification 
not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars for voters in 
any county, city or town as a prerequisite for voting in 
anY election for officers other than members of the Gener-
87 
al Assembly. 
The poll tax was set at one dollar and fifty cents. 
All poll taxes assessed or assessable were to be person-
ally paid six months prior to the election in which the 
applicant desired to participate. Excluded from payment 
861bid., sec. 19 and sec. 20. 
871bid., sec. 25, sec. 27, sec. 31, and sec. 30. 
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for the right to register and vote were former soldiers 
of the United States or Confederate States. Collection 
was not to be enforced by legal process until the tax had 
become three years past due. 88 \ 
These provisions have little meaning until applied 
as qualifications to the potential electorate. According 
to the census of 1900, there were 301,379 white males and 
146,122 colored males over twenty-one years of age in 
Virginia. With the exception of idiots, the insane, and 
persons convicted of certain crimes, all were eligible to 
vote under provisions of the Underwood Constitution, mak-
ing the potential vote 447,501. The vote in the Presi-
dential election of 1900 was 264,095. 89 Of the potential 
Negro vote of 146,122, over half, or 76,764, were illiter-
ate and would be required to register under the new con-
stitution as a former soldier, the son of a soldier, one 
who had paid one dollar in state taxes, or one able to 
understand and explain a section of the constitution. 
There were few Negroes who were soldiers or sons of 
soldiers, and according to a report furnished the con-
vention, there were in the state only 8,144 Negro males 
881bid., sec. 20, sec. 21, and sec. 22. 
8911Population of Virginia Classified by cOlor, and 
Literacy by Counties, 1900," Journal of the Constitutional 
Convention of Virqinia (Richmond, 1902), document No. VII. 
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assessed for taxes on real estate valued at $300 or over, 
the amount that would produce one dollar in taxes. 90 In 
. I 
1899, the amount collected from Negroes as tax on! personal 
. 91 · I 
property was only $10,433.39. Assuming that Negro owners 
of property worth $300 or more were literate, _it is evident 
. . 
that few of the illiterate N~groes were able to r~gister 
under anythi~g but the understandi~g clause, and it is 
apparent from statements made during the convention that 
Vi~ginia Negroes would not be subject to an impartial 
exarnination. 92 
Of the potential white vote, only 36,493 were illit-
erate. Although it is improbable that many of this number 
paid a dollar in state taxes, many could register under 
either of the soldier clauses, while others would receive 
more favorable consideration than the Negro when attempt-
ing to r~gister under the understanding clause. 
It is obvious that the convention did not leave the 
removal of the Negro from the electorate to one legal device 
9011 communication from the Auditor of Public Accounts, 
in Relation to the Number of Male Citizens of the Common-
wealth Assessed for Taxes on Real Estate Valued at $300.00 
and.over in the Year 1900," ibid., document No. VIII. 
9111 communication from the Auditor of Public Accounts 
Showing the Amount of Taxes Paid on Real Estate, Personal 
Property, Polls, Etc. for the Year 1899," ibid., document 
no. IX. --
92oebates of the Convention, II, pp. 2972-73. 
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such as an understandi~g clause. By the use of three 
different provisions, _the convention hoped to assure the 
accomplishment of its task, but fears persisted that the 
N~gro would remain a political factor. The most distressing 
feature of the poll tax provision was its unpredictability. 
There was no evidence sufficient to remove all doubts that 
the tax ~ght bear more heavily on the whites than upon 
the N~groes. Further danger exi.sted in maki~g the tax 
· cumulative and requiring its prepayment before election 
enthusiasm had been aroused. As one delegate observed,. 
the white man regarded his suffrage as a right, while the 
· N~gro regarded it as a privilege and would do a_ great 
deal to preserve it that the white man would be "listless" 
about. 93 Finally, .there was the matter of the o:r-ganization 
of the N~gro community. "They are organized everywhere 
and controlled everywhere through the power of the ·church," 
. . 
A. P. Thom submitted. 94 It would be an easy matter for 
the black churches to organize the N~groes six months in 
advance of an election and pay poll taxes in a la~ger 
proportion than whites. The poll tax alone was therefore not 
sufficient to remove the blacks from the electoral process, 
but when the N~gro realized that he must make out his own 
application for registration, mark his own ballot, and pay 
93 ..... 
Ibid., remarks by Thom, p. 2979 .. 
94
rbid. 
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the poll tax, and face people hostile to his vote, _his 
removal would be accomplished. 
One could speculate, then, that the effects of the 
constitutional provisions regarding voting were intended to 
be partly psychological. Once he learned that his dis-
. franchisement was the object of the constitutional con-
vention, the Negro would not attempt to meet the· require-
ments necessary to vote. Since he did not participate in 
the-electoral process, there would be no compunction in 
allowing the poll tax to become delinquent, and since 
the state made.no effort to collect it, the Negro would 
take·this to mean silent approval of his action, or at 
least a willi~gness on the part of the state to be rid 
of him·. 95 
Some years after the convention, Carter Glass, by 
then a member of Congress, confirmed this aspect of the 
provisions. Glass termed the plan he had formulated an 
"automatic qualification which would effectively exclude 
negroes from registration." It would accomplish this end, 
Glass, declared, not on account of race, color or previous 
condition of servitude,.but because "the poll tax require-
ment and the registration requirement were both on con-
trariety to the known characteristics of the n~gro. • • • 
[T]he Negro would not, in the abstract, set a high enough 
95 . Snavely, Taxation of Negroes, pp. 42-43. 
55 
value on the right of suffrage, nor was he sufficiently 
thrifty, to pay a poll tax six months in advance of the 
election." 96 
Glass and the other members of the constitutional 
convention had no positive assurances, of course, that 
their assessment of the character of the Negro voting pop-
ulation was correct. The future would reveal, however, 
that the psychological effect upon this segment of the 
population would be as effective as any restrictive feature 
the convention could have hoped to have written into law. 
CONCLUSION 
With the final adoption of the new Virginia constitu-
tion, legal sanction was given to p policy of franchise 
exclusion that had begun after the Civil War. Corruption 
in politics, especially corruption involving the Negro 
voter, fostered the hope that removal of the majority of 
blacks from politics would end the venality that plagued 
the state. Once the source of corruption was removed, it 
seemed assured that whites could-once again freely divide 
on the basic political issues and enjoy a renewed political 
life. The Negro would be forced to abandon his political 
hopes, hopes the white majority considered to be false 
96carter Glass to Thomas W. Harrison, Feb. 25, 1921, 
box·2~6, Carter Glass Papers, University of Virginia 
Library, Charlottesville, Va. 
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and would be returned to his "place" and thus improve race 
relations. 
Although there was disagreement among members of the 
convention over the form and substance of the understanding 
clause, .there was unanimity upon the principle that those 
citizens who participated in the government should contribute 
to its support. The convention turned to a practice that 
would tax the individual for the privilege of casting his 
ballot. The poll tax, it was hoped, would not only provide 
additional revenue to a growing state educational system, 
but, .more importantly, purify and purge the electorate of that 
unworthy element that had been the cause of recent corrup-
tion and fraud. Thus the poll tax became a vital part of 
the franchise section of the new constitution. But there 
were those who warned, like a member of the Virginia con-
vention.in 1902, "I tell you now, gentlemen, while I know 
it is a hopeless thing to argue against a poll tax pre-
requisite in the State of Virginia, that thing will rise 
97 
up to. give us trouble in the years to come." 
97 . 
· Dehates· o·f the· convention, II, 2865, remarks by 
George K. Anderson. 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL LIFE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION, 1902-1935 
No one could know for certain what the result would 
be of the suffrage system designed by the constitutional 
convention delegates. As a result, there was a degree of 
anticipation as Virginians waited for registration 
reports, figures on poll tax payments and assessments by 
their political leaders. When voter registration began 
in September, 1902, the Richmond Dispatch carried daily 
reports of registration figures from around the state. 
In Richmond, 1,268 whites and fifty-eight Negroes 
registered during the first two days of registration. 1 
In Chatham, fifty-eight out of fifty-nine whites registered 
while only three of fourteen Negroes registered. In Front 
Royal, 134 whites registered while the eleven Negro 
applicants who appeared were rejected. 2 The Dispatch 
reported Negro registration in Amherst as "a great falling 
1 Richmond Dispatch, Sept. 17, 1902. 
2
rbid., Sept. 16, 18, 1902. 
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off" since they had previously almost equaled the number 
of whites registered. 3 It was also reported in Hampton 
and Front Royal that Negroes were registered under the 
property qualification and a few under the soldier clause 
of the new constitution. 4 
Some idea of the manner in which Negroes were 
confronted by local registrars can be gained from a report 
from Blackstone carried by the Dispatch. In attempting 
to register under the understanding clause, one old Negro 
was asked if he knew what the General Assembly was. The 
Negro replied that he thought it was some type of military 
gathering. Another Negro was asked what punishment he 
would inflict upon a man who had committed suicide. The 
reply by the Negro was that he would send the man to jail 
for twelve months, an answer that brought obvious 
enjoyment to onlookers. 5 But it was not only the Negro 
that had to endure such humiliation. Whites, particularly 
Republicans, suffered the same fate. w. c. Pendleton 
reported that it was "painful and pitiful" to see the 
horror and dread in the faces of Ninth District whites 
as they waited to take their turn before "the inquisition. 116 
3
rbid., Sept. 18, 1902. 
5
rbid., Sept. 16, 1902. 
4
rbid., Sept. 17, 1902. 
6Pendleton, Political History of Appalachin 
Virginia, p. 458. 
' ; 
Many had seen their neighbors turned away because they 
were not able to answer the registrar's questions, and 
I 
it took earnest persuasion to get them to submit to the 
same ordeal. \ 
This was horrible to behold, but it 
was still more horrible to see the marks of 
humiliation and despair that were stamped 
upon the faces of honest but poor white men 
who had been refused registration and who 
had been robbed of their citizenship without 
cause. We saw them as they came from the 
presence of the registrars with bowed heads 
and agonized faces; and when they spoke, in 
many instances, there was a tear7in the voice of the humiliated citizen. 
To bar Negroes and whites from registering under 
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the understanding clause of the new constitution was thus 
a simple matter. There were parts of the document that 
even intelligent whites could not explain, and if there 
was doubt in the registrar's mind, he could always ask 
for an explanation of an ex post facto law. 8 Even after 
the understanding clause expired in 1903, there remained 
in the constitution the clause requiring the applicant 
to "answer on oath any and all questions affecting his 
qualifications" which allowed the registrar to ask how 
many historical flags the United States had, or who 
discovered the Rocky Mountains, or whether a minor could 
p. 48. 
7Ibid., pp. 458-59. 
8 McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention, 
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hold office in Virginia. 9 These questions were asked 
where the Negro population was large, where the Republican 
vote was large, and also to the voters of the state who 
I 
opposed the dominant organization. 10 That local Jegistrars 
were given considerable discretion is undeniable. When 
asked if there were many ordinary respectable citizens 
who were unable to comply literally with the law, one 
official replied, "Oh, if I see they are decent and 
respectable citizens, I can give them a little hint" to 
help them complete their registration. 11 
Soon after the new state constitution went into 
effect it was obvious to Negroes and certain white 
elements that the chief obstacle to be overcome on the 
way to suffrage was the registrar. As a result, the poll 
tax, except for few instances, did not emerge as a point 
of immediate attention. Especially among the Negroes of 
the state, efforts were directed at securing the registra-
tion of as many qualified voters as possible. The poll 
tax was taken care of for the "faithful" white voter, but 
9Henry W. Anderson, "Popular Government in Virginia," 
University of Virginia Record Extension Series, XI (Jun., 
1927), 20-21; Paul Lewinson, Race, Class and Party (New 
York, 1932), pp. 117-18. The catch in the last question 
was that notaries public need only be eighteen years old. 
lOAnderson, "Popular Government in Virginia," 21. 
llL . Cl d P t 115 ewinson, Race, ass an ar y, p. • 
the Negro was forced into a state of neglect with no 
allies to look to for assistance until the 1930's. 
FRAUD, VENAL VOTERS AND THE BLACK SATCHEL 
The improvement in state elections failed to 
materialize. Fraud continued and new deceptions were 
introduced. In some instances registered prospective 
voters were merely not placed on the tax lists and local 
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treasurers thus refused to accept payment of the poll 
tax. 12 In other instances both Democrats and Republicans 
resorted to the use of guide or "educational" ballots, 
which had all candidates except those of the party marked 
13 
out. 
Probably the worst, and certainly the most expensive, 
outcome of the new constitution was the creation of a 
class of venal voters that emerged because of the poll 
tax requirerrent. These venal voters, called "floaters" 
by the politicians, were arranged in lots as Democrats, 
Republicans, or doubtfuls. There were also groups of 
voters who, for a fee, could be persuaded to stay away 
from the polls on election day. Another group, described 
by one politician as "the cheapest and most contemptible 
12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Dec. 2, 4, 1903. The 
paper reported 231 registered voters out of 700 not on 
the Berkley tax list. 
13Pendleton, Political History of Appalachin 
Virginia, p. 470. 
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of the venal voters," were those with property who became 
delinquent in payment of the poll tax and required party 
managers to pay the tax for them in exchange for their 
vote. 14 Almost inunediately then the size of the party 
purse became more important to election campaigns. One 
county chairman wrote the head of the State Democratic 
Central Committee, J. Taylor Ellyson, that it had cost 
him nbetween One & Two Hundred Dollars" to produce 
Democratic majorities in a 1905 election. 15 The ante 
was raised considerably when the election was in a highly 
contested district such as the Republican Ninth. The 
Democratic chairman of Wise County wrote that money was 
urgently needed for a 1906 election. "Nothing will do 
this County any good now," the chairman wrote Ellyson, 
nBuT CASH, as the Republicans have all they can use and 
we cannot combat CASH with WIND. 1116 Other reports 
from the Ninth indicated that the Republicans had made 
collections from all over the state and had concentrated 
the money in the district, while the Democrats made a 
14
rbid., pp. 470-71. 
15T.L. Clark to J. Taylor Ellyson, Oct. 22, 1906, 
J. Taylor Ellyson Papers, University of Virginia Library, 
Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter cited as Ellyson 
Papers. 
16w.J. Snodgrass to J. Taylor Ellyson, Oct. 26, 
1906, ibid. 
desperate struggle to raise $7,000 within the district 
and $1,000 outside. 17 After district Democrats lost 
the election, the defeated candidate wrote Chairman 
Ellyson that 11we had about 2,700 democrats who had not 
paid their~poll tax, and had at least I think $30,000 
money to run against." If the district Democrats could 
have voted, the candidate said, he could have w·on, not 
withstanding the odds. 18 
In order to assure that the money paid resulted 
in a correct vote, Republican and Democratic politicians 
had the assistance of loyal election judges who could 
enter the polling booth. The vote buyer would inform 
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the voter which friendly judge to select, the judge would 
enter the booth and see that the ballot was correctly 
marked and then signal the buyer to pay the voter. 
Another practice, known as the "Tasmanian dodge," was 
also employed to assure the vote was delivered. Party 
workers obtained, either through a loyal ballot printer 
or election judge, a number of ballots which they marked 
for their voters. The voter would then deposit his 
prepared ballot and return the unmarked ballot to the 
17A.A. Campbell to J. Taylor Ellyson, Oct. 29, 
1906; W.H. Bond to J.T. Ellyson, Oct. 30, 1906; A.A. 
Campbell to J.T. Ellyson, Nov. 3, 1906, ibid. 
18R.P. Bruce to J. Taylor Ellyson, Nov. 12, 1906, 
ibid. 
party worker to be marked and given to another venal 
voter. 19 
The importance of the bountiful political campaign 
I 
I fund is well illustrated by the 1910 effort by Democrat 
Henry c. Stuart to oust Ninth District Republican 
Representative c. Bascom Slemp. "Never before in the 
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district's history," one historian wrote, "had there been 
a campaign in which such vast sums of money were spent 
by both sides," with some estimates as high as a total 
of $500,000 spent by the two parties. 20 The Democrats 
realized they must make a concerted effort to pay the 
poll tax if they hoped to wrest control of the Ninth 
from Slemp. One local politician from Bland wrote 
Democratic Committee Chairman Ellyson, "We are in better 
shape in the way of having our poll taxes paid than we 
have ever been. We looked after that matter as close 
as it possibly could be. 1121 Another politician claimed 
that Ninth District Democrats were better organized 
19Horn, "Growth of the Democratic Party," pp. 
197-98. 
20
rbid., p. 192; Guy B. Hathorn, "Congressional 
Campaign--rn-the Fighting Ninth: The Contest Between 
c. Bascom Slemp and Henry C. Stuart," Virginia Magazine 
of History and Biography, LXVI (Jul., 1958), 337-344. 
21George T. Byrd to J. Taylor Ellyson, Aug. 16, 1910. 
Ellyson Papers. 
because of the new constitution and poll tax requirement 
and reported, "Our condition as to payment of the poll 
' 
tax is encouraging •••• The Republicans have made small, 
I 
if any, gains in this direction because they have \been 
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in the habit of keeping their men paid up all the 
while. 1122 The Democrats worked hard, but as the election 
drew closer, requests for more money flowed in to Chairman 
Ellyson and one Democrat pleaded for $2,000 to $3,000 as 
a "life saving act. 1123 
Balloting in the Ninth District contest was close 
with the unofficial vote count giving Slemp a lead of 
217 votes. Henry c. Stuart refused to concede the 
election and called for an investigation, implying that 
the Republicans had been able to vote unqualified voters. 
Subsequently, Stuart did not push for the investigation 
and Slemp retained his seat. 24 
The Republicans were able to maintain control of 
the Ninth through a costly, depleting use of campaign 
ibid. 
ibid. 
22s.B. Quillen to J. Taylor Ellyson, Aug. 20, 1910, 
See also W.D. Smith to J.T. Ellyson, Aug. 15, 1910, 
23J. Murray Hooker to J. Taylor Ellyson, Sept. 30, 
1910; c.B. Willis to J.T. Ellyson, Aug. 25, 1910; Claude 
Swanson to J.T. Ellyson, Sept. 8,.15, 1910. J.T. Ellyson 
to E. Peyton Turner, Sept. 19, 1910, ibid. 
24Hathorn, "Congressional Campaign in the Fighting 
Ninth," 344. 
funds, a tactic that could not be employed across the 
state. And they began to learn the price they and their 
el~ctorate had to pay as a result of the poll tax even 
prior to the Slemp-Stuart contest. 
One of the first publicized accounts of block 
payment of poll taxes had occurred in Russell County in 
May, 1905. Two Democrats allegedly paid the tax for 107 
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loyal party members the day after the expiration date for 
tax payments. The Republican commonwealth's attorney 
threatened prosecution but there is no report that any 
further action resulted. 25 
In 1906, J.P. Royall from Tazewell, leader of a 
small Republican minority in the House of Delegates, 
introduced measures that would have provided for elimination 
of the poll tax requirement from the constitution. 26 The 
bills were never reported out of committee, but the 
editorial response of the Times-Dispatch reveals some 
interesting aspects of what one element of the state 
thought the purposes, advantages, and results of the poll 
tax were. 
25 d ' h N . V' ' . l' t' An rew Buni, T e egro in irginia Po 1 ics, 
1902-1965, (Charlottesville, 1967), p. 29. Hereafter 
cited as Buni, The Negro in Virginia Politics. 
' 26Journal of the Senate, 1906, pp. 52, 58. 
Journal of the House, 1906, pp. 75, 167. 
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To abolish the payment of the poll tax as a 
prerequisite to voting would be, the newspaper declared, 
"a public misfortune," throwing down the bars at the polls 
to "negroes and bummers." The tax had eliminated a large 
nwnber of objectionable voters, the Negro was no longer 
a factor in elections, and "shiftless whites" no longer 
had to be paid for their vote because of the poll tax. 
The result was, the newspaper concluded, that the·state 
had the best electorate since the Civil War. 27 Recalling 
the issuance of tax receipts to the "faithful" during the 
Readjuster period, the Times-Dispatch submitted that the 
payment provisions of the tax prevented vote buying and 
left nothing to the discretion of the election officials, 
thus minimizing opportunities for "improper practices. 1128 
nThe man who is unwilling to pay such a tax for the 
privilege of voting," the paper declared, "is not a 
desirable voter, and the State is better off without his 
vote than with it. 1129 It was just such arguments that 
tax repeal forces would find themselves arguing against 
for many years to come. 
27 d"t . 1 E i oria in Times-DisEatch, Jan. 25, 1906. 
28Editorial in ibid., Jan. 31, 1906. 
29 d" . 1 E itoria in ibid., Jan. 25, 28, 1906. 
By 1916, another source of possible election 
fraud had been introduced into the state's political 
system. In an effort to make it possible for more 
people to participate in elections, the General Assembly 
adopted a measure providing that any voter "who was 
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absent from city, county, or precinct on regular business 
or habitual duties on the day of election" could vote 
by mail, provided he applied for a ballot by registered 
mail and had the marked ballot properly witnessed. 30 
State politicians soon discovered that these absentee 
voting procedures could produce Democratic majorities 
. 1 t" 31 in c ose coun 1es. Victories that were won by use 
of the absentee ballot were attributed to the "black 
satchel" vote, a term derived from the method in which 
absentee ballots were delivered. 
Subsequent amendments to the absentee voting law 
furthered its use in buying votes. In 1922, the 
application by registered mail feature was removed and 
the voter was allowed to apply for a ballot up to fifteen 
days prior to an election, instead of thirty days prior 
30Acts of the General Assembly, 1916, pp. ·636-37. 
31Key, Southern Politics, p. 454. Key discusses 
the importance of absentee voting in a chapter on the 
conduct of elections in the South, ibid., pp. 443-462. 
as the 1906 law required. 32 Another amendment in 1924 
allowed application to be made from five to sixty days 
before the election by any voter who may be absent from 
I 
!, 
his precinct. In addition, the local registrar was 
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required to forward ballots by registered mail, but the 
voter could either hand his ballot to the registrar or 
return it by mail. 33 In 1926 the General Assembly removed 
the requirement that absentee ballots be forwarded by 
registered mail. All that was now required was that a 
absentee voter present an application to the local 
registrar, obtain a sealed ballot in return, and then 
mark his ballot before a notary public, a highly convenient 
system. 34 
Political workers were quick to realize the 
opportunities the absent voters system afforded. Local 
voters often received unsolicited absentee ballots with 
postage, a sample ballot properly marked, and money, while 
other party workers would arrive at the front door of 
venal voters with the local registrar and notary public. 35 
Even though the constitutionality of certain sections 
32Acts of the General Assembly, 1922, p. 268. 
33~., 1924, p. 644. 34Ibid., 1926, p. 391. 
35Times-Dispatch, Aug. 4, 1917:- Horn, "Growth 
of the Democratic Party," p. 201. 
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of the law were eventually challenged, and the General 
Assembly acted in an effort to improve the law, fraudulent 
use of the absent voter law continued to be a part of 
Virginia politics into the 1940's. 36 
All of the features of Virginia politics just 
described were at work in one of the few instances in the 
early part of the twentieth century when the poll tax 
became a political campaign issue, the 1921 campaign for 
governor. Although Virginia Republicans were well aware 
of the abuses of state election laws, and especially the 
poll tax provisions, no real effort to present reform as 
a political issue was made until this time. Part of the 
explanation of the Republican position is that the party 
was certainly on the defensive, trying to avoid the 
"race issue" that the election laws necessarily evoked, 
thus trying to avoid raising a bogus issue that might 
cloud any real issues at stake. 37 
The man chosen by the Republican convention 
meeting in Norfolk to run for governor was Henry W. 
Anderson, a successful Richmond corporation lawyer. 
In his acceptance speech, Anderson launched a broad 
36Moore v. Pullem, 150 Va. 174 (1928); Acts of 
the General Assembly, 1930, p. 5. 
37Arthur s. Link, "The Negro as a Factor in the 
Campaign of 1912," Journal of Southern History, XIII 
(Feb., 1947), 82. 
attack against state Democrats, charging them with 
extravagance, failure to administer state affairs· in 
the public interest, excessive taxation, and with pro-
viding unsatisfactory education facilities. 38 He I 
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specifically criticized Corporation and Circuit Court 
judges for their partisan electoral board appointments, 
attacked registration requirements as severe and strictly 
enforced against the Republican minority and blasted the 
poll tax as a repressive measure. Anderson proposed as 
remedies to these problems a pledge of prompt and complete 
revision of the constitution which would include removal 
of election machinery from the hands of local judges, 
creation of bipartisan electoral boards, simplification 
of registration requirements and the ballot, and that 
"the iniquitious poll tax as a prerequisite to voting 
be abolished. 1139 
Well aware that the Democrats could turn his 
proposals against him and charge that he was attempting 
to return the state to pre-1902 conditions, Anderson set 
forth what he termed an open minded approach to the race 
38Times-Dispatch, Jul. 15, 1921; Henry W. Anderson, 
Freedom in Virginia. An Address by Henry W. Anderson, Esq., 
Nominee of the Republican Party for Governor, Delivered 
Before the Reoublican State Convention at Norfolk, Jul 14, 
1921 n.p., n.d. , pp. 1-10. Hereafter cited as Anderson, 
Freedom in Virginia. 
39Anderson, Freedom in Virginia, pp. 10-11, 25-26. 
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question. After a Republican review of Virginia political 
history, Anderson concluded that justice to the people 
of both races demanded the continuance of white supremacy • 
••• The white people of Virginia, 
constituting over two-thirds of the 
population and owning 95 per cent of the 
property of the State, with their long 
experience in self-government, are morally 
charged with the duty to present and future 
generations to see that the State and local 
governments of Virginia are conducted and 
administered in accord~fice with the 
principles stated •••• 
The Republican candidate obviously believed that this 
exposition would allow him to conduct his campaign 
solely on the issue of good or bad management of state 
affairs, and thus began his active campaign by attacking 
the Democratic "officeholders trust. ,.4l But the Democrats 
were not willing to let the Republicans escape so easily. 
Democratic gubernatorial candidate E. Lee Trinkle 
opened his attack on the Republicans at Clintwood in 
September. Trinkle countered the G.O.P. charges by 
attacking the continuing Reconstruction policies of the 
party and the Republican treatment of Woodrow Wilson. If 
the Republicans were to succeed with their planned 
constitutional revision, Trinkle warned, it would mean 
40Ibid., pp. 19-23; Times-Dispatch, Jul. 15, 1921 
41Ibid., Sept. 6, 1921; Henry W. Anderson, Address 
of Henry W. Anderson, Esq., Opening the State Campaign, 
Delivered at Lexin ton, Virginia, Monda , Se t. 5, 1921 
n.p., n.d. , pp .• 18-24. 
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that in a few years the doors would be open for the Negro, 
with the Negro once again holding the balance of power 
in the state. The promised repeal of the poll tax was 
a sop to catch the Negro vote and a demonstration of the 
"cheap expediency" of the Republican party. After 
Virginia had repudiated the Republicans, the Democratic 
candidate declared, the G.O.P. labored to regain control 
by Negro aid. Then in an attempt to reform, they had 
cast the Negro out again, hoping in the process to win 
42 favor. The obvious implication was that the Republicans 
had not really changed, that there still existed the 
threat of Negro resurgence aided by the Republicans. 
Anderson attempted to assert again that the 
question at issue was one of good management of state 
affairs, saying that 800,000 white voters would ensure 
that there was no threat to white supremacy, and he 
attacked the Democrats for their handling of the race 
issue. To demonstrate Democratic inconsistency, Anderson 
claimed an illiterate Negro was made an election judge 
over the protest of Republicans, and the G.O.P. candidate 
asserted that there were twenty-five other Negroes 
. . a v· . . 43 serving as JU ges across irginia. 
42Times-Dispatch, Sept. 28, 1921. 
43Ibid., Oct. 16, 1921. 
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The Democrats were relentless however. Shortly 
before the November election, newspapers in Richmond and 
Roanoke published letters to Democratic Chairman Henry 
Flood from Senators Swanson and Glass. Carter Glass claimed 
that Anderson was trying to change horses in mid-stream by 
first advocating just treatment of the Negro and then 
complaining about their appointment as election judges. In 
addition, Glass told Flood that by eliminating the poll 
tax, the G.O.P. Candidate proposed "to tear down the 
barriers ••• and thus clear the way to the ballot box for 
every shiftless and ignorant darkey who may desire to 
exercise an unrestricted right to participate in the 
t f th St t .. 44 governmen o e a e •••• Senator Swanson's letter 
to Chairman Flood followed the same lines, saying that 
Democrats stood for white supremacy while Republicans 
stood for political equality among the races. Swanson 
singled out that portion.of the Republican platform 
calling for removal of the poll tax, calling it their 
"cloven hoof." "The plea for unlimited suffrage made 
by the republican [sic] party, " Swanson wrote, "is an 
- . 
insidious way of bringing the negro back to politics. 1145 
441bid., Nov. 1, 1921 • 
. 45 .. 
Roanoke Times, Nov. 4, 1921. 
In the closing days of the campaign, Chairman Flood 
could confidently predict an overwhelming Democratic 
\ 
victory·, while the only thing Henry Anderson could do 
was again insist that the real issue of the campaign 
was the management of state affairs. 46 
On election day the Democratic victory was 
complete. Anderson lost his own precinct to Trinkle. 
The Negro vote was judged to be "negligible" with the 
majority of blacks standing by their regular Republican 
affiliations. Bascom Slemp blamed the resounding 
defeat on industrial depression and the raising of false 
issues by the Democrats. 47 But perhaps Carter Glass 
correctly brought the issues into focus for most 
Virginians. The Republican platform, Glass stated, 
reduced the contest to the issue of repeal of the 
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constitutional safeguards against "effective participation 
of the black man in the politics of the State," and 
Glass offered the fitting epitaph for the gubernatorial 
contest. "Colonel Anderson has been buried," the Senator 
stated, "in the same grave in which the people of Virginia 
) 48 in 1902 buried unrestricted suffrage." 
46Times-Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1921. 
47rbid., Nov. 9, 1921; Roanoke Times, Nov. 10, 1921 • 
. 
48Roanoke Times, Nov. 10, 1921. 
The 1921 election effectively demonstrated that 
to campaign for electoral reform, especially repeal of 
the poll tax, meant certain political defeat. With no 
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one to force this issue, the Democrats, controlling the 
election machinery, had no trouble maintaining their 
superiority. Yet careful observers saw that something 
was happening to the electorate. Just three years after 
the Anderson defeat, the Richmond News Leader, alarmed 
at the waning electorate, called for the creation of a 
new opposition party at any cost, believing that it was 
because the Republican opposition had disappeared that 
Virginia had become negligent in the franchise. 49 After 
a review of the voting records of Democratic Pittsylvania 
County, with a 40 per cent black population, with that 
of Republican Augusta County, with only 14 per cent of 
its population Negro, the newspaper concluded that whites 
in Pittsylvania rio longer went to the polls because they 
knew there was no chance of a Negro victory, while in 
Augusta County, white Democrats did not go because they 
knew other parts of the state would bring up the necessary 
Democratic majority. "In state and national politics," 
the News Leader observed, "they have yielded with the 
49Editorial in News Leader, Dec. 26, 1924. 
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rest to the lethargy the present constitution so temptingly 
provides. 1150 While the newspaper was primarily concerned 
with admonishing the citizenry for its lack of political 
consciousness, the editorials laid to rest the contention 
that the decline in voting was due to the disfranchisement 
of the Negro by pointing out that the actual decline was 
more than the percentage of the Negro population in the 
state. 51 
The 1921 election in which repeal of the poll tax 
was advocated by Virginia Republicans and the 1924 
pleadings by the Richmond News Leader for an aroused voter 
consciousness are indicative of the increasing attention 
being given to the condition of the suffrage in Virginia. 
The quest for poll tax repeal by the Republicans con-
tributed to the overwhelming victory of the Democrats in 
1921, but if the advice given in 1924 to create a new 
opposition party at any cost was taken seriously, it 
might be expected that the issue would once again come 
before the electorate. In the meantime, it was largely 
left to the Negro population to do what was possible 
50Editorial in ibid., Nov. 22, 1924. 
51Editorial in ibid., Nov. 19, 1924. See also 
editorial in ibid., Nov. 8, Dec. 2, 1924. The News Leader 
discovered that prior to 1902 voting in Richmond averaged 
126 per 1,000 population. Between 1902 and 1920, the 
average was 44 per 1,000 population. From 1920, when 
women were granted suffrage, to 1924, the average vote 
was 79 per 1,000 population. Editorial in ibid., Nov. 7, 
1924. --
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to regain a voice in politics. Their voice was understand-
ably weak at first but gained in strength as time, progressed. 
THE NEGRO'S FIGHT FOR SUFFRAGE 
Negroes and white Republicans soon realized that 
the chief obstacle to the franchise was the local registrar. 
The Negro could not look to local Republicans for assistance 
since the party was attempting to disassociate itself from 
the Negro. This became evident shortly after the new 
constitution went into effect. Angered by the removal 
of a Negro bailiff of the Circuit Court of Appeals, several 
v.ocal Richmond and Henrico white Republicans observed 
that Negroes "had almost been forced out of the party under 
the present organization and year by year were finding 
themselves more and more in disfavor with the white leaders," 
the majority of whom acquiesced in Democratic disfran-
chisement of the race. 52 The process of exclusion 
continued until it culminated in the "lily white" and 
"lily black" Republican parties during the 1921 election 
for governor. 
As a result, the Virginia Negro's fight to recover 
political influence proceeded along two parallel lines of 
52
rbid., May 19, 1904. Outside of positions in the 
post office, Negroes had received no recognition in 
appointment to Federal positions except one department 
collector for the Internal Revenue, two or three court 
messengers and several janitors. 
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effort, one legal and the other political. The largest 
effort by Negroes to regain the franchise after 1902 was 
\ 
directed to action in the courts. \ 
Virginia Negroes desired to test the legalily of 
the new constitution even before registration under.its 
provisions began. In August, 1902, the Virginia Educational 
and Industrial Association, continuing plans begun a year 
earlier, met in Richmond to decide how to raise funds to 
test the legality of the new constitution. Three thousand 
dollars had already been raised and the organization had 
assurances of support from former Virginia politician and 
lawyer Johns. Wise and Richmond judge L.L. Lewis. 53 
Shortly thereafter the publication of the Negro Advocate 
was announced to serve as an organ of opinion for those 
favoring the defeat of the new constitution. 54 The 
announced resistance by Negroes aroused the Richmond 
Dispatch to declare the effort "ill advised, wild and 
foolish" because it would bring whites closer together. 
nThe white in Virginia will not allow themselves to the 
thwarted"in maintaining political control, and if the 
Supreme Court should throw obstacles in the path, the 
newspaper declared that "a new and safe path will be 
53
nispatch, Aug. 16, 1902. 
54~., Sept. 16, 1902. 
found," and warned that a new convention would not treat 
the Negro as "leniently and liberally. 1155 
Unfortunately, no copies of the Negro Advocate 
i 
exist from which to judge the response of the black 
conununity to this threat of harsher action if the Negro 
should continue his pressure. But it is obvious that 
those opposing the constitution were not deterred. In 
November, 1902, William H. Jones, John Hill, and Edgar 
Lee, all represented by John s. Wise, filed in the U.S. 
Circuit Court a petition for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a canvass of the votes cast in a House of 
Representatives contest. The three men claimed to have 
been refused registration in the Third Congressional 
District and argued that the new constitution had not 
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been submitted to the people for ratification and that the 
purpose of the Democratic party that controlled the 
convention had been disfranchisement of the Negro voters 
of Virginia. The petitioners therefore asked that the 
election be held null, void and of no effect. The 
Circuit Court denied the petition on the grounds of lack 
of jurisdiction, and the case was brought to the Supreme 
Court. 56 In its opinion, the Court denied the requested 
55Editorial in ibid., Aug. 21, 1902. 
56 Jones, et al. v. Montaque, et al., 24 S.C. 611 
(1904). 
... 
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petition on the grounds that the election sought to be 
prohibited had already been concluded. Justice Brewer, 
writing the majority opinion, declared that any action the 
Court might take would only be ineffectual. "Under the 
circumstances there is nothing but a moot case remaining," 
the justice declared. 57 
Those who had hoped for gains in suffrage through the 
courts were sadly disappointed by the decision. In Wise's 
view, the Negro was a "friendless institution politically" 
and the Supreme Court and Congress were passing the ques-
tion of Negro suffrage back and forth in a game "amusing 
to everybody, except the Negro. 1158 Unfortunately for the 
Negro, the state and Federal courts made no attempt to 
change their viewpoint on the question and continued to 
disclaim jurisdiction in cases concerning suffrage pro-
. . . t •t t• 59 visions in s ate consti u ions. 
One further Virginia case illustrates the attitude of 
the courts in regard to these contests testing the validity 
of the suffrage provisions. In November, 1908, the United 
57Ibid. Selden v .• Montague, 24 s.c. 613 (1904), 194 
U.S. 153, was a suit in equity seeking an injunction against 
the canvass in the 1902 election brought to the Supreme 
Court at the same time. John s. Wise was also the peti-
tioner's lawyer. The case was dismissed on the same grounds 
as Jones v • .Montague. 
58 . .. 
~Leader~ _Jun. 8, Dec. 16, 1904. 
59
carter G. Woodson, "Fifty Years of Negro Citizen-
ship as Qualified by the United States Supreme Court," 
Journal of Negro History, VI (Jan., 1921), 37-43. 
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States Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of Brickhouse 
v. Brook et al. Brickhouse claimed damages of $5,000 
because of the refusal of his vote during the Noverr~er, 
1902 election. John s. Wise, representing Brickhouse, 
again argued that the Virginia constitution was invalid 
because the document was not framed by authorized delegates 
and because it had been proclaimed rather than submitted 
to a vote. In its opinion, the Circuit Court skirted the 
question of the legality of the constitution. After 
noting that the task of the courts was only to decide the 
rights of the people under adopted constitutions, the 
Circuit Court declared that the question of whether or 
not the people of Virginia had duly adopted the constitu-
tion was a political question to be decided by the legisla-
tive and executive departments of the government. "Those 
departments having recognized and promulgated that Consti-
tution, having declared it valid and in force," the opinion 
stated, "it consequently is the fundamental law of Virginia 
1160 
. . . . 
The efforts by Negroes
0
and their allies to have the 
1902 Virginia constitution overturned in the courts thus 
came to an end. One historian has noted, however, that 
although the Negro was disfranchised, none of the cases 
during the period tested the real issue involved. The 
60 Brickhouse v. Brook et al., 165 F.R. 534 (1908). 
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real question was whether the constitutional convention 
of 1902 had the right to proclaim the new constitution 
contrary to the provisions of the Underwood Constitution. 61 
As far as the poll tax was concerned, the Virginia 
courts encouraged irregularities in its use. In a case 
before the State Supreme Court in 1908, it was declared 
that treasurers should include in their poll lists only 
the names of persons who had personally paid their poll 
taxes. 62 What constituted personal payment was not 
decided until the following year when the court declared 
that the poll, tax need only be paid out of a person's 
estate and not the estate of another. In addition, the 
payment need not be by the voter in person, the court 
declared, but could be made by any authorized agent or 
clerk or "in other ways. 1163 
Subsequently, the only other cases to reach the 
State Supreme Court touching upon the payment of the poll 
tax occurred in 1939. A Virginia resident in that year 
made application to the Commissioner of Revenue in Richmond 
for a license to practice law. A section of the Tax Code 
61McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention, 145. 
62Tazewell v. Herman, 108 Va. 416 {1908). 
63Tilton. v •. Herman, .109 Va. 503 {1909); Allen W. Moger, 
Virginia, Bourbonism to Byrd (Charlottesville, 1968), pp. 
195-98. 
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of VI \'ginia required as a prerequisite prepayment of poll 
taxuu, The lawyer certified that he had not paid,his 
poll tax for 1937 and was refused the necessary likense. 
I 
The l',)sulting suit stemmed from the fact the state1 consti-
tut;ll,\\ prohibited enforced collection by legal process 
unt;l\ the poll tax had become three years past due,' and 
the Htate Supreme Court overturned the portion of the 
tax '-~\.'de requiring the prepayment. The Court declared that 
the l\\\position of the poll tax was "not intended primarily 
for lhe production of revenue, but to limit the right of 
suffl:"-ge to those who took sufficient interest in the 
affC\l\~s of the State to qualify themselves to vote. 1164 
Obvi~\\sly, the decision had no great impact on Negro voting 
sine~ it allowed continued non-payment of the poll tax 
rath\)\~ than making tax payment mandatory. 
'~he first serious challenge to the existing suffrage 
systt)\\\ came as a result of the United States Supreme Court 
dec:b~ton in Nixon v. Herndon which declared the rules 
bar~\\\g Negroes from the Texas Democratic primary constituted 
a dt~\\\al of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth 
However, when Richmond Negroes attempted to 
vote tn a 1928 primary, Democratic party officials asserted 
that: the Texas decision did not apply because the Virginia 
\\14 . Campbell v. Goode, 172 Va. 463 (1939). 
,.;;5 . .. 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
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statute on party primaries gave the party the right to 
make its own regulations. 66 When a suit was instituted to 
I 
resolve the question, however, the district judge :found 
that the 1924 Democratic party rule limiting votin~ to 
whites was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
state legislature, having once undertaken to regulate 
primary elections and having authorized them to be held 
at public expense, could not, the court ruled, do 
indirectly what the more direct Texas statute had done. 67 
Appropriately, portions of the Virginia Negro population 
greeted the decision as a great breakthrough. 68 
An even more important ruling was handed down by the 
State Supreme Court in 1931. In October, 1929, W. E. Davis 
tried to register to vote in Hampton. The registrar, 
Thomas c. Allen, refused to register Davis on the grounds 
that he had failed to make application in proper form and 
had failed to answer to the satisfaction of the registrar 
certain questions affecting his qualifications as an 
elector. In the resulting suit, evidence was presented as 
to Davis's responses to questions asked. 
(2d) 
Question. 
Answer. 
When is payment of Poll Tax Not Requared 
After a Pearson have obtaine the age of 
sixty years. 
66Tirnes-Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1928. 
67 . . . ... . ····· 
West v. Bliley et al. r 33 F. (2d) 177 (1929), 42 F. 
101\1930}. 
68 Planet, Jun. 21, 1930. 
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Question. What are the Requisites to enable one to 
Register in Va 
Answer. he will have to Be 21 years of age and 
a citizen -- of the State for one year 
in the City Town or county for 6 month 
Precinct in which he ofers to vote 30 
Days and Pay all State Tax for 3 years 
Back say for 1926, 27 & 28 •••• 69 
While admitting that the application and answers to 
questions filed by Davis showed he had comparatively little 
education, the Court noted that the state constitution 
provided for no test of knowledge or understanding other 
than that the applicant make application in his own hand-
writing, without aid, suggestion or memorandum. The ques-
tions asked by the Hampton registrar obviously elicited no 
information from Davis which he was required by the consti-
tution to have in order to vote, seemingly being designed 
instead to test his understanding or knowledge of the law. 
As a result, the State Supreme Court declared that the 
registrar was not authorized to refuse Davis registration 
because of his failure to correctly answer these questions. 70 
As might be expected, the court's decision was greatly 
applauded by the Negro community. The local registrar had 
long remained an obstacle to Negro voting, especially in 
the Hampton area where they had turned down professors at 
Hampton Institute and numerous professional and business 
69navis v. Allen, 157 Va. 84 (1931). This passage is 
duplicated as it appears in the text of the decision. 
?Oibid. 
87 
rnen. 71 The Norfolk Journal and Guide declared that the 
Davis decision was "perhaps the most important decree of a 
State Court bearing upon the exercise of the suffrage" 
since enactment of suffrage restrictions, and noted the 
significance of having leadership that was capable of 
bringing the issue to a just conclusion "in such a hostile 
political environment. 1172 
Opposition to Negro registration and vo·ting remained 
despite court rulings on the white primary and allowable 
application procedures. But now the Negro had an ally in 
the courts. When Negroes were refused ballots in an 
August, 1931 primary vote in Jefferson Ward in Portsmouth, 
the city circuit judge ordered their registration. 73 In 
1933, the Democratic Committees in Elizabeth City County 
and Portsmouth attempted to require an oath from primary 
voters and ruled that only whites could vote in the primary. 
It was estimated that the oath alone would slow voting at 
any polling place to 1,000 a day. 74 When a suit for damages 
71Journal and Guide, Oct. 10, 1931. 
72Editorial in ibid. 
73rbid., Aug. 8, 1931. 
74rbid., Apr. 29, May 20, 1933. The Journal and Guide 
also repoFEe'O that Suffolk election officials sought to ban 
Negro voting but were prevented by the Attorney General by 
threat of prosecution. Ibid., Aug. 13, 1933. 
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resulting from the denial of registration to a local busi-
ness man and the head of the biology department of Hampton 
Institute reached the state courts, Negroes won a clarifica-
tion of the earlier decision regarding primary elections. 
The Democratic party could not, the decision said, deny 
its privileges to those who subscribed to its principles 
and tenets, nor could it lawfully discriminate because of 
race, color or previous condition of servitude. 75 
At this point, the Negro community could turn its 
attention to organizing to make its potential strength 
felt and also to attack the major obstacle remaining in 
the path to suffrage - the poll tax. As was noted, after 
adoption of the disfranchising constitution of 1902, the Vir-
ginia Negro found himself in a political limbo, unwanted 
by Republicans and despised by Democrats. But the portion 
of Virginia Negroes who still were able to vote clung to 
the Republican party. Henry W. Anderson's campaign in 1921 
75Ibid., Aug 26, Oct. 14, Nov. 4, 18, 1933. Some 
Democratic elements persisted in their attempts to deny the 
Negro access to the party primary. During the 1934 General 
Assembly, House Floor Leader Ashton Dovell and Senator Harry 
Holt introduced a resolution to establish a party financed 
and controlled primary system. After passing the House, the 
measure was defeated in the Senate, but only after pressure 
was reportedly applied by Senato;~Byrd and Governor Peery. 
One reason for the defeat, according to the Journal and Guide 
was that party leaders did not want the primary stripped of 
its legal safeguards which saved it from manipulation. Ibid., 
Mar. 17, 1934. 
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not only saw the poll tax emerge as a campaign issue but 
also saw the creation of a "lily black" Republican faction 
out of frustration with party attitudes toward the Negro. 
The black Republican movement began shortly after the 
Republican convention nominating Anderson and produced a 
ticket headed by John Mitchell, editor of the Richmond 
Planet, for governor, Theodore Nash for lieutenant governor 
and J. Thomas Newsome for attorney general. With a plat-
form stressing equal rights as voting citizens of Virginia, 
the Negro Republicans avoided the poll tax issue that was 
to damage white Republicans. 76 
In addition to the lack of voting strength, the lily 
blacks found dissension in their own ranks. The opposition 
was led by P. B. Young, editor of the Norfolk Journal and 
Guide, who had been offered the position of lieutenant 
governor on the black ticket but had declined. Young 
asserted that the black movement was badly timed and that 
the bitter speeches of Negro Republicans aroused white 
77 
and Negro race hatred. As a result, the two factions fell 
to bickering among themselves, undoubtedly hurting whatever 
slim chance they had of being any influence in the election. 
The 16,000 votes for Mitchell predicted by the Planet turned 
76 Planet, Aug. 20, Sept. 10, 14, 1921; Journal and 
Guide, Sept. 3, 16, 1921. 
77
rbid., Jul. 30, Oct. 22, 1921. 
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into 5,046 at the polls. To P. B. Young, this was both 
an indication that Negroes would not countenance Mitchell's 
type of "radical leadership," and also a message to white 
Republicans that they could not win in Virginia by erecting 
barriers against the political rights of Negroes within 
the party. 78 To the Planet, the failure was due to 36,000 
eligible Negroes who failed to meet registration require-
ments and make poll tax payments. 79 
One result of the Negro's experience in this election 
was the .beginning of a gradual shift of Negro voters to the 
Democratic party. 80 However, even after the court decisions 
permitting the Negro to vote in the white Democratic 
primaries, black participation increased ever so slowly. 
The Journal and Guide discerned three reasons why the Negro 
did not immediately rush into Democratic primaries. First 
·was the fact that some Negroes still remained Republicans. 
Secondly, the past history of Negro disfranchisement gave 
the impression that the law would be circumvented and his 
vote would be cast out. Finally, the newspaper observed 
78 Planet, Nov. 5, 1921: Journal and Guide, Nov. 12, 
1921 •. 
79Planet, Nov. 26, 1921. 
80Buni, The Negro in Virginia .Politi~s, pp. 90-123, 
described in detail the Virginia Negro's move to the 
Democratic party during the years 1922 to 1940, and the 
continued exclusion of the race from the Republican party. 
91 
that there was a movement underway to make more politically 
mature decisions. Many Negro leaders were beginning to 
urge the members of their race to vote for the candidate 
( 
I 
of the party which promised them most in return, and 
the rank and file were slowly coming over to this view. 
11It may be that a decade or two hence we shall· see the 
Negro participating in large numbers in the Democratic 
primaries in Virginia, and exercising potent influence 
upon the outcome," the Norfolk paper estimated. 81 
The decade of the 1930's was therefore marked by an 
effort to organize in order to become a political force. 
While there was some criticism of the poll tax requirement, 
most of the attention was directed toward stressing the 
importance of poll tax payment. The main force behind 
this drive was the various Negro organizations that began 
to emerge to enable Virginia Negroes to make the more 
politically mature decisions referred to by the Journal 
and Guide. 
The organization that could of fer the most statewide 
influence was the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, organized in Richmond and Falls Church 
in 1915. 82 Prior to 1935, the number of state branches 
81 . Journal and Guide, Sept. 12, 1931 • 
.. .. .. .... .. .. . ..... . 82Annual Report of the N.-A. A. c. P. for the Years 
1917 and 1918 (New York, 1918), p. 85. 
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belonging to the organization was only twenty, but after 
formation of the State Conference of Branches in that year, 
increasing interest resulted in the organization of over 
Sl..xty local branches. 83 Th N A A c· P L l C "tt e • • • • • ega onuni ee 
supplied much of the expertise necessary to prosecute 
cases such as the aforementioned case of W. E. Davis 
against T. C. Allen and the elimination of the understanding 
and educational questions asked by local registrars was a 
major goal of the organization in Virginia. 84 
Working to assist the N. A. A. c. P. in voter 
registration and payment of poll taxes were various local 
organizations. Groups such as the Norfolk Civic League, 
Nonpareil Literary, Social and Beneficial Association 
and Bachelor Benedicts, although social in nature, admitted 
only registered voters. Other organizations, such as 
the Young Men's Progressive League, set aside money for 
payment of the poll tax for members not able to pay. In 
addition, large city Independent Voter Leagues provided a 
medium for promotion of interest and action in all political 
matters affecting the Negro and worked particularly hard 
to get registered voters to pay their poll taxes. Activity 
by these groups was supplemented by Negro Citizen Voter 
83 ................ ··~ .. . . . .. . . ... . 
.. . . ·N' .A.A.C .P. :- .vir inia Conference 
Fifth Anniversary Issue, - 9 Ric 
14-15 •. 
84 .... ······ ..... . 
Journal and Guide, Jun. 21, 1930. 
Twent -
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Leagues, which conducted "gum-shoe" campaigns at election 
time and sent letters to registered voters reminding them 
I 
of tax payment deadlines, and by city Democratic clubs. 
I 
I 
Of ten these organizations had backing from other Negro 
groups and churches. 85 Negro college students participated 
ma~ing a house to house canvass in Negro districts and 
carrying signs reading, "A Voteless People Is A Defenseless 
People - Pay Your Poll Taxes By May 4, at the Court House." 
Too often, however, reports from the local canvass indicated 
Negro indifference and the opinion that voting was "white 
folks business. 1186 
One attempt to organize the various socia1., fraternal 
and civic groups on a statewide basis to stimulate the 
exercis.e of suffrage by the Negro was made in 1932. The 
call for such a nonpartisan group was instituted by A. 
w. E. Bassette, a Hampton attorney, and Portsmouth attorney 
Thomas H. Reid, and resulted in the creation of the United 
Civic League of Virginia, with Bassette serving as president. 
The league vowed not only to prepare its members for the 
exercise of the duties of citizenship but also promised 
to protect and defend its members against "injustice and 
discrimination in the administration of government, and 
85Ibid., Dec. 19, 26, 1931, Mar. 5, 1932, Aug. 5, 
1933, May 4, 1935. 
86
rbid., May 4, 1935. 
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against enactment of laws which retard their progress as 
citizens of Virginia." The league would supply b~ckground 
information on candidates for public office and inform its 
\ 
members of happenings of a public nature affecting the 
Negro. A legal committee was to provide its services 
free, and plans were instituted to form local civic leagues 
87 in every town, city and county. Editor P. B. Young of 
the Norfolk Journal and Guide keynoted the organizational 
meeting stressing the importance of Negro action to improve 
th N I • t' 88 e egro s posi ion. 
Evidently, the organization stimulated activity. The 
Journal and Guide credited the United Civic League with 
aiding the high political enthusiasm prior to the 1932 
primaries. Large crowds appeared to listen to President 
Bassette explain the function of the United Civic League, 
and in Covington, a group associated with the league was 
able to secure the appointment of a local school principal 
who advocated increased attention to the needs of local 
county training schools. 89 
The United Civic League undoubtedly achieved only 
limited success, for by 1941, an active member of the league 
organized the Virginia Voters' League in an effort to band 
. 
87 Ibid., Mar 12, 19, 1932. 
88rbld., Mar. 19, 1932. 
89
rbid., Apr. 2, Jul. 16, 1932. 
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together local voters leagues and civic associations under 
one head that could coordinate their activities. The 
director of the new league, from 1941 to the time of his 
death in 1950, was Luther P. Jackson, histor.y professor 
at Virginia State College, secretary of the Virginia Teachers 
Association and long-time participant in N. A. A. c. P. 
activities in Virginia. 90 The slogan of the Virginia 
Voters' League became "Pay the poll tax in order to 
abolish the poll tax. 1191 
Jackson saw a number of reasons for non-payraent of the 
poll tax. First there was the great delinquency among 
Negroes in the payment of all taxes. This was complicated 
by an ignorance of the final date for payment of the poll 
tax and the belief that the tax could only be paid at 
the time when other taxes were paid. There was also a 
lack of interest in politics among Negroes caused by the 
prepayment requirement, ignorance of the fact that the 
funds from the tax went to support the public schools, 
and the escape offered by the no lien provisions of the 
t . t" 92 state cons itu ion. To remedy at least some of these 
90Times-Dispatch, Apr. 13, 1950; Dorothy B. -Porter, 
.,,Luther P. Jackson Bibliographical Notes," Negro History 
Bulletin, XIII {Jun., 1950), 213-215 • 
. ... ······ ................... . 91Annual Re ort of the .Virginia Voters' League, The 
Voting Status of Uegroes in Virginia, 1943. Petersburg, 1944), 
p. 1. Hereafter cited as Annual Report of V.V.L. 
92Ibid., 1944, p.8. 
conditions, the Virginia Voters' League published an 
annual report that surrunarized the advances made i~ Negro 
registration, \ listed procedures and requirements fbr 
I 
96 
registration, supplied a registration application and gave 
information on Negro candidates for public office in 
Virginia. There is no accurate estimate of the eventual 
size of the league available. While 10,000 copies of the 
first annual report of the league were published, a letter 
to a poll tax repeal advocate in 1949 indicates that 
Jackson, through the Virginia Voters' League, was "in 
touch 1' with only 900 persons. 93 But Jackson undoubtedly 
reached a wider audience by means of his weekly "Rights 
and Duties in a Democracy" column, begun in 1942, that 
appeared in the Journal and Guide. Writing on subjects 
such as "intricacies of the Poll Tax," "Failing to 
Register, 11 and "Paying the Poll Tax, but Failing to 
Register," Jackson stressed the importance of Negro 
participation in politics if the race was to have a part 
in its own future. 94 
Jackson's efforts coincided with those of the Journal 
and Guide, the leading Negro newspaper in Virginia. 
Especially after the Davis v. Allen decision, the newspaper 
93 . . Ibid., 1943, p. l.; Luther P. Jackson to Francis P. 
Miller, NOV'. 4, 1949, box 76, Miller Papers. 
94.. . ........ ······ .... . 
Journal and Guide, Oct. 24, Nov. 7, Dec. 1942. 
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reported both the ease with which registration was now 
possible and the increased Negro registration figures, 
along with reports of new registration drives undertaken 
by local organizations. Notification of poll tax payment 
deadlines was a prominent and continuing practice, as was 
criticism of the Democratic party efforts to continue 
the limited primary. "Good sense," the newspaper said, 
demanded that Democrats give up the rattling of "the 
sabre in the tents of a mythical white supremacy" before 
they forced Negroes and whites into the Communist party. 95 
Nor did the paper let the Democrats escape with other 
"political tricks" such as the mailing of poll tax bills 
to whites only. The Journal and Guide caught the Richmond 
city treasurer, who claimed that no tax bills were sent 
out for less than five dollars, in a prevarication by 
producing serial numbers of bills sent to white voters 
for one dollar and fifty cents, and exposed the practice 
of treasurers that made Negroes believe they owed two 
years poll tax when in fact they owed three. 96 
Another politically informative device used by the 
Norfolk paper was a questionnaire sent to candidates for 
95Editorial in ibid., May 27, 1933. See also ibid., 
Apr. 2, Oct. 8, 1932, May 13, Aug. 5, 1933 . 
... .. ... . .. 
96 rbid., Dec. 9, 16, 1933i Times-Dispatch, Dec. 5, 
8, 1933.-
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public office at election time. The newspaper faithfully 
published the answers by the candidates to such questions 
as their views on jury service for Negroes, the salary 
scales for Negro teachers, equal pay for blacks in public 
works projects, and whether they favored repeal or 
modification of the poll tax law as a prerequisite to 
voting. While some candidates responded in a manner 
unique to politicians, the Journal and Guide was impressed 
by the liberal tone of many responses and reported that 
the questionnaire had definitely had a "very evident" 
effect. 97 
The Norfolk newspaper, however, never lessened its 
attack on the poll tax. While.attempting to communicate 
to its readers that payment of the tax was a responsibility 
of citizenship, the newspaper stressed the political 
expediency of voting. Very few groups of any race who 
did not take the pains to make themselves of some importance 
politically received any consideration at the hands of 
those who control the government, the paper observed. 
"A voteless people is a helpless people politically and 
have no influence with anybody," therefore it was necessary 
for the Negro to take the first step himself if he wished 
The 
who 
. f 
97Journal and Guide, Jul. 29, 1933, Aug. 3, 1935. 
paper also faithfully reported the names of politicians 
failed to reply to their questionnaire. 
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to remedy his own disabilities. At present, the poll 
tax was "merely a subterfuge to keep certain people from 
voting," but with increased effort from the Negro popula-
tion, the hold of the dominant political machine could be 
broken, resulting in the removal of the "last illegitimate 
descendent of the original disfranchisement devices, and 
••• the return of the government to the people. 1198 The 
Journal and Guide, like the Virginia Voters' League, 
believed it was necessary to "Pay the poll tax in order 
to abolish the poll tax." 
CONCLUSION 
Virginia's attempt to reform her suffrage system in 
1902 undeniably did not bring the good government that was 
desired. Resourceful politicians resorted to the use of 
political fraud in elections, found a willing class of 
venal voters, and circumvented election procedures with 
the widespread abuse of an absentee voters law. Since 
state election machinery was controlled in most areas by 
the Democratic organization, the losers in the process 
were Virginia Republicans and the Negro. The Republicans 
discovered in 1921 that to campaign on the election reform 
issue, especially to advocate removal of the poll tax, was 
to raise cries of endangering white supremacy and to court 
98Editorials in ibid., May 20, 1933, Sept. 29, Oct. 
20, Nov. 3, 1934, Jan.~26, 1935. 
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political disaster. Unwanted by the Republicans and 
ignored by state Democrats, the Negro learned early that 
the only chance for a voice in his own future rested with 
! 
I • Negro political action. But the 1921 lily black experience 
illustrated effectively the great distance it was necessary 
to travel before the Negro could gain the control he 
desired. 
Long perserverance in state and Federal courts 
eventually resulted in the slight opening that was 
necessary, first the admittance to the South's white 
primary, and then the escape from the capriciousness of 
the local registrar. This accomplished, the Virginia 
Negro could turn to what the Journal and Guide described 
as the last illegitimate descendant of the original 
disfranchising devices, the poll tax. Once the way was 
open, the Uegro community proved amazingly resourceful, 
perhaps even more so than whites. With the assistance 
of the N.A.A.C.P., the United Civic League of Virginia, 
the Virginia Voters' League, newspapers, and other social, 
fraternal and religious groups, a campaign was undertake'il 
to stress to the Negro the importance of participation in 
the political process. It was a slow process. But a 
new political awareness emerged, recognizing the .political 
importance of placing even its comparitively small support 
in the right place. At a Norfolk Civic League meeting in 
1933 initiating a drive for 1,000 voters as new members, 
...__.. ___ . 
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the league members agreed upon the necessity of working with 
Virginia Democrats if they hoped to achieve anything. 99 
The Virginia Voters' League and the editorials of 
the Norfolk Journal and Guide reflect the Negro's attitude 
toward the poll tax during this period. If the Negro was 
to be of consequence politically, it was necessary to 
register and pay the poll tax. Once the Negro was of 
consequence politically, he could use his influence in an 
effort to abolish the poll tax. But the Virginia Negro 
needed further assistance in the fight against the tax. 
That assistance emerged from several unlikely sources during 
the late 1930's. 
99Journal and Guide, Jul. 22, 1933. 
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CHAPTER III 
"RESPECTABLE" OPPOSITION APPEARS, 1936-1945 
In 1942, Virginius Dabney, editor of the Richmond 
Time~r-DLs·p·atch, observed that "From the crags above Harper's 
Ferry to the Mesas fringing the Rio Grande, a revolt is 
brewing against the poll tax. 111 The poll tax had persisted, 
Dabney believed, because a portion of the population viewed 
it as still necessary for "white supremacy," because 
politicians with power saw the status quo and their own 
existence threatened by its removal, and because the 
attitude of the disfranchised whites was indifferent or 
inarticulate. The political and social consequences of 
retention of the levy were burdensome: the tax tended to 
encourage corruption and contributed to the partial atrophy 
of the democratic process while placing obstacles in the 
way of needed social and labor legislation in the states 
where the beneficiaries of such legislation could note vote. 2 
1virginius Dabney,· Be·1·ow the· p·otomac,· A Book About 
· ·th·e· Net-t South (New York, 1942) , p·. 106. Hereafter cited 
as Dabney,· Be·1·ow th·e· Potomac. Dabney ' s "Sh al 1 the Sou th ' s 
Poll Tax Go?" New York· Times Magazine, Feb. 12, 19 39 , pp. 
9, 20, expresses essentially the same ideas relative to the 
poll tax. 
·
2Ibid., pp. 113-114. 
1Q3 
Dabney's comments reveal that the poll tax had 
finally emerged as a respectable issue of debate, not just 
a subject to be relinquished to carping Republicans and 
! 
I 
I 
Negroes. By 1942, a number of events had transpired that 
brought the matter to increased public attention. Of 
particular importance are the activities of Virginia governors 
Westmoreland Davis, the state's chief executive from 1918 
to 1922 who had left the Governor's mansion to edit an 
agricultural journal, and James H. Price, a Democratic 
organization man who had come out publicly for poll tax 
repeal in the gubernatorial campaign of 1938 and pursued 
his efforts once he entered the statehouse. 
From 1942 until 1949, the tempo of activity of the 
poll tax repeal forces appeared to increase geometrically. 
Public discussion of the poll tax led to legislative dis-
cussion, which was stimulated further by the consideration 
of Federal action to eliminate the tax as a prerequisite 
to voting in national elections. Then, in trying to deal 
with a situation created by Congress's declaration of war, 
Virginia politicians were forced to face a test of strength 
between poll tax repeal forces and those elements that 
considered retention of the levy essential to good govern-
ment. Finally, Virginia was reminded of the abuses possible 
under its election system in a contested election for 
lieutenant governor late in 1945. 
Ultimately these events led to a situation discussed 
in the following chapter. Between 1938 and 1945, the revolt 
104 
against the poll tax was brought from the point of brewing 
to the point of boiling and confirmed the prediction of 
that Constitutional Convention delegate of 1902 who fore-
saw that the poll tax prerequisite would "rise up to give 
. 
us trouble in the years to come. 113 
THE' SOUTHERN' PLANTER ATTACKS THE TAX 
In 1942, Virginius Dabney credited the Richmond 
published Southern· Pl·an'ter with the "first important 
contribution made to poll tax literature during the past 
. 4 
several decades." This is a somewhat unusual and sur-
prising claim on two counts. First of all, the· Southern 
Pl'anter had been established in 1841 as a non-political 
agricultural monthly publicizing the advantages of the 
new scientific farming procedures. Secondly, the editor 
of the magazine at the time Dabney wrote was a former 
. governor, Westmoreland Davis. 
Davis, a Democrat in the gentleman-farmer-aristocrat 
tradition, had been governor of Virginia from 1918 to 1922, 
a period of Virginia government marked by a central theme 
of economy and efficiency. As governor, he had centralized 
state budgeting under the executive, issued the first 
executive budget in 1920, established a state purchasing 
agency and had instituted prison reforms. After leaving 
·3Deb'~te·s· of· the· c·onventi·on, II, p. 2865, remarks by 
George K. Anderson. 
4Dabney ,- Be'l'ow the Potomac, p. 108. 
the governorship, he was defeated in 1922 for a Senate 
seat by Claude Swanson. 5 While remaining politically 
aware, Davis devoted the majority of his energies until 
his death in 19 42 to the· SbUth·e·rn· Planter. 
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There is nothing in Davis's life or activities prior 
to the late 1930's to suggest that he ever questioned the 
rigid voter qualifications placed upon the Virginia 
electorate. Instead, it appears that Davis's concern for 
poll tax repeal grew out of the Depression and its effect 
upon the farmer. During the Roosevelt era, Davis, through 
the· SbUthe·r·n· Pl·anter, appealed for direct relief of the 
farmer, _thus becoming "one of the New Deal' s foremost 
friends in the upper South. 116 Being a defender of the New 
Deal policy meant attacking the foes of the Roosevelt 
program, and in Virginia this meant attacking Harry F. 
I 
Byrd and the state Democratic organization. So with "a 
spirit of liberal criticism" in the air, Davis became, as 
his biographer notes, "the first significant white Democrat 
in the Old Dominion to step forward and frontally assault 
the poll tax. 117 
The attack on the tax began in July, 1936, and 
continued until March, 1941, a period during which the 
..... : ..... ~Ja~k- T. Kirby, we·stmo·reland Davi·s·:· vi·rginia· Planter-
. Pb'l"iti·ci'an·,· '1'859-·1942 (Charlottesville, 1968), pp. 75, 97. 
·
6!hi.a., pp. 185-86 • 
.7 Ib·i.a. ; p • 19 3 • 
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circulation of the· S'outherh· p·1·ahter in six states reached 
the 300,000 level. 8 In a series of editorials and articles, 
the magazine focused its attention upon the effect of the 
poll tax on Virginia politics and upon the farmer. The 
election laws of the state had diminished interest in 
government in Virginia, the· Plahter declared, and had 
"enabled a political organization to grow up that is 
unequaled in ruthlessness anywhere in this country. 119 
The cumulative and prepayment features were "a tremendous 
hardship on our citizens of low incomes - the farmer, the 
workingmen and their wives. 1110 If anyone doubted that the 
farmer was eager to vote, Davis offered the evidence 
provided by recent Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
tobacco referenda in which the farmer vote exceeded the 
total vote for President in the Virginia tobacco growing 
. 11 
regions. 
The· southe·rn· Pl'anter and Davis were especially active 
as the 1938 session of the General Assembly approached. 
·
8
·rbid. , p • 191. 
9 
"Government by the People, II editorial in' s·outh·ern 
. PTahter, XCVII (Jul.' 1936)' P· 4. 
1011The Virginia Poll Tax," editorial in· 'ibid., XCVII 
(Oc~., 1936), p. 20. 
1111The Right to Vote," editorial in· ·ibid., XCVIII (Jan., 
1937), p. 4; "The Right to Vote," editorial in ibid., C 
(Mar.·, 19 39) , p. 6. 
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After urging that women's clubs, the Granqe, the Virginia 
State Farm Bureau Federation, and all other rural groups 
I 
. 12 ; 
work to get the poll tax paid, letters were seqt by the 
I 
Planter to various leaders of farmer organizations in the 
state. "If we need the revenue, which the poll tax affords," 
one letter declared, "let's assess it_ generally and collect 
it without any relation to voting," thus not allowing 
people to escape taxation by surrendering a voice in the 
. government. 13 To the president of the Agricultural Con-
ference Board, the· Planter recommended that the Grange 
urge the General Assembly to pass. an enabling act permitting 
·the people of the state to change the constitution. 14 Once 
the legislature convened, letters were sent to all members 
of the General Assembly with reprints of three articles 
·from the· PTanter on the poll tax. 15 
Some idea of the course, and effectiveness, of the 
SO'Uthe·rn· Pl'anter • s attack on the poll tax is offered by 
one of its more ambitious editorials, "The Poll Tax - A 
Burden Upon Education. 1116 One shibboleth of poll tax 
1211The Right to Vote," editorial in· ibid., XCVIII 
--. (Jan., 1937), p. 4. 
13P. D. Sanders to Mark Turner, Nov. 29, 1937, box 
122, Davis Papers. 
14P. D. Sanders to C. Nelson Bech, Nov. 29, 1937, ·ibid. 
15Letters to members of the Virginia General Assembly 
from the· Southe-rn· Pl·anter, Feb. 14, 1938,· 'ibid. 
1611The Poll Tax - A Burden Upon Education," editorial 
in· sou·the·rn· PTanter XCIX (Jan., 1938), pp. 5, 25. 
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defenders was that the tax was necessary to secure revenue 
for the public school system of the state. Accompanied by 
a careful compilation of statistics, the Planter revealed 
that two-thirds of the adult population of Virginia escaped 
making any poll tax payment, thus robbing the state school 
system of $1,315,528 in 1935 alone. Further investiga-
tion revealed that from one-fifth to one-third of all 
persons assessable with capitation taxes were never assessed, 
and that often from one-third to one-half of the assess-
ments made were actually never paid. "Hence," the Planter 
declared, "we • • • picture the voter poll tax as an arch..,. 
enemy of education • • 
Other editorials attacked the absentee voting ballot 
as the "little brother" of the poll tax allowing the 
prostitution of the spirit and letter of the law by "poli-
18 ticians eager for personal advantage." When Federal action 
to eliminate the tax was being considered, the p1·anter 
19 added its voice in support. And as world war became more 
of a possibility, the magazine declared that "double-
barrelled democracy demands that the responsibility to 
l.7Ihid. 
18 ' 
"Menace of the Mail Ballot, " editorial in· ·ibid. , 
c (Feb. I 1938) I 8. 
19 
"The Poll Tax Must Go," editorial in· 'ihid. , CI 
(May, 1940) , 4. 
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defend the country in time of war carries with it the 
20 
right to vote in time of peace." One informative article 
by a member of the Virginia Department of Taxation traced 
the suffrage history of the state from the colonial period, 
demonstrating that up until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Virginia's suffrage had been an expanding one and 
concluded that citizens of the state should demand an 
amendment to remove the poll tax, "the vicious limitation 
f d f N b t . f . th h. t t 11 21 rame or egroes u cruci ying e w i e vo ers • • • • 
The intensity of discussion of the poll tax was definitely 
raised by the appearance of the· southern· p1·anter articles • 
The Richmond Time·s--ni·spatch reprinted one of the· p·1·anter' s 
editorials against the tax, and Virginius Dabney used the 
delinquency rate argument to support tax modification in 
his book on the South. 22 Other publications gave the 
information supplied by Davis exposure outside of both 
V. . . d th f d 0 23 L 1 D t' irginia an e armer au ience. oca ernocra ic 
20"Double....;.Barrelled Dernocracy,n editorial in ibid., 
CII (Mar., 1941), 8. 
21John H. Russell, "Highlights of Virginia Suffrage 
History," ibid., XCIX (Feb., 1938), 5, 21-24. 
22Time·s·-nisoatch, Nov. 23, 1937; Dabney,· B'e'l'ow the 
Potomac, p. 117. 
23clipping from L'OU'i'sVi'l'l'e' co·urie·r·-·Journ·a1 I Apr. 9, 
1939, box 95, Miller Papers; George c. Stoney, "Suffrage 
in the South I Part I I The Poll Tax I II su·rvey Gr·aphic I XXIX 
(Jan., 1940), 5-9, 41-43. 
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organi.zations debated the question of whether the tax 
should be retained and requested information from the 
Planter. 24 State politicians reported to Davis that there 
was sentiment among influential members of the Senate of 
Virginia to repeal or .modify the tax and to remove many 
of the iniquities of. the absentee ballot. 25 The Virginia 
Young Democrats considered the poll tax enough of a poli-
ti.cal question to authorize a conuni ttee to study the possi-
bilities of changes in the election laws. Unfortunately, 
the committee report made no suggestions for modifications 
but offered an insight into the thinking any subsequent 
efforts at repeal would have to overcome. As long as a 
sizeable portion of the electorate participate, the 
conunittee declared, "good government is not dependent upon 
a universal and wholesale representation at the polls." 
These Young Democrats feared that removal of the poll tax 
"would tend to place in the hand~.of any demagogue the 
power to destroy the very objects of good government," 
allowing persons with "no sense of responsibility" to be 
cajoled into going to the polls and "voting for all types 
of proposals and candidates. 1126 
24Mrs. w. P. Elmore to Westmoreland Davis, Apr. 3, 
1939, box 122 Davis ;t>apeJ;s. 
25Representative Norman R. Hamilton to Westmoreland 
Davis, Nov. 30, 1937, ibid. 
2611Report of the Conunittee on the Study of the 
Capitation Tax as a Pre-requisite to Voting, 0 Virginia 
While the Young Democrats studied and debated, the 
General Assembly of 1938 considered possible changes in 
111 
the election law relative to the poll tax. Early in the 
session, it became apparent that outright repeal of the tax 
was an impossibility when the Senate defeated such a pro-
posal. 27 But two other resolutions with .more limited ob-
jectives did receive the attention of the House Committee 
on Privileges and Elections. One measure, introduced by 
Washington County delegate, William N. Neff, sought changes 
in the law that would have allowed the General Assembly to 
handle poll tax regulations and stipulated payment any 
time from one to three years. 28 The second resolution was 
submitted by Richmond delegate A. O. Boschen and sought to 
reduce the tax to one dollar, require only one year's pay-
ment, and allow payment up to thirty days prior to an 
Democrat, V (Jul., 1939}, 4-6, box 95, Miller Papers. Mem-
bers of the committee were Mrs. John Marshall, Charles R. 
Fenwick, Daniel Weymouth, R. L. Anderson, Richard s. Wright, 
and M. Raymond Doubles. Doubles, chairman of the committee, 
did submit a minority report in which he generally agreed 
with the majority but recommended that a city or county 
provide for one day's work as a substitute for payment of 
the poll tax. 
27Times-Dispatch, Feb. 23, 1938. Senator Vivian Page 
introduced the proposal. 
2811 House Joint Resolution B, 1938 Session, 11 series 1, 
box 10, Robert Whitehead ;papers, University of Virgi.nia 
Library, Charlottesvi.lle, Va. Hereafter cited as Whitehead 
Papers. 
1 t . 29 e ec ion. The two resolutions were supported by such 
independent Democrats as former State Senator c. O'Conor 
Goolrick, Francis P. Miller, Robert Whitehead and former 
delegate Melvin B. Nunnally from Richmond but failed to 
win the approval of committee chairman, George A. 
Massenburg. 30 
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The proposal by Neff was presented as an indirect re-
sult of the articles appearing in the Southern Planter and 
the direct efforts of Francis P. Miller, General Assembly 
member from Fairfax County. Miller was a member of the 
Virginia Policy Committee, a non-governmental organization 
studying problems of state interest. The policy committee 
had adopted resolutions in late 1937 proposing, among 
other things, the reduction of the poll tax to one dollar 
and the creation by the Governor of a study commission to 
eliminate election law abuses. 31 After reading the arti-
cles appearing in the Planter, Miller wrote several promi-
nent and influential Virginians, including Neff, praising 
the articles and the resulting coverage and asking if they 
agreed that the first step toward liberalization would be 
29
"House Joint Resolution No. 1, 1938 Session," ibid.; 
Francis P. Mi.ller to Charles Picket, Apr. 7, 1941, box9'5';" 
};tiller Papers. 
JOTimes-Di~spatch, Feb. 23, 1938. 
31
"Virginia Policy Conunittee Resolutions, Oct. 9-10( 
1937," boJC 95, lliller Papers. The Virginia Policy Committee 
was the affiliate of the National Policy Committee. 
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removal of voting regulations from the constitution in order 
that the General Assembly have final authority over the 
matter. 32 
i 
Neff responded that sucn a proposal wocild 
"command a great deal of support", and Miller urged Neff to 
introduce a resolution to accomplish the result during the 
forthcoming General Assembly session. 33 
It is unfortunate that the General Assembly did not 
give more consideration to the proposals presented in 
1938, but the efforts by Neff, aoschen and Miller amply 
illustrate the effect of the Southern Planter articles on 
the poll tax discussion. With few exceptions over the 
preceeding third of a century, criticism of the poll tax 
had been the domain of Virginia Negroes and Republicans. 
The articles appearing in the Planter assaulting the poll 
tax helped give respectability to the revolt against the 
tax. The Planter was white, Protestant and Democratic, 
which guaranteed a hearing by an audience larger than 
state Republicans and Negroes could appeal to. The manner 
in which the argument was presented and the underplaying 
of the Negro's grievances to those of the poor white made 
the attack .more acceptable to some Virginians threatened by 
32Francis P. Mi.ller to Virginius Dabney, Dec. 3 1 1937; 
F. ;J? • .Mill.er to W. N. Neff, Dec. 7, 193 7; Howard B. Bloomer, 
editor of the Arlington Sun, to F. P. Miller, Dec. 7, 1937, 
ibid. ~-
33w. N. Neff to Francis P • .Miller, Dec. 9, 1937; F. 
P. Miller to W. N. Neff, Dec. 17, 1937; W. N. Neff to F. P. 
Miller, Dec. 23, 1937, ibid. 
114 
the loss of "white supremacy." Again, as Virginius 
Dabney noted, the poll tax was under fire, and that fire 
was getting hotter. 34 
GOVERNOR PRICE AND THE GOOCH REPORT 
After the failure to secure election law reform 
duri.ng the 1938 General Assembly session, poll tax repeal 
forces resorted to a more oblique approach, and found a 
powerful ally in State Controller LeRoy Hodges, long time 
advocate of poll tax reform. Hodges estimated that 
$1,200,000 in state revenues were lost annually through 
the failure to collect poll taxes and revealed that only 
forty percent of the amount due the state had been collect-
ed over the past three years. As a result, the State 
Controller's office desired to initiate stronger measures 
to enforce collection. 35 This tactic was designed to 
stir a popular rebellion against the tax, and Hodges ad-
mitted privately that "if the people do not want the poll 
taxes enforced, then I think the next General Assembly 
should nullify the statutes. 1136 Hodges's effort met with 
little success, however, probably because it would have 
34 Dabney, Below the Potomac, p. 126. 
35 Press release tram LeRoy Hodges, Jan. 30, 1939, 
box 95 ( Miller ;!?ape.rs. 
36LeRoy Hodges to Francis P. Miller, Feb. 2, 1939; 
clipping from Louisville Courier-Journal, Apr. 9, 1939, 
ibid. 
115 
required the cooperation of local tax officials, loyal 
organization men. 
New enthusiasm emerged and the possibility for poll 
tax reform increased the following year when Governor 
James H. Price advocated such in an address .to the General 
Assembly. Repeal forces had contacted Price prior to his 
assuming office in 1938 and found him receptive to the 
proposals of the Virginia Policy Committee and willing to 
submit the poll tax problem to a governmental study. 37 
In his 1940 message, Price referred the study to the 
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council, requesting revision 
and codification of all election laws. 38 It was generally 
recognized, the Governor declared, that the state's elec-
tion machinery was in need of repair. Many citizens were 
disfranchised because of "mistakes" in records; block pay-
ment of the poll tax had become a "racket", and the ab-
sentee voter's law was "openly violated." Addressing him-
self directly to the matter of the poll tax, Governor 
Price said, 
The poll tax has become, in the last analysis, 
an instrument of fraud and vicious practices. • • 
If this form of tax is to be continued, it should 
be safeguarded and possibly reduced in amount so 
that .more people would individually become inter-
ested in its pay,.ment. • .Condi.tions have changed 
31c. O'Conor Goolrick to Francis. l> • .Miller, Dec. 18, 
1937, ibid. 
38 4 Journal of the Senate, 19 O, document no. 1, p. 22. 
since 1902 , and I believe that our attitude 
should be more liberal ••• Personally, I feel 
that i.t [the tax] should be retained, a smaller 
tax imposed, and a more earnest effort made 
to collect i.t. 39 
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As a result of Price's recommendations, a bill making 
the block payment of poll taxes a f elo~y was introduced in 
the General Assembly. The debate on the measure reveals 
much about the existing abuse of Virginia's election laws. 
Delegate V. C. Smith of Buchanan County stated that "if 
you put this law into effect, you won't have half the 
people in the Ni.nth district voting," while a Hanover 
County delegate reported that one prominent man had told 
him that "if you don't pass this bill, you are going to 
break another man of this town and myself because we have 
to get up money to pay the poll taxes for all the people." 
The effort at reform apparently appeared futile to some 
delegates for, as one Virginia legislator remarked, "if 
you make the block buying of poll taxes a felony, no jury 
will ever convict the accused person. 1140 
Despite the fact that the proposed legislation had 
the direct support of Governor Price and the indirect 
approval of Senator Byrd, the measure was defeatea. 41 In 
39
rbid., pp. 27-28. 
40Times-Di.spatch, Mar. 1, 1940. 
41The Winchester Evening Star, a newspaper owned by 
Senator Byrd, endorsed the bill as being in the cause of 
good government. Editorial from the Winchester Evening Star, 
quoted by ibid., Mar. 2, 1940. 
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an effort to claim some credit for reform of the election 
laws, the General Assembly did pass a bill supposedly de-
signed to prevent block buying. The act required that 
local treasurers report to the commonwealth's attorney any 
payment of poll taxes for political purposes, but the 
measure was emasculated by imposing no penalty for failure 
42 to report such payments. The effect of the legislation, 
as the Portsmouth Star pointed out, would be to "merely 
legalize the present practices" because candidates fre-
quently had their political workers collect authorization 
coupons from assessed voters allowing someone else to 
pay their poll taxes. The candidate for office then gave 
the collected slips and the necessary money to the trea-
surer in exchange for the poll tax receipts. 43 
Even though the General Assembly stumbled in its 
attempt to revise the election laws, the Virginia Advisory 
Legislative Council acted to carry out the study recommend-
ed by Governor Price. Late in March, 1941, Senator 
Leonard G. Muse of Roanoke, a member of the Council, 
authorized the creation of three subcommittees to investi-
gate and report changes which should be made to the 
constitutional, absent voters, and statutory voting 
42 Acts of the General Assembly, 1940, p. 390. 
43Editorial from the Portsmouth Star, quoted by the 
Times-Dispatch, l1ar. 3, 1940. 
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procedures. The three members appointed to the subconunittee 
investigating consti.tutional voting procedures were 
Robert K. Gooch, a University of Virginia professor, 
Radford attorney Ted Dalton, a Republican, and Col. James 
P. Woods of Roanoke, a traditional Democrat. 44 The 
principal matter of concern for this subcommittee, Senator 
Muse told the members, was the question of retention of 
45 the poll tax. 
The subcommittee held two hearings, one in Richmond, 
the other in Roanoke. At the Richmond hearing in July, 
there were six speakers against the poll tax while only 
one person, Capt. Nathaniel Ewell of Charlottesville, 
appeared in defense. Moss Plunkett of Roanoke, then 
running in the Democratic primary for lieutenant governor, 
attacked the tax as violating the spirit and letter of the 
Virginia Bill of Rights and asked that legislative action 
be instituted to allow the voters to decide if the levy 
44Robert K. Gooch, The Poll Tax in Vir inia Suffra e 
Histor A Premature Proposal for Reform Charlottesville, 
969 _, pp. 7, 11-12. Hereafter cited as Gooch, The Poll 
Tax in Virginia Suffrage History. This book is a reprint 
of the 1941 report. The 1941 report of the subcommittee, 
whi.ch became known as the Gooch report, entitled "Report 
of the Subcommittee for a Study of Constitutional Provisions 
Concerning Voting in Virginia" can also be found in the 
Hutchinson Papers, box 18, and the Byrd papers, box 179. 
45Leonard G. Muse to Robert K. Gooch, Mar. 26, 1941, 
quoted in ibid., p. 12. 
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should be retained. Senator Hunsdon Cary of Henrico, also 
running in the primary race for Governor, asserted that re-
peal of the poll tax would awaken the electorate and thus 
cure some of the state's ills. In defense of the tax, 
Ewell could only say that he believed "the bulk of the 
people we get rid of (as voters) are those not mentally 
qualified. 1146 The same forces, led by Plunkett, attacked 
the tax at the subcommittee hearing in Roanoke on August 
23. Once again there was but a single defender, local 
attorney James c. Martin. 47 
Aft.er collecting a mass of information at the hear-
ings and from other sources, the subcommittee prepared and 
submitted its report to the Virginia Advisory Legislative 
Council in early November, 1941. The subcommittee report 
advocated two changes in the election laws of the· state. 
After noting that registration was often the final factor 
preventing voter participation in elections, the majority 
of the subcommittee concluded that the fundamental defect 
46Times-Dispatch, Jul. 6, 1941. Other people advo-
cating repeal were David G. George, chai.rman of the Virginia 
Electoral Reform League, Ray Thomason, regional director of 
the c. I. o., R. H. Wilton of the Virginia Federation of 
Labo,r, Howard Davis of Richmond and Howard Carwile of 
Cha,rlotte. 
47 Ibid., Aug. 24, 1941; Roanoke Times, Aug. 24, 1941. 
Others present attacking the tax included Virgil Goode of 
Rocky Mount, a member of the House of Delegates and Robert 
c. Jackson, former Roanoke city attorney. 
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in the registration system was the discretionary authority 
of registration officials. To remedy the defect, a fairly 
and impartially administered literacy test was reconunended. 
The second recommendation was that the poll tax be elimi-
t d . . t. 48 na e as a prerequisite to vo ing. 
The Gooch report is unique among government sponsored 
studies because of i.ts brief eloquence and·the force of its 
logic. This is illustrated by the discussion of the evi-
dence considered before reaching the conclusion that the 
poll tax should be removed. The subcommittee recognized the 
difficulties presented by its recommendation. First, there 
was the problem of amending the state constitution, and 
then there was the historical fact of a restricted suffrage 
for the previous half century. The result, as the majority 
assessed it, was that suffrage restriction "has entered in-
to the people's habits of thought; and a consequent inertia 
exists" taking the form of unquestioning acceptance and un-
49 
reasoned hostility to change. Despite the obstacles to be 
overcome, "advocacy of retenti.on of the poll tax and genuine 
belief in political democracy are basically irreconcilable," 
leading the subcommittee to conclude that the principal, 
if not the only, argument to be made concerning the effect 
48 Gooch, The Poll Tax in Virgini.a Suffrage History, 
pp. 15 ' 2 6 ' 2 9 • 
49
rbid., pp. 15-16. 
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of liberalizing the suffrage in Virginia was that "the 
government of the State would be placed upon a democratic 
basis -- the only basis worthy of the best tradition of 
the Conunonwealth. 1150 
Addressing directly the questions raised hy those 
who advocated retention of the tax, the Gooch report stated 
that the assertion that more people paid the poll tax than 
voted in the elections was a canard. Such a charge im-
plied that the poll tax did not operate as a limitation 
upon the elective franchise. If the supporters of reten-
tion believed this to be true, they could not consistently 
object to the removal of the tax. "If the poll tax pro-
visions do not serve the purpose of restricting the suf-
frage," the report declared, "they do not serve any pur-
pose at all. 1151 The contention that payment of the tax 
was a desirable test of interest in government was, the 
subconunittee found, simply an unsupported assertion whose 
opposite was equally as plausible. From all the evidence 
and testimony, the only logical conclusion that could be 
reached was that no test or penalty was justifiable. 52 
When the final report of the Virginia Advisory 
Legislative Council was presented to Governor ~rice in 
December, 1941, the changes reconunended in Virginia's 
SOih'd ~·1 pp. 18-19, 22. 
52
rbid., pp. 25-26. 
51Ih'd 
---2:;._• I p. 22. 
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election laws were that the absentee voting procedures be 
amended, the time during which the polls were open be 
lengthened, that provisi.ons be made for special primaries, 
and that a three judge court be authorized to hear con-
tested election cases. The only indication of other sub-
conunittee findings was the statement that "several sub-
conunittees made other recommendations upon which the 
Council did not find it possible to agree. • • • The 
only existing evidence of the Council meeting of November 
7, at which the Gooch report was discussed, indicates that 
evidently no interest was aroused by the Gooch report re-
d t . 54 conunen a ions. 
Thus the Gooch report remained hidden fro~ public 
attention. It is now evident that the Advisory ~ouncil 
intended for it to remain hidden, for the Gooch =eport 
was unusually ordered filed "under lock and key" in the 
office of the Legislative Reference Bureau.SS I~ would 
have remained hidden had it not been for the efforts of 
Moss Plunkett, now head of the Virginia Electora2 Reform 
s3 "Report of the Virginia Advisory Legi.sla-=.ive 
Council, Dec. 12, 1941," box 17, Governor James ~- Price 
Executive Papers, Virginia State Library, Richmo:=i.5, Va. 
54Gooch, The Poll Tax in Virginia Suffrage 3istory, 
pp. 33-34. 
55 . 
E. R. Combs to Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 16, i:;.42, box 
133, Harry F. Byrd :Papers, University of Virgini.~ Library, 
Charlottesville, Va. Hereafter cited as Byrd Pa-;:.'-ers. It 
is interesting to note that even Senator Byrd die not know 
about the existence of the report until November, 1942. 
See, Harry F. Byrd to E. R. Combs, Nov. 10, 1942,. ibid. 
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League organized in June, 1941, to fight for the elimina-
tion of the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. 
In February, 1942, a joint Senate and House Privileges 
and Elections Committee was to hear testimony on Senator 
Vivian Page's bill to abolish the poll tax prerequisite. 56 
The pending hearing prompted the Times-Dispatch to 
editorially ask what had happened to the Gooch report. 
"Thunderous silence has enveloped the whole matter since 
early last fall," the newspaper noted, and the silence 
could only be interpreted to mean that "the report con-
tained a minimum of whitewash and a maximum of forthright 
criticism of the status quo, and that its contents did not 
find favor with the political powers that be. 1157 At the 
hearing on the Page bill, Moss Plunkett produced a copy of 
the Gooch report and proceeded to read it to the members of 
the House and Senate present "for fear that they had never 
seen or heard of the report. 1158 The exhumation of the 
report prompted the Times-Dispatch to state that it "must 
have been a first-magnitude bombshell for those who had 
kept this documentary dynamite under wraps for several 
56Times-Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1942. 
57Editorial in ibid., Feb. 12, 1942. 
58
rbid., Feb. 13, 1942; U. s. Congress, Senate, 
Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, Hearings, on 
S. 1280, Poll Taxes, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, p. 72. 
Cited hereafter as Senate Subcommittee of the Judiciary, 
Hearings on S. 1280, 1942. 
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months," and declared the poll tax a "relic of a by-gone 
era" and called for its repeal along with substantial 
changes in the registration laws. 59 I 
The revelation of the Gooch report did not aid the 
passage of Senator Page's bill, for it was never reported 
out of the Privileges and Elections Committee. But the 
Gooch report, an examinati.on of the poll tax question under-
taken by a division of the state government at the request 
of the Governor, had surfaced, and its conclusions were a 
contribution to the growing argument against retention of 
the levy as prerequisite to voting. Moss Plunkett con-
cluded his testimony in support of Page's bill by stating, 
"the day of final reckoning is almost at hand, even in 
Old Virginia." 60 
THE PRESSURE FOR REPEAL CONTINUES 
Despite General Assembly inaction on Senator Page's 
proposal, the pressure for modification of state election 
laws was maintained. Additional legislation was intro-
duced by Robert Whitehead to enforce collection of delin-
quent poll taxes. 61 In fact, Whitehead's arguments in 
support of his resolution are reminiscent of the 1902 
59Editorial in Times-Dispatch, Feb. 14, 1942. 
60
rbid., Feb. 1-3 / 1942. 
6111 House Joint Resolution No. 27, Feb. 16, 1942," 
seri.es 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers. 
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debates of the constitutional conventi.on. The objects 
of attack were the two sections of the state constitution 
i 
prohibi.ting collection of the poll tax by legal process 
I 
until it had become three years past due and prohibiting 
the placing of a li.en upon personal property exempted 
under the poor debtors law. 62 Several delegates to the 
constitutional convention objected to the provisions 
allowing these exemptions on the grounds that the state 
school system would be robbed of badly needed revenue. 63 
Whitehead estimated that the state lost one million 
dollars per year that could be used for the schools be-
f th t . . . 64 cause o e exemp ion provisions. If the two provisions 
were removed, Whitehead believed that the electorate would 
be increased and the revenue collected would also increase. 
The poll tax had become "a mere fee, payable or not at 
will" for admission to the ballot box. 65 The result was 
that the people of Virginia had become "content to go 
their own way and let the other people pay the taxes and 
. 66 
and do the voting." Like Senator Page's bill, 
62constituti.on of Virginia, 1902, sec. 22 and 173. 
63nebates of the Convention, II., pp. 2860-61, remarks 
by T. W. Harrison. 
64Robert Whi.tehead to A. Willis Robertson, Nov. 24, 
1944, series 1, box 10, Whitehead papers. 
65Robert Whitehead to Howard H. Davi.s, Jul. 15, 1941, 
ibi.d. 
66Robert Whitehead to A. Willis Robertson, Nov. 24, 
1944, ibid. 
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Whitehead's effort failed to gain the approval of the 
Privileges and Elections Committee and the 1942 General 
Assembly sessi.on passed without seeing any changeJ in the 
~,I election laws. 
At this point attention turned to events unfolding 
in Washington as the Senate considered a measure introduced 
by Senator Claude Pepper of Florida that would have removed 
the poll tax requirement to voting or registering to vote 
in primaries or general elections for national office. 
First, however, mention should be made of a brief contra-
versy that demonstrates the anamolies that could be ex-
pected from the position taken by the Byrd organization in 
Virginia on the payment of poll taxes. In February, 1942, 
it had come to light that the Federal Security 
Administration, a New Deal agency making small household 
budget loans, had included in its calculations for loans 
going to families in southern states provisions for funds 
with which the poll tax could be paid. 67 President 
Roosevelt approved of the procedure, considering the tax 
a legitimate liability of the individual, and reaffirmed 
hi.s life-long oppositi.on to the poll tax, but Senators 
from the poll tax states immediately exploded. Senator 
Byrd was perhaps ..most vocal, as he was the chairman of a 
Senate committee considering the possibi.li.ties of contin-
uing the Federal Security Administration. "Such loans," 
67New York Times, Feb. 14, 1942. 
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Senator Byrd declared, "are in direct violation with the 
constitutions and laws of States which prohibit the pay-
ment of poll taxes by any one other than the prospective 
voter. 1168 It seems that Senator Byrd was not willing to 
countenance Federal action similar to the political facts 
of life in Virginia. 
The debate over the Federal Security Administration 
had barely subsided when the Senate began hearings on 
Senator Pepper's poll tax repeal measure. Testifying be-
fore the subcommittee holding the hearings were various 
.members of the Virginia repeal effort. Moss Plunkett, 
appearing as the chairman of the Virginia Electoral Reform 
League, introduced the subcommittee to the contents of the 
Gooch report and testified to his observations of block 
payment of poll taxes. 69 David G. George, director of the 
Southern Electoral Reform League, also testified concerning 
the procedures used to secure the absentee vote in 
Virginia. 70 Dr. Frederick K. Beutel, a professor of law 
68Ibid. 
69senate Subconunittee of the Judiciary, Hearings on 
s. 1280, 1942, pp. 72-78. Plunkett testified that during 
hJ...S recent campaign for lieutenant governor he was told 
"there would be no possibility of .my .matching the 85,000 
votes which the poll tax crowd has in its vest pocket in 
Virginia, ••• and that it would take over $100,000 to 
finance the necessary campaign in the State." Ibid., 
p. 78. 
'JOib'd 
--2:_·, pp. 90-93. 
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from the College of William and Mary, told the subcommittee 
that, because of the necessity of frequent moves and the 
differing poll tax requirements in the states where he had 
lived, he and his family had voted in only two elections 
since 1928. The poll tax, Dr. Beutel contended, was thus 
disfranchising a large portion of the professional popu-
lation who, like himself, found i.t necessary to change 
.. d f 71 resi ency o ten. 
Perhaps most enlightening of all was the testimony 
given by Virginia Attorney General Abram P. Staples. 
Staples's testimony reveals the legal argument con-
structed by those opposed to enactment of Federal legis-
lation abolishing the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting, 
and can be taken as the position of the state political 
organization he represented relative to the power of 
Congress to establish restrictions upon the poll tax. 
Briefly, Staples asserted that the Federal Constitution 
reserved to the states the exclusive power to determine 
the manner of choosing its electors to vote for President 
and Vi.ce President, and conferred no power on Congress 
to legislate on the subject. Certain sections of the 
71Ibid., ~P· 110-14. 
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Constitution reserved to the states the exclusive power 
to prescribe the qualifications of the electors for mem-
bers to the Senate and House, and this power was not modi-
fied by the power delegated to Congress· to regulate the 
time, place and manner of holding elections. 72 The re-
quirement of poll tax payment, the Attorney General con-
tended, was a "qualification" of an elector and not sub-
ject to Congressional modification. Even if it was not 
considered a qualification, the poll tax fell within the 
reserved powers of the states over suffrage, as well as 
within the taxing powers. Finally, the Virginia Attorney 
General told the subcommittee that since the Federal 
Constitution protected the right to vote of only those 
qualified under state statutes, the question of whether a 
state had exercised its constitutional power to prescribe 
qualifications of electors in an unconstitutional manner 
was a question for the courts to decide. 73 
The testimony by the repeal forces during the hearings 
72The sections of the Constitution referred to by 
Staples are Article I, secti.on 2, and the 17th Amendment. 
Ibid • I p • 3 5 9 • 
731bid., pp. 359-81. For supporting views, see the 
statements submi.tted by J. Torn Watson, attorney general of 
Florida, John M. Daniel, attorney general of South 
Carolina, and Arthur J. Edwards( ibid., pp. 404-28. For 
opposing views, see the statements submitted by the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the c. Ie o., ibid., 
pp. 185-88, 330-35. -
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elicited replies from other Virginia officials. The State 
Auditor of Public Accounts, the Comptroller of the 
' 
Commonwealth, and Senator Byrd's political lieutenant E. 
l 
R. Combs, who was Clerk of the Senate and chairman of the 
State Compensation Board, replied to the charges made by 
74 Virginia poll tax repeal forces. Combs was so outraged 
by Dr. Beutel's statement that he went to the president 
of the Virginia Bar Association to request a counter state-
ment, and informed Senator Byrd that he considered it 
"outrageous" for William and Mary to keep Beutel on its 
11 . . f h' t t' 75 payro in view o is es imony. 
The pressure eased somewhat when the Senate subcom-
rnittee issued its final report rejecting Federal legisla-
tion in favor of a constitutional amendment. 76 However, 
Southern Senators were quickly forced to mobilize the 
following month to oppose consideration of a House approved 
b ;ll tl . h 11 . . t t t. 77 ~ ou awing t e po tax as a prerequisi e o vo ing. 
While major attention during the next year was 
directed to contemplated Federal repeal action, the 
Virginia General Assembly of 1944 was again presented with 
election law modification proposals. Robert Whitehead 
74
rbid., pp. 428-31 
75E. R. Combs to Harry F. Byrd, Apr. 15, 1942, 
box 133, Byrd Papers. 
76 k T' 0 t 3 1942 New Yor imes , c • , • 
77
rbid., Nov. 10, 1942. 
again introduced a bill to provide for the elimination 
from the state consti.tution of the two provisions, re-
l 
stricting collection of the delinquent poll taxes; but 
! 
I 
the measure died in committee. Whitehead did succeed in 
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getting approval for legislation requiring local treasurers 
to send out notices for all taxes assessed, not just for 
amounts over five dollars as the existing law requirea. 78 
The measure gave the delinquent poll tax voter the oppor-
tunity to at least know the status of his tax. The 
General Assembly in addition passed legislation creating 
an "Armed Forces poll tax fund." This was a patriotic 
gesture designed to facilitate voting by Vitginia residents 
serving in the armed forces which established a fund for 
the payment of poll taxes and outlined a system for absen-
tee registration and voting.by soldiers and sailors. 79 
By late August, 1944, the Times-Dispatch noted that 
the "snowball" of poll tax repeal was gaining strength.BO 
And it did appear that a growing number of Democratic or-
ganization men were announcing their opinions on the sub-
ject. Representative David E. Satterfield declared that 
the time had come for elimination of the tax and also 
proposed revision of the r~gistration system in order to 
78Robert Whitehead to A. Willis Robertson, Nov. 24, 
1944, series 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers. 
79Acts of the General Assembly, 1944, pp. 408-25. 
BOEditorial in Times-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 1944. 
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make it a "fair and impartial test of literacy. 1181 Probably 
the strongest voice to emerge at this time was that of L. 
Preston Collins of .Marion, administration leader in the 
House of Delegates and the 1940 manager of the State 
Democratic campaign. Collins declared that he favored 
the poll tax but believed "a nominal poll tax should have 
nothing to do with the right to vote." Significance was 
attached to his statement, of course, because of the 
position he held.in Democratic party councils. 82 
Any speculation, and hope on the part of the repeal 
forces, that Collins's statement indicated a shift in 
viewpoint by the Byrd organization toward abolition of the 
poll levy was quickly dashed as a result of the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals decision on the constitutionality 
of the recently established "Armed Forces poll tax fund." 
In declaring the act unconstitutional, the Court noted 
that it lacked uniformity because the amount to be paid 
could vary from zero to four dollars and fifty cents. The 
Court's opinion also concluded that the poll tax was not 
"personally" paid as was required and that the system of 
temporary or absentee registration introduced by the 
legislation was not a situation contemplated by the state 
. t' 83 constitu ion. 
81rbid., Aug. 30, 1944. . 82 . · Ibid., Sept. 8, 1944. 
83Ibid., Nov. 20, .1944; Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 
338 ll94~ 
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As a result of the Supreme Court's opinion, there 
was an immediate announcement by Governor Darden in favor 
of calling a constitutional convention to give the ser-
l 
vicemen the right to vote. As might be expected, 1there 
was also an immediate declaration that the disfranchised 
at home were entitled to the same consideration as 
Virginia's servicemen. 84 Quickly then a controversy had 
emerged as to whether a constitutional convention should 
be called restricted to the sole issue of giving the ser-
vicemen the vote, as Darden desired, or whether the con-
vention should be an open one able to consider the possible 
abolition of the poll tax. 
While Darden polled General Assembly members on their 
opinions, forces favoring an open convention emerged. The 
Southern Electoral Reform League, the Virginia Electoral 
Reform League, the A. F. L. and the C. I. O. added their 
voices for an unrestricted convention, while the Times-
Dispatch reported that the leading press of the state 
favored letting the voters decide if the convention was to 
b 85 e open. Darden, however, remained adamant and called 
a special session of the General Assembly to convene 
December 15th, saying that his only consideration was the 
84Times-Dispatch, Nov. 25 1 1944. 
85rbid., Nov. 30, 1944; editorial in ibid., Nov. 26, 
1944, quoted the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, the Roanoke Times 
and the Portsmouth Star as favoring a voter's decision on 
an open convention.~ 
war voters and that he had no intention of submitting 
anything else for consideration. 86 i 
The administration bill providing for a limited 
I 
I 
constitutional convention met a storm of debate in the 
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special session of the General Assembly, but the Governor 
had polled the assembly well and he had the necessary 
votes to secure passage of his legislation. The House 
and Senate passed identical bills providing for a refer-
endum on a constitutional convention limited to enfranchise-
ment of service personnel in what the Times-Dispatch called 
a "raw performance" during which the people were gagged. 87 
But the controversy was not yet over. Moss Plunkett 
announced that he would seek an injunction to stop the 
referendum, while John Locke Green, Republican treasurer 
of Arlington, filed a suit to force the removal of the 
"informatory," or restricting, statement from the re-
ferendum ballot. This was followed by an announcement 
that Attorney General Staples and State Comptroller Gilmer 
would institute a "friendly" test case on the legislature's 
t . 88 ac ion. 
86
rbid., Dec. s, 6, 1944. 
87Editorial in ibid., Dec. 15, 1944. The vote in the 
House was 84 to 6, while the Senate voted 33 to 2 for 
Darden\s proposal. Ibid., Dec. 16, 1944 1 and News Leader, 
Dec. 16 1 1944. 
88Times-Dispatch, Dec. 17, 21, 1944; Lynchburg News, 
Dec. 19, 1944. 
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The question hung in balance until mid-January, 1945, 
when the State Supreme Court heard the merged petitions of 
Green and Gilmer. On January 19th, the decision was up-
89 I held by a six to one vote by the Court. No formal deci-
sion was issued, however, until late February. It is 
interesting that the dissenting justice in the case was 
Chief Justice Clarence J. Campbell, a member of the con-
stitutional convention of 1902 who had voted for the poll 
tax and who also acknowledged his subsequent long aff ilia-
tion with the Byrd organization in his dissenting opinion. 
Chief Justice Campbell said that since the 1902 convention 
never intended the use of informatory statements on refer-
enda, it was his "conscientious conviction that the act in 
question is subversive of my every concept of democratic 
. . 1 ,.90 princip es. 
The restricted constitutional convention eventually 
convened and revised the state constitution to give 
Virginia's servicemen the vote without having to pay the 
poll tax. 91 There was one more incident the following 
year which illustrated that the opportunity for fraud in 
state elections was still very much an issue. The 
Democratic primaries in August, 1945, saw the poll tax 
89Times-Dispatch, Jan. 19, 1945. 
90staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613 (1945)-. 
91Acts of the General Assembly, special session, 1945, 
pp. 3-7. 
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emerge only mildly as an issue. The successful guber-
natorial candidate, William Tuck, said he would ask the 
General Assembly to submit the matter to the people in a 
referendum, but announced no personal position on the 
poll tax. 92 The real controversy of the election grew out 
of the narrow victory given Charles R. Fenwick, from 
Arlington, for lieutenant governor _over L. Preston Collins 
of Marion, both Byrd machine stalwarts. The state-wide 
vote gave Fenwick 572 more votes than Collins, but there 
was such a disparity in the Ninth District Wise County 
returns that Collins's friends urged him to press for a 
recount. 93 
After a speedy investigation, Collins filed suit in 
the Circuit Court in Richmond charging vote count irregu-
larities in Pound and Broad Mill precincts of Wise County. 
The brief filed by Collins quoted the Pound registrar as 
saying only one hundred votes were cast while 418 votes 
for Fenwick were reported. Collins also charged that no 
election was held in one precinct and that "certain elec-
tion officials" had enclosed sample ballots and instructions 
to vote for Fenwick with mailed absentee ballots. 94 
92Times-Dispatch, Aug. 8, 1945. 
93rbid., Aug. 10, 15, 17, 1945. The Wise County vote 
was 3,307 for Fenwick, 122 for Collins while the total Ninth 
District vote was 5,466 for Fenwick, 4,117 for Collins. 
94 rbi'd., A 22 1945 Ug. I • 
Circuit Judge Julian Gunn ordered the poll books, 
ballots, and applications for mail ballots opened for 
Collins as Fenwick's campaign manager Willis E. Cohoon 
criticized Collins's action as a "disservice" to himself 
and his party and hinted the Fenwick forces would be 
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interested in the counties where Collins received similar 
. 't' 95 maJori ies. The Fenwick forces did eventually file 
counter charges, but a grand jury investigation subse-
quently concluded that what errors there were were the 
result of honest mistakes and no evidence of fraud 
existed. 96 
The seriousness .of. this political controversy be-
came more apparent when Preston Collins arrived in Wise 
County to find that all twenty-six of the county's poll 
books were missing from the clerk's office. 97 J. A. 
Gardner, clerk of the Circuit Court in Wise, theorized 
that the poll books were apparently stolen while he was 
enjoying a post-primary vacation. One poll book was 
eventually found, but the investigation of available 
officially certified returns revealed that the returns for 
Pound contained only 101 ballots instead of the 400 listed, 
that some ballots exhibited a similarity in markings and 
95Ibid .-, Aug. 23, 24, 1945. 
96Ibid. I Aug. 27, 30, Sept. 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 29, 1945. 
97Ihid., Aug. 25, 1945. 
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that many were not "strung" as required by law. In the 
meantime, the Wise Commonwealth Attorney started an investi-
gation to find the lost poll books. 98 l 
I 
State Republicans relished the discomfort caused the 
Democrats, going so far as to offer the Governor the assis-
tance of six "widely known" Republican cor:LTfionwealth's 
attorneys to assist in investigating the case, and took 
advantage of the dirty linen by asserting that since there 
were voting irregularities, state Democrats were removed 
from the obligation of voting for Tuck in the upcoming 
race for governor. 99 State Democrats, on the other hand, 
were deeply embarassed by the disclosure of how political 
business was conducted in their organization. Governor 
- . 
Darden said that Virginians were "shocked and humiliated" 
by the events, while the head of the Democratic State 
Central Committee promised strong party action to prevent 
similar fraud in the future and "unequivocally" condemned 
the theft of the election records. Even candidate Tuck, 
who had avoided a clear stand on election law reform dur-
ing the primaries, emerged with a promise to strengthen 
the election laws and even suggested making the act of 
alteration of election records a felony.loo Even Senator 
98 rbid. 1 Aug. 26, 28, Sept. 3 1 4, 14, -·15, 1945. 
99rbid., Sept. 11, 13, 15, 1945. Darden refused the 
generous offer of help from the Republicans. 
lOOibid., Aug. 29, Sept. 14, 18, 24, 1945. 
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Byrd seemed to place no restraint upon the scop~ of the 
investigation. "The gravity of the charges made," Byrd 
announced, "demands a searching investigation without the 
suppression of any of the pertinent f ac~s or the protec-
tion of any person or persons who may be involved. 11101 
The climax of the Wise County episode came when 
Judge Gunn ordered that Preston Collins's name be placed on 
the ballot as the official party nominee for lieutenant 
governor. In his opinion, Gunn declared that he was cer-
tain neither Fenwick or Collins were cognizant of the vio-
lations of the law by Wise County officials because both 
were men of high character, not associated with the "poli-
tical crooks and ballot thieves. 11102 But the judge, in 
reviewing the entire incident, found much to be puzzled 
with. "In broad daylight," Gunn stated, "someone went into 
the clerks office, into the vault, ••• took the poll books 
and walked out without the deputy clerk or anyone else 
seeing him or them -- 'tis strange, 'tis passing strange. 11103 
CONCLUSION 
During the period from 1936 to 1945, Virginia poll 
tax repeal forces did not achieve their objective on either 
the Federal or state level, but there was a measure of 
101Ibid • f Aug. 29, 1945. 
l0 2Ibid., Sept. 30, Oct. 2, 1945. 
l03Ibid., Sept. 30, 1945. 
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success obtained. Consideration of the questions surround-
ing removal of the tax had been extended by the efforts of 
the Southern Planter and Westmoreland Davis. At least one 
state Democratic leader, Governor James Price, recognized 
that the poll tax had seriously effected the conduct of 
state politics, that changes were necessary and took ac-
tion. The Senate subcommittee hearings that took place 
in 1942 focused the attention of the rest of the country 
on the local political practices of Virginia and other 
poll tax states, increasing the pressure for some action. 
Finally, the voter scandals in Wise County in 1945 effec-
tively demonstrated to state political leaders that the 
time had passed when election frauds would be silently 
countenanced, even within the Democratic party. 
Two other observations can be made about this period. 
State Democratic leaders were not yet ready to undertake 
any drastic change regarding the poll tax. The study 
commissioned by Governor Price that recommended elimina-
tion of the poll tax and modification of the literacy test 
to make it fair and impartial was placed under lock and key 
and treated only as a matter with which the supervising 
committee could not agree. When an opportunity was 
afforded whereby the state political leaders could have 
made modifications of the state constitution if they had 
seriously desired to do so, they decided that it was better 
to secure only the vote for Virginians in the armed forces 
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rather than to extend the same consideration to those who 
remained on the homefront. I 
' 
Secondly, the period from 1936 to 1945 saw the gradu-
~ 
I 
al erosion of the basis for support of the poll tax as a 
prerequisite to voting. Articles appearing in the 
Southern Planter and other publications portrayed the poll 
tax requirement as running against the historical tradi-
tion of Virginia, and even against the cherished beliefs 
of the founders of the Democratic party. Through the 
efforts of Westmoreland Davis and LeRoy Hodges, the dis-
closure was made that Virginia was losing hundreds of · 
thousands of dollars by insufficient efforts to assess 
and collect the poll tax, thus weakening the argument that 
the levy was essential to the financial continuance of the 
state school system. The Gooch report also brought into 
question another tenet of supporters of the poll tax. If 
it could be argued in defense of the tax that more people 
paid it than eventually voted, thus implying there was no 
restriction of suffrage in the process, the Gooch conunittee 
asked what the poll tax requirement did accomplish. Their 
conclusion was that if the tax did not restrict, then it 
did not do anything and supporters could not consistently 
argue for retention. Lastly, there was the Fenwick-Collins 
episode. Many-'Virginia Democrats obviously believed, ·as 
the Young Democrats' .. study of 1939-suggests, that the 
removal of the tax would allow persons with no sense of 
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responsibility to be cajoled into destroying the objects 
of good government. The question to be asked after the 
Collins investigation revelations was just what aspects of 
good government were preserved by election laws that 
would allow such fraud to take place. 
There was still one argument that supporters of re-
tention of the poll tax could use. If left alone, it was 
argued, the poll tax states would work out their own solu-
tions to the tax question, probably even considering the 
complete removal of the tax, as North Carolina and Florida 
had done. But the seriousness of the intentions of organi-
zation political leaders who proposed changes on their 
own was open to question. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIGHT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE, 1946-1949 
\ 
I 
I 
The agitation of the ten previous years was but a 
prelude to the events that transpired between 1946 and 
1949. Strangely, however, the major positions that had 
developed during the early 1940's were reversed. The 
State Democratic organization led by Senator Byrd could 
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no longer ignore the strong demands for poll tax reform. 
Opinion for reform crested with the disclosure of the Wise 
County primary frauds in 1945, and public pressure for re-
peal increased due largely to the educational efforts of 
groups such as the Virginia Electoral Reform League. 
Also, there was the fear that there would be national 
action to repeal the poll tax. In early 1945, Byrd had 
received a subpoena from an organization known as "Parents 
and Wives of Fighting Americans" to appear in a contested 
election case instituted by Moss Plunkett in an effort at 
yet another test of the constitutionality of the tax. 1 
At about the same time, the Southern Electoral Reform 
1Arthur Dunn to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 9, 1945, box 
192, Byrd Papers. 
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League outlined its new attack on the tax. Contending 
that the poll tax abridged the right to vote, the League 
was prepared to demand that the poll tax states either 
give up the tax or face the possibility of reduced repre-
sentation as provided for in Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. 2 
Political necessity demands that an organization such 
as the one that existed in Virginia respond to public 
pressure if it has the intention of maintaining control. 
Thus, the Byrd organization found it necessary to yield a 
bit on the poll tax question, but it carefully attempted 
to guarantee its continued mastery over state elections. 
The former organization antagonists suddenly found them-
selves aligned with the force that had for so long been 
able to maintain that which they despised. The alliance, 
however, proved to be an exceedingly short one. 
THE CAMPBELL AMENDMENTS 
Poll tax repeal forces in Virginia had gained in-
creased momentum by late 1944. The Richmond Times-Dispatch 
observed that the tax issue was one of two issues that had 
2Arthur Dunn to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 21, 1945; clip-
ping from New York Post, Jan .. 10, 1945, ibid. Byrd and 
the other Congressmen-8ummoned did not appear at the hear-
ing of the case on the advice of Rep. Hatton w. Sumners 
(D-Tex.~, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. 
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brought criticism to the Virginia Democratic leadership. 
While a governmental study had undertaken to recommend 
changes in the state's school systems, the primary source 
I 
i 
of criticism, there had been no serious attempt to insti-
tute suffrage reform. 3 Even among the members of the 
Byrd organization support for some sort of reform was 
emerging. The first top-flight member of the Byrd machine 
to advocate repeal of the poll tax was T. McCall Frazier, 
former director of the Division of Motor Vehicles and 
member of the Alcohol Beverage Control Board from the 
Ninth District. Frazier blamed the poll tax for much of 
the state's ills, charging that the tax not only restrict-
ed the electorate "in order that it may be more easily 
controlled by small cliques," but also that it placed "the 
dollar mark on public office" putting it "beyond the reach 
of the man of modest means." Although there was specula-
tion that word had been passed down "the line" for the 
statement, Frazier maintained that he spoke only for him-
self, stating that the situation he described was a "recog-
nized fact" in the Third District. 4 Since Governor 
Darden had been publicly represented as favoring abolition, 
and since there had been no repudiation of the stand, the 
Governor and the organization were urged to back Frazier 
3Editorial in Times·-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 1944; clipping 
from Times-Dispatch, series 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers. 
4Time·s·-Dispatch, Aug. 2 4, Sept. 3, 19 44. 
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and press for repeal, but they remained silent. 5 
The course of the controversy over the proposed 
constitutional convention to give servicemen the vote 
revealed that Darden and the organization were not yet 
prepared to present a plan of reform, but this did not 
lessen the attacks by proponents of reform. The election 
scandals could not be easily dismissed. 
Pressure for the abolition of the poll tax and 
suffrage reform had become so strong that the General 
Assembly, upon recommendation from the Governor, passed a 
joint resolution at the special session in 1945 to create 
a commission to study and report changes in the suffrage 
laws to.the next session of the legislature. 6 Senator 
Stuart Campbell was selected as chairman of the nine mem-
ber committee, which became known as the Campbell Committee. 
Robert c. Vaden, W. L. Prieur, Vernon c. Smith, and J. 
7 Frank Wysor were also appointed to serve as members. 
While Vaden had previously sponsored proposals to change 
the suffrage laws, none of the other members were particu-
larly noted for their reform activity. 
5Editorial in~., Aug. 24, 1944. 
6 Journal ·o·f ·the· Senate, special session, 19 45, pp. 
20, 32, 80-81, 109. The joint resolution was passed by 
the Senate on March 23rd by a vote of 38 to O. The House 
approved the measure the following day. 
7~., 1946, document no. 8, p. 1. 
Commissioned studies and reports have numerous 
political advantages. They give the appearance of acti-
vity when, in fact, there may be very little. They con-
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sume time which allows public attention to be diverted to 
other matters. In addition, studies often result in re-
ports that effectively avoid the major question. This 
last point is illustrated by a report issued by the 
Democratic State Central Committee on December 1, 1945, 
just two weeks before the Campbell Commission submitted 
its report to the General Assembly. The Democratic com-
.mission, headed by Horace Edwards, considered no changes 
t~at would require a constitutional amendment, thus con-
tinuing the constitutional poll tax provisions. To in-
sure "fairness and honesty," the commission recommended 
measures to stop block payments of poll taxes, insure 
personal payment of the tax, and provide for certification 
of voting lists by local treasurers. 8 
The Campbell Commission could have pursued a similar 
course of action if it had chosen. The General Assembly 
resolution establishing the suffrage commission instructed 
. 9 
that it "study and report" changes in the suffrage laws. 
8nemocrati.c State Central Committee, "Recommendations 
for Revision of Election Laws, Dec. 1, 1945," pp. 1, 14-17, 
box 192, Byrd Papers. The other members of the committee 
included Virginia G. Jeffereys, John B. Spiers, Gardner 
:Sooth, and Lawarence Peyton. 
9Journal of the Senate, special session, 1945, p. 20. 
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The majority of the conunittee was aligned with the Byrd 
organization and could have effectively skirted the poll 
tax question and have been assured of organization support. 
Instead, conunission members chose to consider poll tax 
repeal the main issue and real reason for the study. 
There were several reasons for assuming this position. 
First was the seemingly inuninent repeal of the poll tax 
as a prerequisite to voting either through Federal legis-
lation or by constitutional amendment. This would have 
left Virginia without a major portion of its franchise 
requirements, thus opening the door to increased registra-
tion and threatening the life of the Byrd organization and 
possibly producing hastily conceived legislation. It 
might also threaten seats in Congress. Secondly, the ac-
tion of the General Assembly that had exempted veterans 
from the payment of the tax made the continuance of the 
tax difficult. It was estimated by a member of the com-
mission that 200,000 soldiers would return to the Old 
Dominion by 1947 who would not have to pay to vote. An 
incidental result of the veterans exemption was that it 
played havoc with the assessment and collection of the 
poll tax, not an ideal situation since cries persisted 
for increased vigi.lance in the collection of revenue from 
the tax. 10 
10J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Apr. 28, 1945; 
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Although he made no public statement, Senator Byrd, 
concerned over the course the commission might take, 
wrote to E. R. Combs that "if the commission recommends 
the repeal of the poll tax, it will have a very great 
effect and will make it more difficult to get a proper 
alternative. 1111 In order to assure that the "proper alter-
native" was considered by the commission, Byrd turned to 
one of his associates, J. Frank Wysor, Democratic treasurer 
of Pulaski County and Campbell Commission member. Byrd 
and Wysor met at Mountain Lake, near Blacksburg, in early 
July to consider the plan and recommendations the study 
commission would make. Wysor described the resulting out-
line as the "answer to a maiden's prayer," and informed 
Byrd that "the more I have worked over it, the better I am 
pleased with it. 1112 
The plan that emerged was strikingly similar to the 
final report the Campbell Commission issued five months 
later. The section of the state constitution providing 
for the General Assembly levy of a capitation tax would be· 
repealed. In its place would be a "State School Head Tax" 
Wysor to Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945; Wysor to E. R. Combs, Feb. 1, 
1948, box 195; Wysor to Watkins Abbitt, Jun. 29, 1949, box 
202, Byrd Papers. 
11Harry F. Byrd to E. R. Combs, Apr. 30, 1945, box 
185, ibid. 
12J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Jul. 11, 1945, box 
195, ibid. 
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of one dollar and fifty cents with the legislature given 
the right to raise the tax to three dollars. The, tax was 
! 
to be assessed against each person 21 years of age, with 
I 
no exemptions, and collected as other taxes were with the 
revenue being racially segregated as to source and also 
distributed to the schools on a segregated basis. 'Article 
II of the state constitution, the franchise article, would 
be rewritten to exclude all references to the poll tax. 
The application procedure for registration would remain 
unchanged, but Wysor believed "it would seem advisable to 
make this more difficult. 1113 
Upon implementation of the Byrd-Wysor plan, central 
registrars under state supervision would take over all 
registration books and administer an annual registration. 
Two classes of voters were created: persons registered 
prior to January 1, 1904, and persons registered after 
that date. The first group was the "permanent" class, not 
subject to the annual reregistration. Persons in the 
second group, those required to register annually, would 
b~ automatically reregistered if they paid their state 
school head tax. Otherwise, reregistration application 
13
11study Of the Right Of Suffrage: Skeleton of a 
suggested plan to, take the place of the present laws, in-
cluding the State Capitation Tax -- on a referendum," 
p. l, enclosure to letter from Wysor to Byrd, Jul. 11, 
1945, ibid. 
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was required to be submitted to the central registrars. 14 
Although registration books were to be kept open ~uring 
the entire year, closing dates for registration tci parti-( 
cipate in a forthcoming election were set at least three 
months in advance. 15 
It is not hard to see how this plan offered the 
"proper alternative" to the poll tax. The main features 
of the proposal were the annual registration requirement 
and the closing dates for registration. Under the exist-
ing system, the potential voter had to register but once 
and then see that he maintained his poll tax payments. 
The Byrd-Wysor plan would have forced the voter to regis-
ter annually, or pay a school tax that might be as high as 
three dollars. While the existing system allowed regis-
tration up to 30 days prior to an election, the new pro-
posal closed registration books at least 90 days prior to 
an election. Thus, in order to relinquish the grip of the 
poll tax, the Byrd organization was prepared to present a 
program that placed the electorate under increased regis-
tration requirements and the possibility of a higher 
financial obligation in order to vote. 
Stuart Campbell readily accepted the Byrd-Wysor 
14 . Wysor suggested a color-coded card system to differ-
entiate between the different rolls, sex and races. 
1511 Study Of The Ri.ght Of Suffrage," pp. 2-4, ibid. 
152 
plan, suggesting only that the new tax be called a "State 
Scho61 Tax" and that the closing dates be pushed further 
back. It was decided that during the public hearings 
l 
held by the commission, proposals should be made by poli-
tical friends somewhat along the lines of Wysor's out-
line.16 Therefore, fully five months before the committee 
submitted its report, and before any public hearings had 
been held, Byrd and Wysor had reached their own conclu-
sions as to what form any new suffrage proposals regarding 
the poll tax should take and had gained approval of the 
plan by the committee chairman. 
But what Wysor had failed to tell Campbell was that 
he and Senator Byrd had decided to limit the action of the 
committee so that no definite plan would be submitted until 
the 1948 General Assembly convened. What was desired was 
a general outline of proposals with no specific recommenda-
tions for legislation until 1948. This approach was de-
signed to delay "controversy", in Wysor's words, and to 
avoid the possibility of an immediately discredited pro-
posal resulting from adoption of Federal legislation. 17 
The first public hearings by the Campbell Commission 
16J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Jul. 11, 1945, ibid. 
Wysor added a postscript that he and Campbell agreed ~ 
to say anything about the proposals to Governor Darden 
until "a little later." 
17J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945, ibid. 
were held in Richmond on August 14, 1945. It, appears 
that the public proponents of poll tax repeal were not 
\ 
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prepared to present a specific plan for legislation at the 
' I 
hearings, being satisfied with merely restating their ob-
jections to the existing election laws. Wysor was elated 
that this first hearing was "a perfect flop" and specu-
lated that subsequent hearings would be little different. 18 
This proved to be true, and as a result the Campbell 
Commission was allowed to follow its own course of action. 
While Wysor tried to delay consideration of a fixed 
plan, the majority of the commission decided it was 
charged, by virtue of the resolution establishing it, with 
the study of the election laws and preparation of a plan 
to be submitted to the Governor with statutes drawn up 
to put the recommendations into effect, and, by early 
November, there were three plans under consideration by 
the commission. 19 The first plan was that of Chairman 
Campbell, and was essentially the July outline by Byrd. 
The second was a proposal by w. L. Prieur that agreed with 
the abolition of the poll tax but separated the payment of 
taxes in any form from the right of registration and 
18 . J. ~. Wysor to Howard W. Smith, Aug. 28, 1945, 
ibid. Wysor told Congressman Smith that 11 only Plunkett 
and a few labor leaders were there," and that they did not 
have ..much to contribute. See also, Times-Dispatch, Aug. 
15, 194.5. 
19 J. F. Wysor to :Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945, ibid. 
franchise, and did not provide for a state electoral 
20 board. A compromise measure was also considered, but 
i 
the Campbell plan was subsequently revised to include a 
~ 
! 
part of Prieur's plan providing that reregistration be 
accomplished by voting in the previous general election. 
When the final vote on the two plans was taken on 
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November 10th, the Campbell proposal carried by a vote of 
6 to 3. 21 Although Wysor had not been able to prevent the 
commission from presenting draft legislation, he concluded 
that the resulting proposals were "a good plan and well 
worked out. 1122 
When presented to the Governor on December 15, 1945, 
the Campbell proposal closely followed the outline com-
posed in July, and is interesting in several respects. 
Of primary importance is the acknowledgement by the com-
mission of the motivation of pending Federal action ·to 
amend the Constitution to prohibit the poll tax. Although 
the report contained the recommendation that payment of 
20Journal of the Senate, 1946, document no. 8, pp. 
27-28. 
21J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945, box 
195, Byrd Papers. Wysor voted for the Prieur plan and 
described his acti.on as "a rather inconsistent vote." The 
other vote against the Campbell plan probably came from 
Vernon c. Smith. 
22
rbid. Campbell had sent Byrd a draft copy of the 
commission's proposals on November 7th, and seemed cer-
tain there was no threat to the plan. Stuart Campbell to 
Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 7, 1945, box 185, ibid. 
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taxes be equivalent to renewal of voter registration, the 
members believed that this would not conflict with any 
Federal action to be taken. Since such a possibility 
would have jeopardized the entire plan, it was decided to 
have these specific recommendations incorporated into the 
statutory recommendati.ons, which the General Assembly 
ld th h . t f . t 23 cou en c ange as i saw i • The effect of such a 
scheme would have been to remove the definition of who 
could vote in elections from the state constitution and 
place it securely in the hands of the General Assembly. 
The second interesting feature of the report was 
that there were six of the nine members who were not in 
complete agreement with its recommendations. John Paul, 
W. R. Shaffer, and Charles J. Smith issued concurring re-
ports that recommended repeal of the Absent Voters law. 
Vernon c .. Smith and Wysor dissented from that much of the 
plan recommending elimination of the poll tax, while W. 
L. Prieur issued a minority report that agreed with the 
abolition of the tax but believed there should be a corn-
plete separation between the payment of taxes and the 
right of registration and franchise. 24 
Finally, the report implied an unchanged attitude 
in regard to the poll tax even though its elimination was 
23Journal of the Senate, 1946, document no. 8, p .. 14. 
24 rbi'd., 26 41 pp. - • 
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reconunended. In the words of the conunission report, an 
"impartial review" of the facts had disclosed that "there 
is no definite relation between the number of poll taxes 
paid and the number of votes cast. •• 25 Repeal proponents 
had been arguing just the opposite since the inception of 
the tax, but their point was not that there were voters who 
did not vote even after having paid the tax but that the 
total size of the electorate was being diminished as a 
result of the tax. Protests against the tax seemingly had 
little effect upon the attitude of the Campbell Conunission. 
Besides discontinuance of the poll tax as a prere-
quisite to voting, there were five major features to the 
suffrage plan. Periodic renewal of registration was to 
substitute as evidence that the voter continued to be a 
resident of his district and was qualified to vote. A 
newly created State Board of Elections was to supervise 
and bring uniformity to the application of election laws. 
Administration of absentee voting was to be conducted by 
the electoral board rather than by local registrars. To 
compensate for the loss of revenue from the poll tax, a 
school tax was instituted. An important conclusion of 
the commission was the recommendation that no change be 
d • . t t' . t 26 ma e in regi.s ra i.on requir~en s. 
25 b'·a ~·r 
26Ib'd 
_2:_·' 
p. 4. 
pp. 6-10. Other provisions provided for 
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The three member, bipartisan Board of Elections was 
to be appointed by the Governor. In turn the State Board 
would appoint bipartisan local boards who would appoint 
both the clerks and local judges of elections and conduct 
. t . 27 regis ration. The division of voters into two classes, 
as reconunended in the Byrd proposal, was maintained. Per-
sons registered after 1904 were required to renew their 
registration periodically. The Commission proposed annual 
registration in the belief it would "cause less confu-
siori ••• and ••• furnish annually a complete, authentic 
and current list of all persons entitled to vote in any 
precinct. 1128 Registration could be accomplished by any 
one of three methods: personal application to the local 
board; payment of all taxes, except real estate taxes, 
assessed for the preceeding year against the individual; 
or voting in the preceeding year's election. Such alter-
natives, the Commission believed, would have the two-fold 
result of encouraging voting by "rewarding" those who 
voted with the privilege to vote the following year and by 
making citizens conscious of their responsibilities and 
secured electi.on ballot boxes, prepubli.cation of ballots, 
instructi-0n of election officials, final resolution of 
contested electi.ons before a three judge court, and 
standardizati.on o;f penali.ties .for violation of election 
laws. 
27Ih'd 
_J._._• I pp. 12-14, 16~19. 
28 b'd 11 21 !.2:._ • I pp • I • 
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thus aid in the prompt collection of taxes. 29 
One of the taxes to be collected was the new school 
tax. This tax was to be collected as any other personal 
tax, but it was suggested collection be facilitated by 
requiring school tax payment as a condition for the issu-
ance of any license or permit. The tax was not to exceed 
three dollars per year but the commission recommended one 
dollar and fifty cents as an appropriate amount. The 
resulting tax revenue was to be applied exclusively to the 
aid of public schools. The General Assembly could author-
ize any city or county boards of supervisors to levy an 
additional one dollar for local purposes. 3° Conceivably 
then, a young couple wishing to be married might have to 
pay eight dollars for their license in addition to the 
license fee. 
THE OPPOSITION ORGANIZES 
When Governor Darden presented the Campbell report 
to the General Assembly in January, 1946, he expressed his 
general agreement with its reconunendations. The poll tax 
should be eliminated, Darden declared, because "in a free 
society the ballot should rest in the hands of all per-
sons o.f demonstrated competence who evidence an attachment 
29Ib .. d ~·I p. 21. 
30 b'd 14 15 ~·' pp. - • 
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to and an interest in the welfare of the State." The 
Governor also agreed with the recormnendation for a State 
Board of Elections but believed that local boards should 
be chosen locally and that re-registration be required 
only every three or four years because of the expense in-
valved in the proposed annual registration. Darden sup-
ported the idea of a school tax and suggested adoption of 
the three month closing date for registration books pro-
posed in the Prieur minority report. 31 
The General Assembly's evaluation was not as kind as 
the Governor's, and attacks on the Cormnission's report 
were led by both stalwarts of the Democratic organization 
and Independents. Delegate c. G. Quesenbery argued that 
the changes suggested would "restrict us more than the 
poll tax does. 1132 Subsequently Quesenbery was joined by 
Delegate Spiers of Radford, and offered a substitute re-
solution providing for the repeal of the poll tax without 
the other provisions of the Campbell plan. The public 
would only be confused and intimidated by the Campbell 
plan, Spiers maintained, and they were not willing "to 
put on their wrists any newly forged shackles of more 
power and restraint than the poll tax. 1133 
31Ibid. , document no. 1, pp. 6-7. 
- . 
32Times-Dispatch, Feb. 21, 1946. 
33Ibid. 
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In the Senate, Senators Breeden and Tyler of Norfolk 
offered an amendment to the Campbell plan, based upon the 
minority report of W. L. Prieur, that provided for the 
abolition of the poll tax as a requirement for voting and 
substituted in its place a literacy test. The senators 
proclaimed that their resolution would give the people an 
opportuni.ty to vote on the abolition of the tax "in as 
clear and simple a manner as possible" and at the same time 
provide a method for having an "intelligent and enlarged 
electorate. 1134 
The Campbell plan passed the House of Delegates by a 
vote of fifty-seven to thirty-seven on February 20th and 
the Senate shortly approved the joint resolution proposing 
amendments to the sections of the state constitution re-
garding suffrage by a vote of thirty-four to three. 35 J. 
F. Wysor reported to Senator Byrd that he was relieved 
that Stuart Campbell had been able to get the suffrage 
laws through without amendments. "Getting this fixed as 
it is will keep it from being made an issue of this year," 
Wysor told Byrd, "unless the would-be repealers actually 
analyze what the proposals really mean. 1136 But the 
341bid., Yeb. 16, 1946. 
35rbi.d., Feb. 21, 1946; Journal of the Senate, 1946, 
pp. 529-541. The three votes against the resolution were 
those of Senators Hillard, Neff and Robinette. 
36 J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 22, 1946, box 
195, Byrd Papers. 
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constitution of Virginia required that proposed amendments 
be passed by two successive sessions of the General Assembly 
before being submitted to the voters, and this afforded 
ample time for poll tax repealers to analyze what the pro-
37 posals would really mean. 
There was no session of the General Assembly in 1947 
and therefore no podi.um for views on the Campbell amend-
~ents for most state politicians. But the poll tax issue 
remained in the national and state limelight because of , 
other events. In Washington in June, Harry S. Truman 
pledged his support for positive safeguards of civil rights 
in a speech to the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People at the Lincoln Memoria1. 38 
During the first two weeks in July, the Conunittee on 
House Administration held hearings on House Resolution 29 
and seven other resolutions that made unlawful the require-
rnent of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in a pri-
mary or other election for national officers. The conunit-
tee heard the Treasurer of Arlington County, John Locke 
Green, deliver two long statements in support of the anti-
poll tax legi.slation. Green had filed suit in Federal 
Court on the grounds that Virginia election procedures 
violated the ~ourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 
37constitution of Virginia, 1945, sec. 196. 
38New York ~irnes, Jun. 5, 1947, p. 1. 
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sought to enjoin assessment of poll taxes. The committee 
also heard John s. Barbour, prominent Virginia attorney 
and member of the 1902 constitutional convention, defend 
suffrage restriction. Citing the case of Minor v. 
Happersett, decided by a unanimous Supreme Court in the 
1870 's,_ Barbour submi.tted that when the Constitution con-
40 ferred citizenship, it did not confer the right of suffrage. 
While Federal action was still being considered, the 
President's Committee on Civil Rights issued its report. 
Committee Chairman Charles Wilson, president of General 
Electric Corporation, declared the time had come to create 
a permanent, nation-wide system of guardianship for the 
civil rights of Americans, and to assure affirmative action 
by Federal and state organs, the Committee made thirty-five 
specific recommendations. High on its list was abolition 
of the poll tax. President Truman promised a close and 
41 
careful study of the report. 
Reaction to the report of the President's committee 
in Virginia was negative. The Committee on Civi.l Rights 
had rolled into one report practically every piece of 
39u. s. Congress, House, Subconunittee on Elections 
of the Committee on House Administration, Hearings, on 
H. R. 29, H. R. 7, H. R. 66, H. R. 225, H. R. 230, H. R. 
668, H. R. 1435 and H. R. 4040, Poll Taxes, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess., pp. 1, 92-94. Green's suit was eventually 
dismissed as a .moot question. 
40
rbid. I p. 154. 
41New York Times, Oct. 30, 1947, pp. l, 14-15. 
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legislation which the majority of Southern senators had 
opposed in recent years. The Times-Dispatch, while doubt-
ing the constitutionality of some of the measures !if 
! 
I 
passed, warned that "the results in the Southern States 
would be even worse than those in the nation under pro-
hibi.ti.on" because the commission tried to deal with the 
"explosive" issue of race relati.ons. 42 
The Committee on Civil Rights' report brought to a 
head a situation that eventually led to the creation of the 
States Rights Democratic Party in Birmingham, Alabama. 
In February, 1948, President Truman announced his endorse-
ment of the Conunittee's findings and proposed to Congress 
a ten point program of action, part of which urged greater 
protection of the right to vote through statutory protec-
tion and the abolition of the poll tax. 43 At the Democratic 
National Convention in Philadelphia in July, there was the 
dramatic walk-out by the Mississippi and Alabama delega-
tions as the convention approved a civil rights platform 
calling for the abolition of poll taxes in Federal elec-
tions, a national anti-lynch law, creation of the Fair 
Employment Practices Commission and a system of non-segre-
gation in the armed forces. 44 The organization of the 
42Bdi.torial in Times-Dispatch, Oct. 31, 194 7. 
43New York Times, Feb. 3, 1948, p. 22. 
44 rbid., Jul. 15, 1948, p. 1. 
Dixiecrat party quickly followed and at the end of the 
month, the President's anti-poll tax move in Congress 
was stopped by a filibuster by Southern senators.15 
I 
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The President's action in regard to his civil rights 
program caused open hostility in Virginia. Late in 
February, 1948, the Byrd organization and Governor Tuck 
introduced a proposal in the General Assembly that would 
allow the state party convention to determine for whom the 
state Democratic electors would be instructed to vote. 
Although the proposal had Senator Byrd's endorsement, the 
General Assembly refused to go along and the organization 
had to accept an "anti-Truman" proposal that placed the 
names of Truman's electors near the bottom of the November 
ballot. 46 Nevertheless, Truman's actions resulted in a 
strong response from supporters of the Thurmond-Wright 
Dixiecrat ticket. Speaking to a States Rights group at 
the University of Virginia, Richmond attorney Collins 
Denny, with the characteristic venom that marked much of 
the campaign, described the situation in which many 
Southerners found themselves. "The Truman people would 
give us two choices," Denny told his audience of about 150 
people. "They say we must either accept the rot and filth 
45rbid., Jul. 18, 1948, p. 1: Jul. 30, 1948, pp. 1, 3. 
46Ibid., Mar. 21, 1948, sec. IY, p. i, and Key, 
Southernl?OI'itics, p. 336. 
that has soiled the house of our fathers, or else we 
must leave the house and vote for Dewey." There was a 
third choice and that was to support the States Rights 
\ 47 Democratic Party. 
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It was against this background of developing events 
that the second vote on proposing the Campbell amendments 
came in the closing days of the 1948 General Assembly 
session. There was little, if any, discussion on the 
matter. The House passed the measure by a vote of 74 to 
15 h 'l th s t t d . 1 f b . . 48 w i e e ena e vo e unanimous y or su mission. 
When Robert c. Vaden brought the measure to the floor of 
the Senate, one Senator asked for an explanation. There 
was a long silence, then Vaden yielded the floor to Senator 
Robert o. Norris for the explanation. Again, there was 
silence until Norris said, "I have not been advised what 
the resolution is about." The Lieutenant Governor then 
explained the measure and the vote was taken "in some 
confusion. 1149 Almost as an afterthought, Senator Edward 
Breeden noticed that there was no legislation providing 
for a referendum on the measure. The referendum 
47Times-Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1948; see also ibid., 
. -Sept. 24, 25, 1948. 
48
rbi.d., .Mar. 13, 1948. The Times-Dispatch reported 
~·the vote--as-35 for, one against, with Lloyd Robinette cast-
ing the dissenting vote. The Senate Journal, however, re-
ports the vote as 28 to O. Journal o.f the Senate, 1948, 
PP• 1034-1035. 
49Times-Dispatch, Mar. 13, 1948. 
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legislation was subsequently given speedy consideration by 
both chambers and Tuesday after the first Monday of 
November, 1949, was set as the date for the referendum on 
the amendrnents. 50 
The General Assembly could have set the date for the 
referendum any time during 1948, but chose instead November, 
1949, and it appears that the Byrd organization was in-
strumental in having the vote delayed. ~he reported reason 
for the delay was that proper attention and consideration 
would not have been given to this state proposition be-
cause of the Presidential election in the fall of 1948. 51 
However, a more valid explanation would be that Democratic 
stalwarts were not entirely pleased with the possibility 
of an expanded electorate, especially if Congressional 
action on poll tax repeal did not materialize. "If 
Congress takes no action," J. Frank Wysor informed E. R. 
Combs, "I doubt if the plan will carry unless we make a 
very strong effort to put it over. 1152 Considering the 
possibility that if Congress took no action, there was the 
probability of any action being deferred for several 
years, Wysor argued that the referendum be postponed until 
SOibid., Mar. 15 1 1948; Acts of the General Assembly, 
19-48, p. 1062. 
51Times-Dispatch-, Mar. 13, 1948. 
52 J. F. Wysor to E. R. COI"'..bs, Feb. l, 1948, Feb. 4, 
1948, box 195, Byrd Papers. 
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1949 or 1950. 53 As a result, Byrd advised that the refer-
endum be postponed until after the Virginia gubernatorial 
primary in 1949. 54 But Wysor also recognized the danger 
in a delay of the vote. "These people who have been de-
manding abolishme.nt of the poll tax are not going to be 
enthusiastic about this proposal when they find that it 
will continue to keep the electorate curtailed. 1155 
Considered as a political move, the delay of the vote 
offered advantages. The anti-Truman sentiments of the 
state organization were evident by February, 1948, and a 
referendum on the poll tax prior to the Presidential elec-
tion, if successful, would have placed on the registration 
books a large number of voters who could be expected to 
show their appreciation by voting for Truman. A favorable 
vote on the Campbell amendments in November, 1948, on the 
other hand, would have presented the possibility of a real 
Republican threat in the upcoming gubernatorial election 
in 1949. In fact, it did not take the Republicans long 
to seize the delay as an issue in the 1948 contest. Robert 
H. Woods, the Republican candidate for the u. s. Senate, 
charged in October that the Democrati.c machine had not 
wanted the poll tax collected properly because it would 
53J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 1, 1948, ibid. 
54
narry F. nyrd ~o J. F. Wysor, Feb. 3, 1948, ibid. 
SSJ. F. Wysor to E. R. Combs, Feb. 1, 1948, ibid. 
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have put too many persons on the voting rolls and 
therefore had delayed the vote on tax repeal out of con-
sideration for the gubernatorial primary. "To carry out 
its purpose," Woods told his radio audience, 11 the Byrd-
Robertson-Tuck machine had its legislative puppets defer 
the vote on the constitutional amendment until November, 
1949. 1156 
Although it was never openly acknowledged, there is 
also another reason why the delay could have worked to the 
advantage of the state organization. A part of the strate-
gy of the Dixiecrat Party was to deny the South's 127 
electoral votes to the other national parties, thus throw-
ing the election into the House of Representatives where 
each state had one vote. In such a situation, it would 
have been impossible for any candidate to receive a major-
ity without the eleven votes from the South. This placed 
these states in a position to extract promises from those 
they would back. One of these promises would have been 
that no Federal action be taken to repeal the poll tax in 
the seven states where it still existed. 57 The major 
motivation ,for repeal in states like Virginia would thus 
have been removed. The Byrd organization could then give 
56Times-Dispatch, Oct. 3, 1948 1 sec. 2. 
57
sarah M. Lemmon, 0 The Ideology of the 'Dixiecrat' 
.Movement, 11 Social Forces, -XXX (Dec., 1951) , 167 i New York 
Ti1nes, Oct. 30, 1948, p. 1. 
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a sigh of relief, withdraw its support from the Campbell 
plan and watch as it died, with no fear that there was a 
need for such an alternative. \ 
The Campbell amendments took a backseat to national 
issues during the remainder of 1948 and did not emerge 
again until after the Presidential election had passed and 
campaigning for the gubernatorial primary in August of 
1949 began. The gubernatorial race was as furious and wide 
open as the November election and saw four Democratic candi-
dates competing for the voter's favors. John s. Battle 
was the Byrd organization candidate, being chased by 
Horace H. Edwards, Francis P. Miller, and Remmie L. 
Arnold. Edwards was the former State Chairman of the 
Democratic State Central Committee, while Miller repre-
sented the respectable progressive element of the state 
and was a Roosevelt New Deal advocate. Arnold, a fountain 
pen manufacturer, was described as being somewhat to the 
right of Battle. 58 As might be eY.pected, it was Miller 
who injected the Campbell amendments into the campaign. 
The gubernatorial primary was the most bitter poli-
ti.cal contest the state had seen in some time. In the 
clos.ing days of the campaign t there were charges that the 
Alcohol Beverage Control Board was exerting pressure on its 
58
cabell Phi.llips, "New Rumblings in the Old 
.Dominion," New York Times .Magazine, Jun. 19, 1949, pp. 10, 
34-35. 
employees to vote for Battle, and Arnold's campaign 
manager reported that he had been offered $10,000 to 
desert his candidate. 59 Edwards and Arnold attacked the 
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fiscal situati.on of Virginia and ''the old .machine" and its 
professional politicians who forgot their promises to the 
people, while the real contest developed between Miller and 
Battle. 60 Being the machine candidate, Battle hailed its 
responsibility for good government in Virginia and 
attacked Miller as "definitely nailed as the candidate of 
out-of-state CIO and labor league organizers. 1161 Miller 
called the Byrd organization "the old man of the sea on 
Virginia's back," blaming it for inadequate state services 
because of its backward-looking, unimaginative and un-
democratic leadership. The contest gained nationwide 
attention to see if the progressive tide that had carried 
Truman back to the White House would sweep Virginia also. 62 
The proposed Campbell amendments might well have 
become the major issue in the contest had it not been for 
Battle's charge that Miller was backed by out-of-state 
labor groups, Battle charged Miller with being a CIO 
candidate set on changing Virginia's labor laws because 
of a letter the Battle camp had secured that was sent to 
59Times-Dispatch, Jul. 
60rbid., Aug. 2, 1949. 
31, Aug. 1, 1949. 
61Ibid. 
62rbid., Jul. 30, 31, 1949. 
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state union members by James C. Petrillo, Musicians Union 
czar, that urged support of Miller. 63 Miller branded the 
charges as a "tissue of lies" but nevertheless spent most 
of the campaign attempting to counter its influence. 
At first Miller merely attacked the evils of the 
poll tax, blaming it for the elimination of the Republican 
party and the increase in voter apathy. The tax had sur-
vived, Miller said, because it was in the design of the 
Byrd organization which had "become completely insensitive 
to the democratic way of doing things. 1164 Later, Miller 
pointed to the Campbell amendments and the anti-Truman 
legislation passed by the General Asse~~ly as evidence of 
the intent of the Byrd organization to deprive Virginians 
of the benefits of progressive programs being enjoyed by 
65 other states. Battle gave his support to the pending 
proposals, although he doubted their "propriety", and 
favored any reasonable literacy test and method of annual 
registration devised by the General Assembly, but was 
opposed to the appointment of local boards by judges and 
the three dollar school tax. 66 
63The uPetrillo letter" was eventually published by 
the Battle forces. See the political advertisement in the 
Times-Dispatch, Jul. 20, 1949, p. 11. 
6~Newspaper clipping from the Alexandria Gazette, 
box 95, Miller Papers; ~irnes-Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1948. 
65
rbid., Jul. 22, 23, 31, 1949. 
66
rbid,, Jul. 26, 1949. Arnold and Edwards joined 
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The vote in the primary approached the 300,000 mark 
and Battle emerged the victor by a margin of 24,00Q votes 
over Miller- While the Campbell amendments were not the 
central campaign issue in this gubernatorial primary, the 
campaign did arouse a more careful consideration a.rnong the 
liberal elements in the state of the actual effect of the 
pending proposals. In January, 1949, Virgil H. Goode, 
Franklin County Conunonwealth Attorney and former General 
Assembly member, announced a personal state-wide camr;aign 
against the amendments, which he described as a "political 
wolf in sheep' s clothing. " Goode claimed the support of 
several members of the General Assembly and various liberal 
groups and organizations in the state but did not na:'lJ 
them. Attacking the amendments as "unnecessarily ci:.-:~.;,li­
cated, cumbersome and ••• not easily understand~:~,w Goode 
predicted more discouragement for voting in elec~~~~z if 
the amendments were approved. "I don't believe .:.:: ~J; 
poll tax as a voting requirement," Goode said, ":.-;-: : 
don't think this is the way to abolish it -- by ;:2:,z~!tut­
. ing something worse. 1167 
The ensuing controversy centered around e.~ .,-:-::'iing 
of the referendum to be submitted to Virginians :..:. 
.M~ller in opposing the amendments but all three ~::..-:..-~ 
approval of a referendum to repeal the poll tax ~~ 
. -~ 
67 Ibid., Jan. 13, 14, 1949; News Leader, :~- :~, 
1949 
November. 
Question: Shall Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
25, 28, 31, 35, 38, and 173 of the Constitution 
of Virginia, which sections relate to the elec-
tive franchise, and, among other things, provide 
for the elimination of the poll tax as a pre-
requisite to voting, registration and renewal of 
registration of voters, the establishment of a 
State Board of Elections, and the levying of a 
school tax in lieu of the present capitation tax, 
be amended; and shall the Constitution be further 
amended by adding Section 31-a, providing for 
local boards of elections, and 38-a, prescribing 
the effective date of these amendments?68 
173 
The problem was that the sections of the Constitution re-
ferred to did not provide for the elimination of the poll 
tax and the other features of the Campbell plan but merely 
said which sections would be amended, A more precise 
wording would have included the phrase "so as to provide" 
after the list of the sections affected and before the 
list of changes desired. This small point was sufficient 
to raise the question of how the changes were to be made. 
Upon investigation, one soon discovered that the General 
Assembly was invested with the authority to effect the 
changes. In other words, the General Assembly could 
determine the qualification for state voters and change 
them as they saw fi.t, wi.th no constitutional limitations. 
This discovery was enough to stimulate the state's liberal 
forces to action. 
Robert Whitehead raised this issue shortly after the 
68
see Virginia Right to Vote League broadside in 
appendix. 
gubernatorial primary in August in a letter to Attorney 
General J. Lindsay Almond. Whitehead asserted that the 
wording of the questi.on submi.tting the amendments to the 
people did not do what i.t said and was "false" and "mis-
leading", and asked for Almond's opinion. The Attorney 
General replied that the confusion could be blamed on 
"an inadvertence which went unnoticed by the members of 
the Legislature," but maintained that the referendum 
question validated by a majority vote would repeal the 
poll tax, provide for new registration and annual re-
registration, and allow for a three dollar school tax if 
the General Assembly so provided. "The otherwise mis-
leading effect of the form of the question is over-
whelmed by the known and obvious," Almond declared. 69 
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Almond's opinion aroused the political independents 
and poll tax repeal forces. Organized local opposition 
had already begun to appear by the end of September. At a 
meeting at the YWCA on September 26, the Richmond 
Committee Against the Proposed Amendments to the 
Constitution was organized with Democratic, labor and 
Negro support. In a letter to prospective members, the 
committee declared that Lt desired to see the poll tax 
~e~ealed, but that Lts members believed the Campbell plan 
69Newspaper clipping, uni.dentLfied, box 95, .Miller 
~apers; Times-Dispatch, Sept. 14, Oct. S, 1949. 
"could become a severer burden on voters than the poll 
tax ever was. 1170 On October 6, twenty-three people met 
in Richmond in an effort to organize to promote discus-
sion of the Campbell amendments and inform the public of 
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their deficiencies. The group was composed of individuals 
from several sections of the state but most prominent were 
former .Miller backers Whitehead, Beecher Stallard, and 
Louis Spilman, publisher of the Waynesboro News-Virginian 
-- and followers of Horace Edwards and Renunie Arnold. 71 
The result was the formation of an organization consisting 
of Democrats, Republicans, Independents and labor forces, 
with the design of defeating the Campbell amendments, to 
be known as the Virginia Right to Vote League. 72 
Virgil Goode was selected as chairman but the fight 
was led by Miller, Whitehead and Martin Hutchinson. Both 
70Mimeographed letter from the Richmond Conunittee 
Against the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, Sept. 
30, 1949, box 18, Martin A. Hutchinson Papers, University 
of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter 
cited as Hutchinson Papers. People attending the organiza-
tional meeting included Hutchinson, Charles C. Webber of 
the C.I.O. Political Action Conunittee, Dr. J. M. Tinsley of 
the NAACP, Dr. Leon Reid of the Richmond Civic Council, 
Marvin Caplan of the B'nai B'rith, and Adele Clark of the 
League of Women Voters. "People attending the anti-voting 
amendment meeting at the YWCA on Sept. 26, 1949," ibid. 
The letter to prospective members was signed by Tinsley, 
Clark, Caplan, and Howard H. Davis of the Richmond 
Conunittee for Civil Rights. 
71Times-Dispatch, Oct. 6t 1949. 
72Ibid., Oct. 9, 1949. 
Miller and Whitehead attacked the pending proposals as 
confusing and misrepresenting, calling the amendments "a 
' 
cockeyed jack-in-the-box," and declared the amendclents a 
\ 
I 
matter that concerned all members of both parties in the 
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state. The League adopted resolutions calling for the 
defeat of the referendum in November and the sununoning of 
a constitutional convention in 1950 to end the poll tax 
and establish a literacy test as the only requirement for 
voting. 73 
Specifically, the anti-amendment forces feared the 
discretion given to the General Assembly in determining 
voter qualifications. If the amendments were passed, it 
would be impossible to say what the essential qualif ica-
tions of a voter would be until after the legislature took 
action. The League would rather have seen the fundamental 
qualifications fixed in the state constitution. 74 The fear 
was that the question of voter qualification would become a 
political issue in future elections and result in an un-
acceptable degree of instability. In addition, since no 
limitation was placed upon the power of the legislature in 
fixing qualifications, anti-amendment forces feared the 
abuse of any literacy test requirement that might be devised 
73Ibid. 
74
"Notes on Proposed Amendments. to the Constitution," 
undated, p. 3, box 18, Hutchinson Papers. 
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and desired that this also be incorporated into the con-
stitution rather than be subject to change by the!legis-
lature. Finally, the requirement that voters re-i.egister 
! 
I 
120 days prior to an election was deemed unreasonable since 
the present system allowed voters to register thirty days 
prior. This single feature of the Campbell plan was 
"highly objectionable" to League members and reason enough 
by itself to call for defeat of what Hutchinson termed a 
"hand-me-down constitution. 1175 Dr. Luther P. Jackson, 
Negro professor of history at Virginia State College who 
had studied Negro voting since 1940, estimated that the 
periodic registration requirement alone would reduce the 
number of voters by ten to fifteen percent, while other 
Negro and labor leaders were especially fearful of the 
literacy requirement because of the proportionately higher 
percentage of illiteracy among their organizations. 76 
To the already existing organizational structure of 
the labor unions, League of Women Voters, NAACP, and the 
Virginia Civil Rights Organization, the defeated guber-
natorial candidates brought their state-wide organizations 
of supporters. Miller opened an office in Charlottesville 
to coordinate these activities in an effort to "rebuild 
Voice 
75
rbid., pp. 4-5; Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 
of the People letter from Howard H. Davis. 
76
rbid., Oct. 9, 17, Nov. 7, 1949. 
1949, 
the Democratic party in the State and to broaden the in-
alienable right of the franchise." Part of the plan, in 
addition to stimulating public discussion of the chnend-
1 
I 
ments, was to secure poll workers on election day to ex-
plain the reasons for the defeat of the Campbell amend-
ments. 77 
The fears of the Byrd organization that the poll 
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tax repeal forces would analyze the Campbell plan and dis-
cover that Virginia's electorate would continue to be 
curtailed if the amendments were adopted had been realized. 
This had happened even before the primary vote. J. F. 
Wysor confided to Senator Byrd that "it is going to be 
difficult to explain these proposals to the people," find-
ing that those he talked to merely threw up their hands 
and said "too complicated. 1178 Wysor and Senator Byrd be-
lieved, however, that the majority of voters were willing 
to follow the advice of leaders in whom they had confidence 
and encouraged state leaders to convey their confidence in 
the measure to the public. 79 
Machine stalwarts took to the stump throughout the 
77J. Deering Danielson to Luther P. Jackson, Oct. 
10, 1949; Francis P. Miller to Luther P. Jackson, Oct. 31, 
1949, box 76, Miller Papers. 
78J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Jun. 29, 1949 1 box 
202, Byrd Papers. 
79 J. F. Wysor to E. R. Combs, Sept. 27, Oct. 16, 
1949; J. F. Wysor to Watkins Abbitt, Jun. 29, 1949, ibid. 
state. Stuart Campbell, who was now out of the General 
Assembly, enumerated the advantages and improvements his 
plan offered. Bipartisan control of every step iJ the 
\ 
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election process, adequate safeguards to prevent fraud and 
criminality, fixed electoral responsibility, elimination 
of the poll tax, and "indisputable" voter lists were all 
benefits that he concluded would come from passage of the 
referendwn. 80 Proponents of adoption faced opponents on 
radio forums broadcast across the state- On one such 
broadcast, John J. Wicker charged his opponent, Beecher 
Stallard, with being associated with anti-organization 
men who had deliberately fomented and disseminated false 
information and with being allied with the NAACP and the 
Conununist party, while Stallard attacked the amendments as 
giving the General Assembly a "blank check" for action. 81 
To this point the strongest statements of support for 
the Campbell plan had come from Attorney General Almond. 
As a cue for other members of the Democratic organization 
to step forward and volce their support, Governor Tuck 
broke his usual silence to announce his support for the 
the plan, calling it a "forward step of lasting benefit to 
SOTimes-Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1949. 
81
undated clipping from Times-Dispatch, series l, 
box 10, Whitehead Papers. 
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the people of Virginia. 1182 Senator Byrd followed Tuck in 
announcing support, declaring that the amendments.repre-
sented the 
commission 
\ 
"patriotic judgment, first of the bi-partisan 
\ 
appointed to make the recommendations, and 
secondly, the judgment of two sessions of the General 
Assembly. II Byrd charged the amendment opponents . . . 
with confusing the actual effect of the amendments by 
asserting that certain recommendations would be written 
in, when, in fact, such provisions were to be left to 
83 future action by the General Assembly. 
At a meeting in Richmond on October 23rd of 150 
Democratic committee chairmen and members of the Third 
District, organization heirarchy turned out in force to 
support the amendments and attack the opposition for false 
and misleading propaganda. Noting that the amendment 
opponents had in the past fought for poll tax repeal, 
Attorney General Almond concluded that this group now did 
not "want Virginia to get credit for bringing about the 
reform they've cried for--they want the alleged reforms to 
emanate from Washington." Lieutenant Governor L. Preston 
Collins and Richmond Congressman J. Vaughan Gary predicted 
congressional action if the state did not act, while 
82Times-DisEatch, Oct. 23 1 1949; News Lead'er, Oct. 
24, 1949. 
8311 statement -- Oct. 24, 1949 on the Amendments to 
the Virginia Constitution," box 405, Byrd Papers; News 
Leader, Oct. 24, 1949. -
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gubernatorial candidate John s. Battle promised the audi-
ence that a statement was forthcoming listing the, reasons 
for his support. The meeting adjourned after h \ . t e\committee-
men reported the expectation of a big "quiet" vote for 
th d t . N emb 84 e amen men s in ov er. 
The fire from the Byrd organization was returned in 
kind from the anti-amendment forces. Martin A. 
Hutchinson charged that Almond's judgments about the wis-
dom, patriotism, and purity of purpose of anti-amendment 
forces were much like his legal opinions, "more notable 
for their political expediency than for the ennunciation 
of wise and sound legal principles. 1185 Asking rhetorically 
why the chief supporters of the amendments were the long-
time officeholders, Hutchinson concluded that the group 
must recognize that the Campbell amendments would make it 
easier to control the legislature by limiting and restrict-
ing the right to vote. And if there were still those who 
did not fear the arbitrary nature of the legislature, 
Hutchinson reminded them of the recent attempts to keep 
Truman's name off the Presidential ballot and to vest in 
the Democratic State Central Committee the power to cast 
the electoral vote ot Virginia for whomsoever it desirea. 86 
84Times-DisEatch, Oct. 24 1 1949. 
85
undated typescript replying to charges by Almond, 
p. l, box 18, Hutchinson Papers. 
86Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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Since amendment proponents predicted confusion and chaos 
in the event Congress outlawed the poll tax as a prerequi-
1 
site for voting and Virginia did not adopt the Campbell 
i 
I 
plan, anti-amendment forces saw the proposals as a "loaded 
package" being forced on citizens of the state in the name 
of political expediency. "That is the real reason back of 
the submission of these amendments," Hutchinson declared. 87 
Although tpe Democratic machinery in the state 
attempted to deny that the poll tax question was a campaign 
issue and stressed the bipartisan formulation of the 
Campbell proposals, the amendments had quickly overshadowed 
the gubernatorial campaign. The Republican candidate for 
governor in the upcoming election, Walter Johnson, made 
what use he could of the Campbell amendments controversy, 
attacking the amendments as a good example of the Byrd 
organization philosophy of government and character_izing 
it as "a bold effort to deprive [Virginians] of your 
inherent right to vote. 1188 The anti-repeal forces also 
attacked the Democratic organization's bipartisan claim by 
attacking its use of party meetings, such as that in 
Richmond on October 23rd, as springboards for mounting a 
campaign for the amendrnents. 89 
SJ Ibid., p. l. 
88 · · t h N 6 1949 Times-Dispa c , ov. , • 
8911 statement of Martin A. Hutchinson and Robert 
Whitehead, Richmond, Nov. 4, 1949," box 18, Hutchinson 
Papers. 
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The Virginia Right to Vote League and the other 
forces allied with it had conducted a successful campaign. 
As election day approached, more and more voices were 
raised against the Campbell plan. Non-metropolitan news-
paper editorials voiced rejection of the plan either be-
cause of the vagueness of the power given the General 
Assembly or because of the belief that the effect of the 
amendments would be to further restrict or retard voting. 90 
Usually non-political groups, such as the Virginia Council 
of Churches, voiced their disapproval of the plan because 
f . t 1 91 o .i s genera vagueness. Negro organizations, such as 
local black Democratic clubs, non-partisan leagues and 
biracial citizens committees, stirred opposition to the 
amendments because of the provisions giving the legisla-
ture control over standards to be met for registration. 92 
Perhaps the attitude of Negro leaders is best expressed by 
the.Virginia Voters' League letter to its members. "We 
want the poll tax abolished," the League director wrote, 
"but we want it done in another way and as soon as possi-
ble .1193 
goEditorials from the Blue Ridge Herald (Purcellville, 
Ya.}, Dickensonian (Clintwood, Va.), Bristol Herald Courier, 
and News-Virginian (Waynesboro, Va.)_, box 95, Miller Papers. 
91Times-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1949. 
92Journal and Guide, Nov. 5 1 12, 1949. 
93Luther P. Jackson to Francis P. Miller, Nov. 4, 
1949, box 76, Miller Papers. 
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Surprisingly, the Campbell amendments did receive 
support from an important source. The proposed plan gained 
the approval of the state's two largest newspapers, the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 
However, the approval of these newspapers came only re-
luctantly at best. Both papers saw danger in allowing the 
General Assembly to determine the qualifications for voters; 
both recognized that annual registration could curtail the 
electorate; and both admitted that the wording of the pro-
posal to be submitted in the referendum could not have 
been more confusing if a determined effort had been made to 
make it so. The poll tax had played such havoc with the 
state's political system, however, that the best judgment 
of both newspapers demanded that its removal be accom-
plished. Even with its flaws, the Campbell amendments did 
·d f th 1 f t flaw. 94 provi e or e remova o a grea er 
Despite the heated debate that accompanied the com-
ing referendum and election, there were still some voters 
who did not know which way to turn. Three weeks before 
the election, Wysor informed Senator Byrd that 11 the people 
don•t know what to do about the amendments." "They don't 
understand definitely what is proposed and there is no 
hope of enlightening them. 1195 One correspondent to the 
94 d•t . l ' T' • t h 
· E i oria s in imes-Dispa c , Oct. 
6, 1949; Virginian-Pilot, Oct. 12, Nov. 6, 
95J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Oct. 
6, 13, 17, Nov. 
1949. 
16, 1949, box 
Times-Dispatch offered a bit of poetry entitled "Voters 
Soliloquy." 
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To vote for, to vote against, that is the question. 
Whether 'tis better in the State to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous poll tax: 
Or to embark amid a sea of sections 
That by amending ends it •••• 96 
Despite such lingering confusion, Virginia had probably 
not experienced such political debate in over twenty 
years, and local sources predicted a voter turnout of 
200,000 to 250,000 due to the attention given the 
Campbell amendments. 97 
When the polls closed on November 8th, the extent of 
the success of the anti-amendment forces became apparent. 
The referendum results in state districts ranged from two 
to six votes against the Campbell plan for every favorable 
vote for it. 98 No city or county was carried for the pro-
posals, and in Nelson County, home of Robert Whitehead, 
the amendments were defeated by a vote of 127 to 1118. 99 
The statewide final tally revealed that the Campbell amend-
ments had been defeated by a margin of almost four to one, 
202, Byrd Papers. 
96Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1949, Voice of the People 
letter from Adele Clark. 
97 rbid., Nov. 7, 1949. 
98vote tally, by districtsf Nov. 9, 1949, box 95, 
Miller Papers. 
99Times-Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1949. 
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and that over 250,000 Virginia voters had participated.loo 
CONCLUSION 
Careful consideration of the events of 1949 leads to 
the conclusion that the chief motivation for formulation 
of the Campbell amendments was the fear on the part of the 
state Democratic organization of Federal action to repeal 
the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in Federal elec-
tions. The fear was a justifiable one, for if Congress 
acted, Virginia would have been forced into either main-
taining a cumbersome system of dual registration books or 
resorting to the existing system of election laws minus the 
poll tax provision. It was difficult to ignore the belief 
of Senator Byrd and other state political leaders that 
Federal legislative action would soon force repea1. 101 
In this light, the charge by the anti-amendment forces of 
political expediency does not seem realistic. The point of 
difference between the two groups, however, was that while 
the state poll tax repeal forces saw the levy as an impair-
ment of the inherent right to vote in elections, the Byrd 
lOOibid. The final vote count was 56 1 687 for the 
Campbell plan, 206 1 542 against it. 
lOl!bid., Oct. 7, 1949. Senator A. Willis Robertson, 
a supporter of the Campbell plan, predicted Federal action 
in early 1950, and was fearful for state elections if the 
plan did not pass. See also the letter by Representative 
Burr Harrison, News Leader, Jun. 21, 1949. 
forces could draw no connection between the payment of 
the poll tax, the number of votes cast and the size of 
the electorate, thus opening themselves to the charge of 
expediency. 102 Throughout the pre-ele6tion debates, the 
anti-amendment forces stressed that the features of the 
Campbell plan were directed at "creating and maintaining 
government of the few in place of represe_ntative demo-
cracy. 11103 
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Two reasons appear as the cause for the ultimate de-
feat of the Campbell proposals. Arguments by critics that 
the changes contained in the Campbell plan implied worse 
restrictions on the electorate than the poll tax were 
never effectively answered. This led naturally to an 
examination of possible motives behind the proposals, and 
in a state where the General Assembly had only recently 
attempted to remove the Democratic Presidential nominee 
from the ballot and also give Democratic electors a 
carte blanche, the organization's stated motives were 
clearly open to question. Even at best, Democratic stal-
warts had difficulty explaining the confusion of the 
wording on the referendum, attributing it to legislative 
"inadvertence" and contending that it was overcome by the 
102s · 11 1 h ee especia y, Journa of t e Senate, 1946, 
document no. 8, p. 4. 
103 
. . t h 4 1 Times-Dispa c , Nov. / 949, remarks by .Miller 
at the William and Mary Voters League meeting. 
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"known and obvious. 11104 Secondly, it appears that the 
Byrd organization did not send "the word" down the or-
ganizational line in time, or with enough force, to be 
convincing. This means that the courthouse, or rural 
faction, did not give its wholehearted support. Even in 
the southside districts, where the Byrd machine was 
strongest, the referendum returns ran heavily against the 
amendments. Ignorance of the lack of support in the 
rural sections cannot be pleaded, for in mid-October the 
Times-Dispatch called attention to the necessity of apply-
ing "the heat" to the conservative courthouse faction and 
stirring enthusiasm among the Governor elect, state 
legislators, and the man who had drafted the plan, if 
the militancy of the opposition was to be overcome. 105 
It is doubtful that the vote on the Campbell plan 
was in any way a true test of the strength of the Democratic 
state organization. The lines of conflict over the amend-
ments were not necessarily drawn along pro- or anti-machine 
lines. The reluctance on the part of the courthouse fac-
tion to accept and endorse the amendments sterr.med from the 
fact that a large number of the group saw definite advan-
tages to retention of the poll tax, despite impending 
Fede~al action. In mid-October, Armistead L. Boothe of 
l0 4Ibid., Oct. 5, 1949. 
lOSEditorials in ibid., Oct. 17, Nov. 9, 1949. 
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Alexandria, a supporter of the Campbell proposals, pre-
dieted defeat because "a great many conservatives, who do 
not want the poll tax repealed, will vote against the 
amendments. 11106 Privately, some organization Democrats 
said they would get out of politics if the "rabble" were 
allowed to vote without paying the poll tax. 107 
For the opponents of the Campbell amendments, the 
defeat carried important implications. Perhaps most im-
portant to this group was the belief that the vote in-
dicated the degree of trust given the General Assembly by 
the electorate. In a post-referendum statement, Martin 
Hutchinson declared that the people of Virginia had shown 
by their convincing rejection of the Campbell plan "that 
they know the difference between constitutional govern-
ment and government by the legislature. 11108 In addition, 
the fight over the Campbell amendments brought together by 
means of the Virginia Right to Vote League on the local 
level those elements of the electorate that had proved 
such a powerful force in national politics, increasing 
the contact between independent Democrats, labor forces 
and Negro organizations. The unanimity and strength of 
l0 6Ibid., Oct. 18, 1949. 
107Horn, "Growth of the Democratic Party," p. 243. 
108Typescript statement, Nov. 9, 1949 1 box 18, 
Hutchinson Papers. 
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the Negro opposition to the Campbell amendments is es-
pecially noteworthy and is evidenced by the fact that in 
the predominantly black precincts of Norfolk, the ~ballot-
~ 
ing on the referendum ran 1,231 votes against the plan 
with 62 votes for it. 109 After the results were tabu-
lated, the Negro Norfolk Journal and Guide warned those in 
political control to read the returns correctly and make 
the necessary changes or they themselves would be over-
110 
whelmed as the Campbell amendments had been. In 
attempting to combat voter apathy, nothing is more vivid 
than a demonstration that the individual voter does in-
deed make a difference. 
The Virginia referendum also had its national impli-
cations. Using states such as North Carolina as an example, 
some Southern Senators had argued against Federal poll 
tax legislation by stating that if left alone the Southern 
states would solve their own problems, probably by action 
t 1 th 11 tax levy. lll Th V' ' ' t o repea e po e irginia vo e 
appeared to be a denial of this claim and weakened one of 
the arguments for Federal inaction. 
The task ahead of the poll tax repeal forces seemed 
to be a clear one: capitalize upon the momentum generated 
109Journal and Guide, Nov. 12 1 1949. 
llOEditorial in ibid. 
111New York Times, Nov. 10, 1949, pp. 1, 5. 
by the discussion of the Campbell amendments and the 
organization of forces that brought its defeat. To re-
·191 
peal leaders like Miller, Hutchinson and Whitehead, 
possibility of removal of the tax never appeared closer 
to reality, and they accepted the challenge. "The fight 
to reform the franchise provisions of our constitution 
must and will be continued," Hutchinson declared, "until 
the people have been given a fair and just opportunity to 
vote upon the repeal of the poll tax. . . . 
112Typescript statement, Nov. 9, 1949, box 18 
Hutchinson Papers. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Poll tax repeal forces acted quickly to capitalize 
on the momentum generated by the Campbell amendments. The 
day following the defeat of the proposals, Martin 
Hutchinson, Francis Miller and Robert Whitehead called for 
a state constitutional convention to consider removing the 
poll tax. To the anti-amendment forces, the vote against 
the Campbell plan was not a vote against repeal of the 
tax but rather a vote against a "specious and indefensible 
plan to further restrict and encumber the right to vote 
put forward by a political leadership which mistrusts the 
1 people." 
The call for a constitutional convention immediately 
raised questions. The Campbell commission had made statu-
tory recommendations relating to the suffrage system 
that could be enacted by the General Assembly. Was it 
therefore necessary for a constitutional convention to be 
called? The ~iclunond Times-Dispatch, a supporter of the 
1Typescript statement, Nov. 9, 1949, box 18, 
Whitehead Papers. 
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amendments, believed that it was time for the state political 
organization to find a solution to the suffrage problem, 
I 
but did not favor calling a convention because of lthe time 
and money involved. 2 The most important people, ~he top 
members of the Byrd organization, sealed the fate of 
Hutchinson's proposal with their silence. Governor-elect 
Battle would make no conunent, while Tuck as the outgoing 
governor refused to make any recommendations. The Byrd 
organization had decided to let the electorate "stew in 
its juices" for awhile. 3 
Early in the 1950 General Assembly session, bills were 
introduced in both chambers by Whitehead and others to elim-
inate the poll tax and other restrictive suffrage laws, 
along with resolutions calling for a constitutional conven-
tion. The House passed the poll tax repeal measure by a 
vote of 73 to 20, but the Senate Privileges and Elections 
Conunittee killed it with a five to four vote. State 
Senator Harry 'F.~"Byra-,~·Jr:,· ·sa·id ·the Sena:te "committee had 
too little time to consider the measure. 4 
Efforts to repeal the tax during the 1952 session 
also .met defeat. After defeating amendments recommended 
2Ed' ' 1 ' ' ' h itoria in Times-Dispatc , Nov. 11, 1949. 
3
rbid., Nov. 10, 11, 1949. 
4Journal of the House, 1950, pp. 246 1 366, 494, 1049; 
Journal of the Senate, 1950 1 pp, 87-88; New York Times, 
Mar. 13, 1950, p. 2. 
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by the House Privileges and Elections Cor:unittee to raise 
the tax to three dollars, the House passed a repeal mea-
I 
sure introduced by Walter A. Page by a vote of 60)to 38. 
I 
When the bill reached the Senate, it, along with all other 
poll tax repeal measures, was killed by the Privileges 
and Elections Committee. O~e General Assembly.member de-
fended the session's action by saying the people had 
settled the poll tax question by def eating the Campbell 
plan in 1949. Ignoring the House vote, the Senate committee 
said it killed the measure because there was "no demand" 
for such legislation. Their action meant that there was 
no possibility for repeal until 1957. 5 
During the 1954 General Assembly session, poll tax 
repeal supporters could not win approval of their plans in 
the House. The House Privileges and Elections Committee 
killed a repeal measure with the clear backing of the Byrd 
organization, with Democratic Floor Leader Edmund T. 
DeJarnette and House Democratic Caucus Chairman John 
Warren Cooke taking the lead. DeJarnette's objection was 
that if approved by the 1954 and 1956 General Assembly 
sessions, the repeal measure could possibly be voted on in 
the November, 1956 general election for president. "I do 
not believe the questions sliould be submitted to the people 
5Journal of the House, 1952, p. 27; Times-Dispatch, 
Feb. 22, Mar. 4, 1952. 
during a presidential election year," DeJarnette said in 
a statement reminiscent of earlier arguments on the same 
issue. And by the time the 1954 General Assembly\ended, 
\ 
I 
the attention of state politicians was directed to the 
Supreme Court and its decision in the case of Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka. Subsequently, the debate 
over the poll tax was replaced by a more heated debate 
. . t d . t . . 6 over massive resis ance an in erposition. 
It would be a mistake to view the failure of poll 
195 
tax repeal forces to remove the tax as a conplete defeat. 
There were gains incidental to the campaign against the 
tax that were of lasting value. This is in no case truer 
than for the Virginia Negro. The political frustration of 
this group, as exemplified by the futile legal attempts 
to regain the suffrage immediately after th: constitution 
of 1902 went into effect and the abortive l~ly black 
Republican effort in 1921, eased when the national courts 
began to grant admission to the white prima---y and clari-
fied registration procedures. Neg=o attent~on in Virginia 
turned to the problem of the poll ~ax, firs~ in efforts to 
ensure that blacks paid the tax, a~d then t:= organized 
efforts to have the tax repealed. At the ~e3inning this 
organization was local, being enca~raged by =eligious, 
social and fraternal groups. Coor~ination -:\i'.3.s given when 
6
rbid., Feb. 20, 1954; New Yt:-:rk"'Titnes,. Dec. 15, ·1955, 
p. 18. -
the Virginia Conference of Branches of the NAACP was or-
ganized, when A. W. E. Bassette established the United 
Civic League of Virginia, and when Luther P. Jackson or-
i 
I 
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ganized the Virginia Voters' League. Individuals such as 
Bassette, Jackson and P. B. Young, Jr., of the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, spoke out effectively against the poll 
tax, and began to work effectively with white organizations 
with similar goals. 
The cooperative organization of Negroes and whites 
produced results, as evidenced by the campaigns in 
Richmond by Oliver w. Hill for a General Assembly seat in 
1945 and 1947. Hill was not successful in his first two 
attempts, but the coordination developed as a result between 
blacks and the white political powers, especially the 
white labor group, set the pattern for later political 
unity and revealed to the Democratic organization that as 
the strength of the Negro vote increased, it would be 
necessary to seek out their leaders in an effort to gain 
7 
support. 
Organized Negroes and whites also tested the sin-
ce,rity of states' rights politicians of Virginia who 
claimed that enactment of civil rights legislation belonged 
7News Leader, Aug. 6,.1947,.and Times-Dispatch, Aug. 
7, 1947, discuss the outcome of the 1947 effort by Hill, 
a Richmond attorney. See also, Henry L~ Moon, Balance of 
Power; The Negro Vote (Garden City, N. J., 1949), pp. 
164-165~ 
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not to the Federal government but to the states. In 
February, 1948, the Virginia Civil Rights Organization, a 
federation of all bodies working for the attainment of 
civil rights, submitted bills to the General Asserribly to 
repeal state statutes on the separation of the races on 
corrunon carriers and in public assembly. Challenging the 
line of argument that Federal action was an outside inter-
ference with Southern affairs, members of the Virginia 
Civil Rights Organization went to the General Assembly, not 
as outsiders, but as native born Virginia citizens. The 
failure to secure the desired legislation demonstrated that 
the arguments against outside Federal interference were at 
best specious, that the states' rights group did not want 
civil rights legislation regardless of where it was pre-
sented or by whom it was presented. 8 When one considers 
that this attack was followed by the attack on the Campbell 
amendments in 1949, it is apparent that the traditional 
political forces in the state were on the defensive both 
locally and nationally. 
The effects of these coordinated efforts in various 
areas, not just the poll tax, appeared in such ways as a 
change in regi.strar attitudes. Luther Jackson reported in 
April, 1949, that "among the thousand or more [registrarsl 
8Luther P. Jackson, "Virginia and Civil Rights," 
Virginia and the Civil Rights Program (Charlottesville, 
Va., 1950), P• 47. 
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in Virginia the overwhelming majority are receptive to 
colored applicants and draw no color line," and that in 
I 
scarcely no instance would a registrar hold out permanently 
• I 
against a Negro "if he shows a spirit of determination to 
become a qualified voter. 119 As a result, Negro registra-
tion was increasing. And there were signs of Negro poli-
tical consequence -- Oliver Hill was elected to the General 
Assembly in 1948 -- and by 1950, the Virginia Voters' 
League pamphlet recorded longer lists of Negro candidates 
offering for public office. 10 
The campaign against the poll tax also had conse-
quences for white Virginians. With the emergence of 
respectable opposition to the tax, Virginians witnessed the 
slow challenge to the assumptions upon which the levy was 
based. Westmoreland Davis through the Southern Planter, 
and later Virginius Dabney through his books and as editor 
of the Times-Dispatch, emphasized the effects of the tax 
upon the population of the state, the loss of school 
revenue each year because of governmental inefficiency, 
and the tardiness of Virginia in the field of ,progressive 
social legislation. The Gooch report, commissioned at the 
insistence of Governor James Price, effectively 
9
rbid., p. 43. 
10 Annual Reoort of the V. v. L., 1948/1949, p. 6; 
1949/1950, pp. s, 14. 
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demonstrated the illogical nature of the argument for re-
tention of the tax as a voting prerequisite. The scan-
dals in Wise County in 1945, occuring at a time when the 
political organization was expounding the virtues of 
Virginia's good government, pointed up dramatically the 
corruption that was still possible under the existing 
election system. Even the debate and the vote on the 
Campbell amendments proved helpful. After years of hesi-
tation, the Byrd organization finally presented a suffrage 
reform plan to the electorate, albeit an imperfect one 
designed to assure their continued control, demonstrating 
that they were at least capable of some action. In addi-
tion, the anti-amendment forces could look to the defeat of 
the Campbell plan as a victory. They were given a forum 
to educate Virginia voters on the evils of the poll tax and 
were able to get over 250,000 people to the polls to vote, 
no small feat in itself. The rejection of the Campbell 
plan, much as the rejection a year earlier of the plan to 
end segregation on public carriers, weakened the 
Southern claim in Congress that if left alone, the Southern 
states would. take action to remove suffrage restrictions. 
It was becoming increasingly evident by 1950 that Federal 
..... __ .. ·.~· .... .;- ... ..._ - -. . . . . . . . 
action was the best hope of forcing some sort of state 
action. 
Much of the debate over the poll tax between its 
inception and 1950 was a struggle to change public opinion. 
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Dr; Luther P. Jackson pointed out in 1949 that the changes 
brought about in regard to Negro civil rights had come as 
a result of a change in public opinion. Public opinion 
also sustained the advances and backed the victories won 
in the courts. "It does not seem likely," Dr. Jackson 
said, "that the clock of time will be turned back to the 
very inferior position in society the Negro occupied a 
half century ago. 1111 In some respects, Dr. Jackson was 
correct, but the advances made by the Negro and whites 
against the Virginia poll tax were not fully rewarded 
until 1964 with the enactment of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution. 
11Jackson, "Virginia and Civil Rights," p. 49. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following figures were collected by Tipton 
Snavely to illustrate the rising delinquency percentages 
for poll tax payment by Negroes and whites in Virginia 
from 1903 to 1914. For the three years prior to the adop-
tion of the state constitution of 1902, white delinquencies 
were 26.4%, while Negro delinquency rose from 47.7% to 
1 52.7%. 
1snavely, Taxation of Negroes in Virginia, p. 35. 
Assess:aents 
Yea.r i':hi te s :\egroes 
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APPENDIX B 
The following charts were prepared by Dr. R. N. 
Latture of the School of Conunerce and Administration at 
Washington and Lee University for Francis P. Miller in 
1934. 1 It is interesting to note that it was not until 
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the 1920's that the actual vote for President and Governor 
reached pre-1902 levels, and that the average percentage 
actu~l vote after 1902 was 17.6% as compared to 56.8% 
prior to adoption of the new constitution. The adoption 
of the 15th Amendment, while increasing the number of 
potential voters, did not appear to have effected the per-
centage of votes cast in Virginia. 
1R. N. Latture to Francis P. Millei, Mar. 5 1 1934, box 
95, Miller Papers. 
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APPENDIX C 
The following tabulation of poll tax payments by 
month of collection was prepared by LeRoy Hodges for 
Robert Whiteheaa. 1 The largest amounts collected for 
omitted poll taxes, those taxes left off the poll books 
for some reason or another, were made in May, the last 
month for payment to qualify to vote in the August pri-
maries. 
1~eRoy Hodges to Robert Whitehead, Aug. 21, 1941, 
series 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers. 
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AP~ENDIX D 
The following broadside was issued by the Virginia 
Right to Vote League, headed by Virgil Goode, prior to the 
referendum on the Campbell amendments in 1949. The broad-
side summarizes the objections of the League and other 
anti-amendment forces to the Campbell plan and illustrate 
the confused wording of the ballot question. ' 
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Vir1Yn1irmiflDlll1l~ ~ 
. . fil/ 
,. 
Protect Your Right to Vote by Voting 
•. . I 
. . . 
rm Against 
:···The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution. 
, 
If you want to protect your right to vote as now estnblished by the Virginia Constitution, go to the 
polls on November 8th and vote atJainst the proposed amendments. 
You are now a qualified voter in Virginia; nfter November 8th, you may not be unless these amend· 
ments are defeated • 
• < • •• •.·. 
. We now /mow what the quali'fications are to vote in Virginia • 
We now have permanent registration. · · 
We now register before our Local Registrar for life. , . 
- ~ ·-~. 
. . . '.; :.·- We now close the registration books 30 days before election day • 
We now have· our right to vote guaranteed by the constitution. 
. . ... . 
• • • * • • • • • • • • * • * • .· ... -' . ·. 
. ' · Why take a chance? 
:~" .. ~. Why exchange a certainty for an uncertainty? 
· /. . Why exchange our system of permanent registration for annual renewal of registration 120 days 
· :; •. : before any election or primary? . · 
:· : ':' Why surrender your constitutionally guaranteed right to vote for a right yet to be determined and 
' · · · · ' fixed by the legislature? 
Why give a State Board of Elections at Richmond the power to make rules and regulations and to 
supervise all elections? 
.. • .. , Why exchange a $1.50 capitation tax for a pos~ible $3.00 to $4.00 tax under the amendments? 
'. : - ''.. . Why give up -these known and constitutionally established rights for unknown, uncer .... ain and un· 
· · determined rights, yet to be fixed by the Legislature? 
.. 
WORK AGAINST - TALK AGAINST - VOTE IBJ AGAINST_ THE ~ENDMENTS 
•' 
' 
:··. 
VIRGINIA RIGHT TO VOTE LEAGUE 
VIRGIL H. GOODE, Chairman 
HOTEL RICHMOND, RICHMOND, VA. 
UC> . -
. FORM OF BALLOT 
on the 14 proposed amendments 
:_~:.''. : ': ~:. QuESTfOH: Shall s,c:tio~! 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 31, 35, 38, ::.nd 173 of.the Cc:mitu~ian or Virg:ni,, which 
· : · -~ .. sections relate to the elective franchise, and, among other things, provide for the elimination of the poll tax as a pre• 
• . • requisite to voting, registration :ind renewal of registration of voters, the establishment of a State Board of Elections, ::ind 
· the levying of a school tax in lieu of the present capitation tax:, be :imended; and shall the Constitution be further amended 
by adding Section 31-a, providing for local boards of elections, and Section 38-a, prescribing the effective date of these 
. "· amendments~ 
. . 
; .... ·. 
. -'\. 
. . '"" 
.. 
...... 
.. . .. ·· 
D For . 
[BJ Against 
", ·-·.; .. 
.. ·· . 
. . 
. . ' 
.. · ... ·. 
.:. :,:: . ~ 
. '·. r ' • •' •·:. ~ .. 
; . . :· ' 
. . 
. . 
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